these syscalls are new in linux v3.18, bpf is present on all
supported archs except sh, kexec_file_load is only allocted for
x86_64 and x32 yet.
bpf was added in linux commit 99c55f7d47c0dc6fc64729f37bf435abf43f4c60
kexec_file_load syscall number was allocated in commit
f0895685c7fd8c938c91a9d8a6f7c11f22df58d2
except powerpc, which still lacks inline syscalls simply because
nobody has written the code, these are all fallbacks used to work
around a clang bug that probably does not exist in versions of clang
that can compile musl. however, it's useful to have the generic
non-inline code anyway, as it eases the task of porting to new archs:
writing inline syscall code is now optional. this approach could also
help support compilers which don't understand inline asm or lack
support for the needed register constraints.
mips could not be unified because it has special fixup code for broken
layout of the kernel's struct stat.
the kernel syscall interface for or1k does not expect 64-bit arguments
to be aligned to "even" register boundaries. this incorrect alignment
broke truncate/ftruncate and as well as a few less-common syscalls.
these syscalls are new in linux v3.17 and present on all supported
archs except sh.
seccomp was added in commit 48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c
it has operation, flags and pointer arguments (if flags==0 then it is
the same as prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)), the uapi header for flag
definitions is linux/seccomp.h
getrandom was added in commit c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895
it provides an entropy source when open("/dev/urandom",..) would fail,
the uapi header for flags is linux/random.h
memfd_create was added in commit 9183df25fe7b194563db3fec6dc3202a5855839c
it allows anon mmap to have an fd, that can be shared, sealed and needs no
mount point, the uapi header for flags is linux/memfd.h
based on patch by Jens Gustedt.
mtx_t and cnd_t are defined in such a way that they are formally
"compatible types" with pthread_mutex_t and pthread_cond_t,
respectively, when accessed from a different translation unit. this
makes it possible to implement the C11 functions using the pthread
functions (which will dereference them with the pthread types) without
having to use the same types, which would necessitate either namespace
violations (exposing pthread type names in threads.h) or incompatible
changes to the C++ name mangling ABI for the pthread types.
for the rest of the types, things are much simpler; using identical
types is possible without any namespace considerations.
conceptually, a_spin needs to be at least a compiler barrier, so the
compiler will not optimize out loops (and the load on each iteration)
while spinning. it should also be a memory barrier, or the spinning
thread might keep spinning without noticing stores from other threads,
thus delaying for longer than it should.
ideally, an optimal a_spin implementation that avoids unnecessary
cache/memory contention should be chosen for each arch, but for now,
the easiest thing is to perform a useless a_cas on the calling
thread's stack.
unfortunately this needs to be able to vary by arch, because of a huge
mess GCC made: the GCC definition, which became the ABI, depends on
quirks in GCC's definition of __alignof__, which does not match the
formal alignment of the type.
GCC's __alignof__ unexpectedly exposes the an implementation detail,
its "preferred alignment" for the type, rather than the formal/ABI
alignment of the type, which it only actually uses in structures. on
most archs the two values are the same, but on some (at least i386)
the preferred alignment is greater than the ABI alignment.
I considered using _Alignas(8) unconditionally, but on at least one
arch (or1k), the alignment of max_align_t with GCC's definition is
only 4 (even the "preferred alignment" for these types is only 4).
when manipulating the robust list, the order of stores matters,
because the code may be asynchronously interrupted by a fatal signal
and the kernel will then access the robust list in what is essentially
an async-signal context.
previously, aliasing considerations made it seem unlikely that a
compiler could reorder the stores, but proving that they could not be
reordered incorrectly would have been extremely difficult. instead
I've opted to make all the pointers used as part of the robust list,
including those in the robust list head and in the individual mutexes,
volatile.
in addition, the format of the robust list has been changed to point
back to the head at the end, rather than ending with a null pointer.
this is to match the documented kernel robust list ABI. the null
pointer, which was previously used, only worked because faults during
access terminate the robust list processing.
at the very least, a compiler barrier is required no matter what, and
that was missing. current or1k implementations have strong ordering,
but this is not guaranteed as part of the ISA, so some sort of
synchronizing operation is necessary.
in principle we should use l.msync, but due to misinterpretation of
the spec, it was wrongly treated as an optional instruction and is not
supported by some implementations. if future kernels trap it and treat
it as a nop (rather than illegal instruction) when the
hardware/emulator does not support it, we could consider using it.
in the absence of l.msync support, the l.lwa/l.swa instructions, which
are specified to have a built-in l.msync, need to be used. the easiest
way to use them to implement atomic store is to perform an atomic swap
and throw away the result. using compare-and-swap would be lighter,
and would probably be sufficient for all actual usage cases, but
checking this is difficult and error-prone:
with store implemented in terms of swap, it's guaranteed that, when
another atomic operation is performed at the same time as the store,
either the result of the store followed by the other operation, or
just the store (clobbering the other operation's result) is seen. if
store were implemented in terms of cas, there are cases where this
invariant would fail to hold, and we would need detailed rules for the
situations in which the store operation is well-defined.
With the exception of a fenv implementation, the port is fully featured.
The port has been tested in or1ksim, the golden reference functional
simulator for OpenRISC 1000.
It passes all libc-test tests (except the math tests that
requires a fenv implementation).
The port assumes an or1k implementation that has support for
atomic instructions (l.lwa/l.swa).
Although it passes all the libc-test tests, the port is still
in an experimental state, and has yet experienced very little
'real-world' use.
Szabolcs Nagy
Rich Felker
Stefan Kristiansson