mirror of
http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy.git/
synced 2024-12-19 01:54:37 +00:00
6927 lines
203 KiB
C
6927 lines
203 KiB
C
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/*
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* SSL/TLS transport layer over SOCK_STREAM sockets
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 EXCELIANCE, Emeric Brun <ebrun@exceliance.fr>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* Acknowledgement:
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* We'd like to specially thank the Stud project authors for a very clean
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* and well documented code which helped us understand how the OpenSSL API
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* ought to be used in non-blocking mode. This is one difficult part which
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* is not easy to get from the OpenSSL doc, and reading the Stud code made
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* it much more obvious than the examples in the OpenSSL package. Keep up
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* the good works, guys !
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*
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* Stud is an extremely efficient and scalable SSL/TLS proxy which combines
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* particularly well with haproxy. For more info about this project, visit :
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* https://github.com/bumptech/stud
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*
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*/
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/* Note: do NOT include openssl/xxx.h here, do it in openssl-compat.h */
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <dirent.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <netdb.h>
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#include <netinet/tcp.h>
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#include <import/ebpttree.h>
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#include <import/ebsttree.h>
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#include <import/lru.h>
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#include <import/xxhash.h>
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#include <haproxy/api.h>
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#include <haproxy/arg.h>
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#include <haproxy/base64.h>
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#include <haproxy/channel.h>
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#include <haproxy/chunk.h>
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#include <haproxy/cli.h>
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#include <haproxy/connection.h>
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#include <haproxy/dynbuf.h>
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#include <haproxy/errors.h>
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#include <haproxy/fd.h>
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#include <haproxy/freq_ctr.h>
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#include <haproxy/frontend.h>
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#include <haproxy/global.h>
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#include <haproxy/http_rules.h>
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#include <haproxy/log.h>
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#include <haproxy/openssl-compat.h>
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#include <haproxy/pattern-t.h>
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#include <haproxy/proto_tcp.h>
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#include <haproxy/proxy.h>
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#include <haproxy/server.h>
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#include <haproxy/shctx.h>
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#include <haproxy/ssl_ckch.h>
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#include <haproxy/ssl_crtlist.h>
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#include <haproxy/ssl_sock.h>
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#include <haproxy/ssl_utils.h>
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#include <haproxy/stats.h>
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#include <haproxy/stream-t.h>
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#include <haproxy/stream_interface.h>
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#include <haproxy/task.h>
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#include <haproxy/ticks.h>
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#include <haproxy/time.h>
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#include <haproxy/tools.h>
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#include <haproxy/vars.h>
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/* ***** READ THIS before adding code here! *****
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*
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* Due to API incompatibilities between multiple OpenSSL versions and their
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* derivatives, it's often tempting to add macros to (re-)define certain
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* symbols. Please do not do this here, and do it in common/openssl-compat.h
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* exclusively so that the whole code consistently uses the same macros.
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*
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* Whenever possible if a macro is missing in certain versions, it's better
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* to conditionally define it in openssl-compat.h than using lots of ifdefs.
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*/
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int sslconns = 0;
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int totalsslconns = 0;
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int nb_engines = 0;
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static struct eb_root cert_issuer_tree = EB_ROOT; /* issuers tree from "issuers-chain-path" */
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struct global_ssl global_ssl = {
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#ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
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.listen_default_ciphers = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS,
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#endif
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#ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
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.connect_default_ciphers = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS,
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#endif
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#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
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#ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES
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.listen_default_ciphersuites = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES,
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#endif
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#ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES
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.connect_default_ciphersuites = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES,
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#endif
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#endif
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.listen_default_ssloptions = BC_SSL_O_NONE,
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.connect_default_ssloptions = SRV_SSL_O_NONE,
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.listen_default_sslmethods.flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL,
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.listen_default_sslmethods.min = CONF_TLSV_NONE,
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.listen_default_sslmethods.max = CONF_TLSV_NONE,
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.connect_default_sslmethods.flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL,
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.connect_default_sslmethods.min = CONF_TLSV_NONE,
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.connect_default_sslmethods.max = CONF_TLSV_NONE,
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#ifdef DEFAULT_SSL_MAX_RECORD
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.max_record = DEFAULT_SSL_MAX_RECORD,
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#endif
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.default_dh_param = SSL_DEFAULT_DH_PARAM,
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.ctx_cache = DEFAULT_SSL_CTX_CACHE,
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.capture_cipherlist = 0,
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.extra_files = SSL_GF_ALL,
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.extra_files_noext = 0,
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#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
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.keylog = 0
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#endif
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};
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static BIO_METHOD *ha_meth;
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DECLARE_STATIC_POOL(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, "ssl_sock_ctx_pool", sizeof(struct ssl_sock_ctx));
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/* ssl stats module */
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enum {
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SSL_ST_SESS,
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SSL_ST_REUSED_SESS,
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SSL_ST_FAILED_HANDSHAKE,
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SSL_ST_STATS_COUNT /* must be the last member of the enum */
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};
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static struct name_desc ssl_stats[] = {
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[SSL_ST_SESS] = { .name = "ssl_sess",
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.desc = "Total number of ssl sessions established" },
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[SSL_ST_REUSED_SESS] = { .name = "ssl_reused_sess",
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.desc = "Total number of ssl sessions reused" },
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[SSL_ST_FAILED_HANDSHAKE] = { .name = "ssl_failed_handshake",
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.desc = "Total number of failed handshake" },
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};
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static struct ssl_counters {
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long long sess;
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long long reused_sess;
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long long failed_handshake;
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} ssl_counters;
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static void ssl_fill_stats(void *data, struct field *stats)
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{
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struct ssl_counters *counters = data;
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stats[SSL_ST_SESS] = mkf_u64(FN_COUNTER, counters->sess);
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stats[SSL_ST_REUSED_SESS] = mkf_u64(FN_COUNTER, counters->reused_sess);
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stats[SSL_ST_FAILED_HANDSHAKE] = mkf_u64(FN_COUNTER, counters->failed_handshake);
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}
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static struct stats_module ssl_stats_module = {
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.name = "ssl",
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.fill_stats = ssl_fill_stats,
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.stats = ssl_stats,
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.stats_count = SSL_ST_STATS_COUNT,
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.counters = &ssl_counters,
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.counters_size = sizeof(ssl_counters),
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.domain_flags = MK_STATS_PROXY_DOMAIN(STATS_PX_CAP_FE|STATS_PX_CAP_LI|STATS_PX_CAP_BE|STATS_PX_CAP_SRV),
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.clearable = 1,
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};
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INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, stats_register_module, &ssl_stats_module);
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static struct task *ssl_sock_io_cb(struct task *, void *, unsigned short);
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static int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag);
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/* Methods to implement OpenSSL BIO */
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static int ha_ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num)
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{
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struct buffer tmpbuf;
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struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
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int ret;
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ctx = BIO_get_data(h);
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tmpbuf.size = num;
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tmpbuf.area = (void *)(uintptr_t)buf;
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tmpbuf.data = num;
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tmpbuf.head = 0;
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ret = ctx->xprt->snd_buf(ctx->conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, &tmpbuf, num, 0);
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if (ret == 0 && !(ctx->conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH))) {
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BIO_set_retry_write(h);
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ret = -1;
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} else if (ret == 0)
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BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
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return ret;
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}
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static int ha_ssl_gets(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static int ha_ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str)
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{
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return ha_ssl_write(h, str, strlen(str));
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}
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static int ha_ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
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{
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struct buffer tmpbuf;
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struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
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int ret;
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ctx = BIO_get_data(h);
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tmpbuf.size = size;
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tmpbuf.area = buf;
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tmpbuf.data = 0;
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tmpbuf.head = 0;
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ret = ctx->xprt->rcv_buf(ctx->conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, &tmpbuf, size, 0);
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if (ret == 0 && !(ctx->conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH))) {
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BIO_set_retry_read(h);
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ret = -1;
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} else if (ret == 0)
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BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
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return ret;
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}
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static long ha_ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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switch (cmd) {
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case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
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case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
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ret = 1;
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break;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static int ha_ssl_new(BIO *h)
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{
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BIO_set_init(h, 1);
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BIO_set_data(h, NULL);
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BIO_clear_flags(h, ~0);
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return 1;
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}
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static int ha_ssl_free(BIO *data)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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#if defined(USE_THREAD) && (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
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static HA_RWLOCK_T *ssl_rwlocks;
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unsigned long ssl_id_function(void)
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{
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return (unsigned long)tid;
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}
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void ssl_locking_function(int mode, int n, const char * file, int line)
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{
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if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
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if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
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HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]);
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else
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HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]);
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}
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else {
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if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
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HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]);
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else
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HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]);
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}
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}
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static int ssl_locking_init(void)
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{
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int i;
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ssl_rwlocks = malloc(sizeof(HA_RWLOCK_T)*CRYPTO_num_locks());
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if (!ssl_rwlocks)
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return -1;
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for (i = 0 ; i < CRYPTO_num_locks() ; i++)
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HA_RWLOCK_INIT(&ssl_rwlocks[i]);
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CRYPTO_set_id_callback(ssl_id_function);
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CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(ssl_locking_function);
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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__decl_thread(HA_SPINLOCK_T ckch_lock);
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/*
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* deduplicate cafile (and crlfile)
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*/
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struct cafile_entry {
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X509_STORE *ca_store;
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
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struct ebmb_node node;
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char path[0];
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};
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static struct eb_root cafile_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE;
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static X509_STORE* ssl_store_get0_locations_file(char *path)
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{
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struct ebmb_node *eb;
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eb = ebst_lookup(&cafile_tree, path);
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if (eb) {
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struct cafile_entry *ca_e;
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ca_e = ebmb_entry(eb, struct cafile_entry, node);
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return ca_e->ca_store;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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int ssl_store_load_locations_file(char *path)
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{
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if (ssl_store_get0_locations_file(path) == NULL) {
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struct cafile_entry *ca_e;
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X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
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if (X509_STORE_load_locations(store, path, NULL)) {
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int pathlen;
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pathlen = strlen(path);
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ca_e = calloc(1, sizeof(*ca_e) + pathlen + 1);
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if (ca_e) {
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memcpy(ca_e->path, path, pathlen + 1);
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ca_e->ca_store = store;
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ebst_insert(&cafile_tree, &ca_e->node);
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return 1;
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}
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}
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X509_STORE_free(store);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* mimic what X509_STORE_load_locations do with store_ctx */
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static int ssl_set_cert_crl_file(X509_STORE *store_ctx, char *path)
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{
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X509_STORE *store;
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store = ssl_store_get0_locations_file(path);
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if (store_ctx && store) {
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int i;
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X509_OBJECT *obj;
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STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(store);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++) {
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obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i);
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switch (X509_OBJECT_get_type(obj)) {
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case X509_LU_X509:
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X509_STORE_add_cert(store_ctx, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(obj));
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break;
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case X509_LU_CRL:
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X509_STORE_add_crl(store_ctx, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj));
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations substitute, internally call X509_STORE_load_locations */
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static int ssl_set_verify_locations_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *path)
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{
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X509_STORE *store_ctx = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
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return ssl_set_cert_crl_file(store_ctx, path);
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}
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/*
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Extract CA_list from CA_file already in tree.
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Duplicate ca_name is tracking with ebtree. It's simplify openssl compatibility.
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Return a shared ca_list: SSL_dup_CA_list must be used before set it on SSL_CTX.
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*/
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static STACK_OF(X509_NAME)* ssl_get_client_ca_file(char *path)
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{
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struct ebmb_node *eb;
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struct cafile_entry *ca_e;
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eb = ebst_lookup(&cafile_tree, path);
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if (!eb)
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return NULL;
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ca_e = ebmb_entry(eb, struct cafile_entry, node);
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if (ca_e->ca_list == NULL) {
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int i;
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unsigned long key;
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struct eb_root ca_name_tree = EB_ROOT;
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struct eb64_node *node, *back;
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struct {
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struct eb64_node node;
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X509_NAME *xname;
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} *ca_name;
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STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs;
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *skn;
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X509 *x;
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X509_NAME *xn;
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skn = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
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/* take x509 from cafile_tree */
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objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(ca_e->ca_store);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++) {
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x = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i));
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if (!x)
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continue;
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xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
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if (!xn)
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continue;
|
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/* Check for duplicates. */
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key = X509_NAME_hash(xn);
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for (node = eb64_lookup(&ca_name_tree, key), ca_name = NULL;
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node && ca_name == NULL;
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node = eb64_next(node)) {
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ca_name = container_of(node, typeof(*ca_name), node);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, ca_name->xname) != 0)
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ca_name = NULL;
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}
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/* find a duplicate */
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if (ca_name)
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continue;
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ca_name = calloc(1, sizeof *ca_name);
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xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
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if (!ca_name ||
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!xn ||
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!sk_X509_NAME_push(skn, xn)) {
|
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free(ca_name);
|
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X509_NAME_free(xn);
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sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(skn, X509_NAME_free);
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sk_X509_NAME_free(skn);
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skn = NULL;
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break;
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}
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ca_name->node.key = key;
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ca_name->xname = xn;
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eb64_insert(&ca_name_tree, &ca_name->node);
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}
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ca_e->ca_list = skn;
|
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/* remove temporary ca_name tree */
|
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node = eb64_first(&ca_name_tree);
|
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while (node) {
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ca_name = container_of(node, typeof(*ca_name), node);
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back = eb64_next(node);
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eb64_delete(node);
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free(ca_name);
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node = back;
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}
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}
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return ca_e->ca_list;
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}
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|
|
struct pool_head *pool_head_ssl_capture = NULL;
|
|
int ssl_capture_ptr_index = -1;
|
|
static int ssl_app_data_index = -1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
int ssl_keylog_index = -1;
|
|
struct pool_head *pool_head_ssl_keylog = NULL;
|
|
struct pool_head *pool_head_ssl_keylog_str = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
struct list tlskeys_reference = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tlskeys_reference);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
unsigned int openssl_engines_initialized;
|
|
struct list openssl_engines = LIST_HEAD_INIT(openssl_engines);
|
|
struct ssl_engine_list {
|
|
struct list list;
|
|
ENGINE *e;
|
|
};
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
static int ssl_dh_ptr_index = -1;
|
|
static DH *global_dh = NULL;
|
|
static DH *local_dh_1024 = NULL;
|
|
static DH *local_dh_2048 = NULL;
|
|
static DH *local_dh_4096 = NULL;
|
|
static DH *ssl_get_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen);
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
|
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME && !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
/* X509V3 Extensions that will be added on generated certificates */
|
|
#define X509V3_EXT_SIZE 5
|
|
static char *x509v3_ext_names[X509V3_EXT_SIZE] = {
|
|
"basicConstraints",
|
|
"nsComment",
|
|
"subjectKeyIdentifier",
|
|
"authorityKeyIdentifier",
|
|
"keyUsage",
|
|
};
|
|
static char *x509v3_ext_values[X509V3_EXT_SIZE] = {
|
|
"CA:FALSE",
|
|
"\"OpenSSL Generated Certificate\"",
|
|
"hash",
|
|
"keyid,issuer:always",
|
|
"nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment"
|
|
};
|
|
/* LRU cache to store generated certificate */
|
|
static struct lru64_head *ssl_ctx_lru_tree = NULL;
|
|
static unsigned int ssl_ctx_lru_seed = 0;
|
|
static unsigned int ssl_ctx_serial;
|
|
__decl_rwlock(ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
|
|
#endif // SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
|
|
/* The order here matters for picking a default context,
|
|
* keep the most common keytype at the bottom of the list
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[] = {
|
|
"dsa",
|
|
"ecdsa",
|
|
"rsa"
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct shared_context *ssl_shctx = NULL; /* ssl shared session cache */
|
|
static struct eb_root *sh_ssl_sess_tree; /* ssl shared session tree */
|
|
|
|
/* Dedicated callback functions for heartbeat and clienthello.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
|
|
static void ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len,
|
|
SSL *ssl);
|
|
#endif
|
|
static void ssl_sock_parse_clienthello(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len,
|
|
SSL *ssl);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
static void ssl_init_keylog(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len,
|
|
SSL *ssl);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* List head of all registered SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks. */
|
|
struct list ssl_sock_msg_callbacks = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ssl_sock_msg_callbacks);
|
|
|
|
/* Registers the function <func> in order to be called on SSL/TLS protocol
|
|
* message processing. It will return 0 if the function <func> is not set
|
|
* or if it fails to allocate memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_sock_msg_callback_func func)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_msg_callback *cbk;
|
|
|
|
if (!func)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
cbk = calloc(1, sizeof(*cbk));
|
|
if (!cbk) {
|
|
ha_alert("out of memory in ssl_sock_register_msg_callback().\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cbk->func = func;
|
|
|
|
LIST_ADDQ(&ssl_sock_msg_callbacks, &cbk->list);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used to register dedicated SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_register_msg_callbacks(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat))
|
|
return ERR_ABORT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (global_ssl.capture_cipherlist > 0) {
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_sock_parse_clienthello))
|
|
return ERR_ABORT;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
if (global_ssl.keylog > 0) {
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_init_keylog))
|
|
return ERR_ABORT;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return ERR_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used to free all SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks that were
|
|
* registered by using ssl_sock_register_msg_callback().
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ssl_sock_unregister_msg_callbacks(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_msg_callback *cbk, *cbkback;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(cbk, cbkback, &ssl_sock_msg_callbacks, list) {
|
|
LIST_DEL(&cbk->list);
|
|
free(cbk);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl_sock_get_ssl_object(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return ((struct ssl_sock_ctx *)(conn->xprt_ctx))->ssl;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function gives the detail of the SSL error. It is used only
|
|
* if the debug mode and the verbose mode are activated. It dump all
|
|
* the SSL error until the stack was empty.
|
|
*/
|
|
static forceinline void ssl_sock_dump_errors(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(global.mode & MODE_DEBUG)) {
|
|
while(1) {
|
|
ret = ERR_get_error();
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "fd[%04x] OpenSSL error[0x%lx] %s: %s\n",
|
|
(unsigned short)conn->handle.fd, ret,
|
|
ERR_func_error_string(ret), ERR_reason_error_string(ret));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
int ssl_init_single_engine(const char *engine_id, const char *def_algorithms)
|
|
{
|
|
int err_code = ERR_ABORT;
|
|
ENGINE *engine;
|
|
struct ssl_engine_list *el;
|
|
|
|
/* grab the structural reference to the engine */
|
|
engine = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
|
|
if (engine == NULL) {
|
|
ha_alert("ssl-engine %s: failed to get structural reference\n", engine_id);
|
|
goto fail_get;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
|
|
/* the engine couldn't initialise, release it */
|
|
ha_alert("ssl-engine %s: failed to initialize\n", engine_id);
|
|
goto fail_init;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ENGINE_set_default_string(engine, def_algorithms) == 0) {
|
|
ha_alert("ssl-engine %s: failed on ENGINE_set_default_string\n", engine_id);
|
|
goto fail_set_method;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
el = calloc(1, sizeof(*el));
|
|
el->e = engine;
|
|
LIST_ADD(&openssl_engines, &el->list);
|
|
nb_engines++;
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
global.ssl_used_async_engines = nb_engines;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
fail_set_method:
|
|
/* release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */
|
|
ENGINE_finish(engine);
|
|
|
|
fail_init:
|
|
/* release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */
|
|
ENGINE_free(engine);
|
|
|
|
fail_get:
|
|
return err_code;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
/*
|
|
* openssl async fd handler
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_async_fd_handler(int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = fdtab[fd].owner;
|
|
|
|
/* fd is an async enfine fd, we must stop
|
|
* to poll this fd until it is requested
|
|
*/
|
|
fd_stop_recv(fd);
|
|
fd_cant_recv(fd);
|
|
|
|
/* crypto engine is available, let's notify the associated
|
|
* connection that it can pursue its processing.
|
|
*/
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* openssl async delayed SSL_free handler
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_async_fd_free(int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL *ssl = fdtab[fd].owner;
|
|
OSSL_ASYNC_FD all_fd[32];
|
|
size_t num_all_fds = 0;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* We suppose that the async job for a same SSL *
|
|
* are serialized. So if we are awake it is
|
|
* because the running job has just finished
|
|
* and we can remove all async fds safely
|
|
*/
|
|
SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, NULL, &num_all_fds);
|
|
if (num_all_fds > 32) {
|
|
send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, all_fd, &num_all_fds);
|
|
for (i=0 ; i < num_all_fds ; i++)
|
|
fd_stop_both(all_fd[i]);
|
|
|
|
/* Now we can safely call SSL_free, no more pending job in engines */
|
|
SSL_free(ssl);
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sslconns, 1);
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&jobs, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* function used to manage a returned SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC
|
|
* and enable/disable polling for async fds
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void ssl_async_process_fds(struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_ASYNC_FD add_fd[32];
|
|
OSSL_ASYNC_FD del_fd[32];
|
|
SSL *ssl = ctx->ssl;
|
|
size_t num_add_fds = 0;
|
|
size_t num_del_fds = 0;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
SSL_get_changed_async_fds(ssl, NULL, &num_add_fds, NULL,
|
|
&num_del_fds);
|
|
if (num_add_fds > 32 || num_del_fds > 32) {
|
|
send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_get_changed_async_fds(ssl, add_fd, &num_add_fds, del_fd, &num_del_fds);
|
|
|
|
/* We remove unused fds from the fdtab */
|
|
for (i=0 ; i < num_del_fds ; i++)
|
|
fd_stop_both(del_fd[i]);
|
|
|
|
/* We add new fds to the fdtab */
|
|
for (i=0 ; i < num_add_fds ; i++) {
|
|
fd_insert(add_fd[i], ctx, ssl_async_fd_handler, tid_bit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
num_add_fds = 0;
|
|
SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, NULL, &num_add_fds);
|
|
if (num_add_fds > 32) {
|
|
send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We activate the polling for all known async fds */
|
|
SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, add_fd, &num_add_fds);
|
|
for (i=0 ; i < num_add_fds ; i++) {
|
|
fd_want_recv(add_fd[i]);
|
|
/* To ensure that the fd cache won't be used
|
|
* We'll prefer to catch a real RD event
|
|
* because handling an EAGAIN on this fd will
|
|
* result in a context switch and also
|
|
* some engines uses a fd in blocking mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
fd_cant_recv(add_fd[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function returns the number of seconds elapsed
|
|
* since the Epoch, 1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000 (UTC) and the
|
|
* date presented un ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME.
|
|
*
|
|
* In parsing error case, it returns -1.
|
|
*/
|
|
static long asn1_generalizedtime_to_epoch(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
|
|
{
|
|
long epoch;
|
|
char *p, *end;
|
|
const unsigned short month_offset[12] = {
|
|
0, 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334
|
|
};
|
|
int year, month;
|
|
|
|
if (!d || (d->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) return -1;
|
|
|
|
p = (char *)d->data;
|
|
end = p + d->length;
|
|
|
|
if (end - p < 4) return -1;
|
|
year = 1000 * (p[0] - '0') + 100 * (p[1] - '0') + 10 * (p[2] - '0') + p[3] - '0';
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
|
|
month = 10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0';
|
|
if (month < 1 || month > 12) return -1;
|
|
/* Compute the number of seconds since 1 jan 1970 and the beginning of current month
|
|
We consider leap years and the current month (<marsh or not) */
|
|
epoch = ( ((year - 1970) * 365)
|
|
+ ((year - (month < 3)) / 4 - (year - (month < 3)) / 100 + (year - (month < 3)) / 400)
|
|
- ((1970 - 1) / 4 - (1970 - 1) / 100 + (1970 - 1) / 400)
|
|
+ month_offset[month-1]
|
|
) * 24 * 60 * 60;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
|
|
/* Add the number of seconds of completed days of current month */
|
|
epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0' - 1) * 24 * 60 * 60;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
|
|
/* Add the completed hours of the current day */
|
|
epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0') * 60 * 60;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
|
|
/* Add the completed minutes of the current hour */
|
|
epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0') * 60;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
if (p == end) return -1;
|
|
/* Test if there is available seconds */
|
|
if (p[0] < '0' || p[0] > '9')
|
|
goto nosec;
|
|
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
|
|
/* Add the seconds of the current minute */
|
|
epoch += 10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0';
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
if (p == end) return -1;
|
|
/* Ignore seconds float part if present */
|
|
if (p[0] == '.') {
|
|
do {
|
|
if (++p == end) return -1;
|
|
} while (p[0] >= '0' && p[0] <= '9');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nosec:
|
|
if (p[0] == 'Z') {
|
|
if (end - p != 1) return -1;
|
|
return epoch;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (p[0] == '+') {
|
|
if (end - p != 5) return -1;
|
|
/* Apply timezone offset */
|
|
return epoch - ((10 * (p[1] - '0') + p[2] - '0') * 60 * 60 + (10 * (p[3] - '0') + p[4] - '0')) * 60;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (p[0] == '-') {
|
|
if (end - p != 5) return -1;
|
|
/* Apply timezone offset */
|
|
return epoch + ((10 * (p[1] - '0') + p[2] - '0') * 60 * 60 + (10 * (p[3] - '0') + p[4] - '0')) * 60;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct alignment works here such that the key.key is the same as key_data
|
|
* Do not change the placement of key_data
|
|
*/
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp {
|
|
struct ebmb_node key;
|
|
unsigned char key_data[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH];
|
|
struct buffer response;
|
|
int refcount;
|
|
long expire;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct ocsp_cbk_arg {
|
|
int is_single;
|
|
int single_kt;
|
|
union {
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp *s_ocsp;
|
|
/*
|
|
* m_ocsp will have multiple entries dependent on key type
|
|
* Entry 0 - DSA
|
|
* Entry 1 - ECDSA
|
|
* Entry 2 - RSA
|
|
*/
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp *m_ocsp[SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES];
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct eb_root cert_ocsp_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE;
|
|
|
|
/* This function starts to check if the OCSP response (in DER format) contained
|
|
* in chunk 'ocsp_response' is valid (else exits on error).
|
|
* If 'cid' is not NULL, it will be compared to the OCSP certificate ID
|
|
* contained in the OCSP Response and exits on error if no match.
|
|
* If it's a valid OCSP Response:
|
|
* If 'ocsp' is not NULL, the chunk is copied in the OCSP response's container
|
|
* pointed by 'ocsp'.
|
|
* If 'ocsp' is NULL, the function looks up into the OCSP response's
|
|
* containers tree (using as index the ASN1 form of the OCSP Certificate ID extracted
|
|
* from the response) and exits on error if not found. Finally, If an OCSP response is
|
|
* already present in the container, it will be overwritten.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: OCSP response containing more than one OCSP Single response is not
|
|
* considered valid.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(struct buffer *ocsp_response,
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp,
|
|
OCSP_CERTID *cid, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
|
|
OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
|
|
OCSP_SINGLERESP *sr;
|
|
OCSP_CERTID *id;
|
|
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ocsp_response->area;
|
|
int rc , count_sr;
|
|
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revtime, *thisupd, *nextupd = NULL;
|
|
int reason;
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p,
|
|
ocsp_response->data);
|
|
if (!resp) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "Unable to parse OCSP response");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = OCSP_response_status(resp);
|
|
if (rc != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP response status not successful");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
|
|
if (!bs) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "Failed to get basic response from OCSP Response");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
count_sr = OCSP_resp_count(bs);
|
|
if (count_sr > 1) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP response ignored because contains multiple single responses (%d)", count_sr);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sr = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
|
|
if (!sr) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "Failed to get OCSP single response");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
id = (OCSP_CERTID*)OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(sr);
|
|
|
|
rc = OCSP_single_get0_status(sr, &reason, &revtime, &thisupd, &nextupd);
|
|
if (rc != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD && rc != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: certificate status is unknown");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!nextupd) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: missing nextupdate");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, OCSP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_SKEW, -1);
|
|
if (!rc) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: no longer valid.");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cid) {
|
|
if (OCSP_id_cmp(id, cid)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID does not match certificate and issuer");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ocsp) {
|
|
unsigned char key[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
rc = i2d_OCSP_CERTID(id, NULL);
|
|
if (!rc) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Unable to encode Certificate ID");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc > OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID too long");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = key;
|
|
memset(key, 0, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH);
|
|
i2d_OCSP_CERTID(id, &p);
|
|
ocsp = (struct certificate_ocsp *)ebmb_lookup(&cert_ocsp_tree, key, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH);
|
|
if (!ocsp) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID does not match any certificate or issuer");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* According to comments on "chunk_dup", the
|
|
previous chunk buffer will be freed */
|
|
if (!chunk_dup(&ocsp->response, ocsp_response)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "OCSP response: Memory allocation error");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ocsp->expire = asn1_generalizedtime_to_epoch(nextupd) - OCSP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_SKEW;
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
if (bs)
|
|
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
|
|
|
|
if (resp)
|
|
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* External function use to update the OCSP response in the OCSP response's
|
|
* containers tree. The chunk 'ocsp_response' must contain the OCSP response
|
|
* to update in DER format.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_update_ocsp_response(struct buffer *ocsp_response, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(ocsp_response, NULL, NULL, err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref;
|
|
union tls_sess_key *keys;
|
|
struct connection *conn;
|
|
int head;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int ret = -1; /* error by default */
|
|
|
|
conn = SSL_get_ex_data(s, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
ref = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->keys_ref;
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
|
|
keys = ref->tlskeys;
|
|
head = ref->tls_ticket_enc_index;
|
|
|
|
if (enc) {
|
|
memcpy(key_name, keys[head].name, 16);
|
|
|
|
if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) {
|
|
|
|
if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, keys[head].key_128.aes_key, iv))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[head].key_128.hmac_key, 16, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL);
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256 ) {
|
|
|
|
if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, keys[head].key_256.aes_key, iv))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[head].key_256.hmac_key, 32, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL);
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < TLS_TICKETS_NO; i++) {
|
|
if (!memcmp(key_name, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].name, 16))
|
|
goto found;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
found:
|
|
if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) {
|
|
HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_128.hmac_key, 16, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL);
|
|
if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_128.aes_key, iv))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* 2 for key renewal, 1 if current key is still valid */
|
|
ret = i ? 2 : 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256) {
|
|
HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_256.hmac_key, 32, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL);
|
|
if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_256.aes_key, iv))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* 2 for key renewal, 1 if current key is still valid */
|
|
ret = i ? 2 : 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookup(const char *filename)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list)
|
|
if (ref->filename && strcmp(filename, ref->filename) == 0)
|
|
return ref;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookupid(int unique_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list)
|
|
if (ref->unique_id == unique_id)
|
|
return ref;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the key into ref: if keysize doesn't
|
|
* match existing ones, this function returns -1
|
|
* else it returns 0 on success.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_update_tlskey_ref(struct tls_keys_ref *ref,
|
|
struct buffer *tlskey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) {
|
|
if (tlskey->data != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_128))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256) {
|
|
if (tlskey->data != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_256))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
memcpy((char *) (ref->tlskeys + ((ref->tls_ticket_enc_index + 2) % TLS_TICKETS_NO)),
|
|
tlskey->area, tlskey->data);
|
|
ref->tls_ticket_enc_index = (ref->tls_ticket_enc_index + 1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO;
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_sock_update_tlskey(char *filename, struct buffer *tlskey, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref = tlskeys_ref_lookup(filename);
|
|
|
|
if(!ref) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "Unable to locate the referenced filename: %s", filename);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_sock_update_tlskey_ref(ref, tlskey) < 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "Invalid key size");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function finalize the configuration parsing. Its set all the
|
|
* automatic ids. It's called just after the basic checks. It returns
|
|
* 0 on success otherwise ERR_*.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tlskeys_finalize_config(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref, *ref2, *ref3;
|
|
struct list tkr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tkr);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) {
|
|
if (ref->unique_id == -1) {
|
|
/* Look for the first free id. */
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ref2, &tlskeys_reference, list) {
|
|
if (ref2->unique_id == i) {
|
|
i++;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (&ref2->list == &tlskeys_reference)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Uses the unique id and increment it for the next entry. */
|
|
ref->unique_id = i;
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This sort the reference list by id. */
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(ref, ref2, &tlskeys_reference, list) {
|
|
LIST_DEL(&ref->list);
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ref3, &tkr, list) {
|
|
if (ref->unique_id < ref3->unique_id) {
|
|
LIST_ADDQ(&ref3->list, &ref->list);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (&ref3->list == &tkr)
|
|
LIST_ADDQ(&tkr, &ref->list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* swap root */
|
|
LIST_ADD(&tkr, &tlskeys_reference);
|
|
LIST_DEL(&tkr);
|
|
return ERR_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
|
|
int ocsp_ex_index = -1;
|
|
|
|
int ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(int evp_keytype)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (evp_keytype) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
return 2;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Callback used to set OCSP status extension content in server hello.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp;
|
|
struct ocsp_cbk_arg *ocsp_arg;
|
|
char *ssl_buf;
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ssl_pkey;
|
|
int key_type;
|
|
int index;
|
|
|
|
ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
|
|
ocsp_arg = SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ocsp_ex_index);
|
|
if (!ocsp_arg)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
|
|
ssl_pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
|
|
if (!ssl_pkey)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
|
|
key_type = EVP_PKEY_base_id(ssl_pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (ocsp_arg->is_single && ocsp_arg->single_kt == key_type)
|
|
ocsp = ocsp_arg->s_ocsp;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* For multiple certs per context, we have to find the correct OCSP response based on
|
|
* the certificate type
|
|
*/
|
|
index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(key_type);
|
|
|
|
if (index < 0)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
|
|
ocsp = ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[index];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ocsp ||
|
|
!ocsp->response.area ||
|
|
!ocsp->response.data ||
|
|
(ocsp->expire < now.tv_sec))
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
|
|
ssl_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(ocsp->response.data);
|
|
if (!ssl_buf)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ssl_buf, ocsp->response.area, ocsp->response.data);
|
|
SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, ssl_buf, ocsp->response.data);
|
|
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Decrease the refcount of the struct ocsp_response and frees it if it's not
|
|
* used anymore. Also removes it from the tree if free'd.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ssl_sock_free_ocsp(struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ocsp)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ocsp->refcount--;
|
|
if (ocsp->refcount <= 0) {
|
|
ebmb_delete(&ocsp->key);
|
|
chunk_destroy(&ocsp->response);
|
|
free(ocsp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function enables the handling of OCSP status extension on 'ctx' if a
|
|
* ocsp_response buffer was found in the cert_key_and_chain. To enable OCSP
|
|
* status extension, the issuer's certificate is mandatory. It should be
|
|
* present in ckch->ocsp_issuer.
|
|
*
|
|
* In addition, the ckch->ocsp_reponse buffer is loaded as a DER format of an
|
|
* OCSP response. If file is empty or content is not a valid OCSP response,
|
|
* OCSP status extension is enabled but OCSP response is ignored (a warning is
|
|
* displayed).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 if no ".ocsp" file found, 0 if OCSP status extension is
|
|
* successfully enabled, or -1 in other error case.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *x, *issuer;
|
|
OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
|
|
int i, ret = -1;
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp = NULL, *iocsp;
|
|
char *warn = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
void (*callback) (void);
|
|
|
|
|
|
x = ckch->cert;
|
|
if (!x)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
issuer = ckch->ocsp_issuer;
|
|
/* take issuer from chain over ocsp_issuer, is what is done historicaly */
|
|
if (chain) {
|
|
/* check if one of the certificate of the chain is the issuer */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
|
|
X509 *ti = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
if (X509_check_issued(ti, x) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
issuer = ti;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!issuer)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
cid = OCSP_cert_to_id(0, x, issuer);
|
|
if (!cid)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
i = i2d_OCSP_CERTID(cid, NULL);
|
|
if (!i || (i > OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ocsp = calloc(1, sizeof(*ocsp));
|
|
if (!ocsp)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
p = ocsp->key_data;
|
|
i2d_OCSP_CERTID(cid, &p);
|
|
|
|
iocsp = (struct certificate_ocsp *)ebmb_insert(&cert_ocsp_tree, &ocsp->key, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH);
|
|
if (iocsp == ocsp)
|
|
ocsp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb
|
|
# define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cb) \
|
|
*cb = (void (*) (void))ctx->tlsext_status_cb;
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, &callback);
|
|
|
|
if (!callback) {
|
|
struct ocsp_cbk_arg *cb_arg;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
|
|
cb_arg = calloc(1, sizeof(*cb_arg));
|
|
if (!cb_arg)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
cb_arg->is_single = 1;
|
|
cb_arg->s_ocsp = iocsp;
|
|
iocsp->refcount++;
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
cb_arg->single_kt = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk);
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ocsp_ex_index, cb_arg); /* we use the ex_data instead of the cb_arg function here, so we can use the cleanup callback to free */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the ctx has a status CB, then we have previously set an OCSP staple for this ctx
|
|
* Update that cb_arg with the new cert's staple
|
|
*/
|
|
struct ocsp_cbk_arg *cb_arg;
|
|
struct certificate_ocsp *tmp_ocsp;
|
|
int index;
|
|
int key_type;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
|
|
cb_arg = SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ocsp_ex_index);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The following few lines will convert cb_arg from a single ocsp to multi ocsp
|
|
* the order of operations below matter, take care when changing it
|
|
*/
|
|
tmp_ocsp = cb_arg->s_ocsp;
|
|
index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(cb_arg->single_kt);
|
|
cb_arg->s_ocsp = NULL;
|
|
cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = tmp_ocsp;
|
|
cb_arg->is_single = 0;
|
|
cb_arg->single_kt = 0;
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
key_type = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(key_type);
|
|
if (index >= 0 && !cb_arg->m_ocsp[index]) {
|
|
cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = iocsp;
|
|
iocsp->refcount++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
warn = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(ckch->ocsp_response, iocsp, cid, &warn)) {
|
|
memprintf(&warn, "Loading: %s. Content will be ignored", warn ? warn : "failure");
|
|
ha_warning("%s.\n", warn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (cid)
|
|
OCSP_CERTID_free(cid);
|
|
|
|
if (ocsp)
|
|
free(ocsp);
|
|
|
|
if (warn)
|
|
free(warn);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
return SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(ctx, (const uint8_t *)ckch->ocsp_response->area, ckch->ocsp_response->data);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
|
|
#define CT_EXTENSION_TYPE 18
|
|
|
|
int sctl_ex_index = -1;
|
|
|
|
int ssl_sock_sctl_add_cbk(SSL *ssl, unsigned ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct buffer *sctl = add_arg;
|
|
|
|
*out = (unsigned char *) sctl->area;
|
|
*outlen = sctl->data;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_sock_sctl_parse_cbk(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_sock_load_sctl(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct buffer *sctl)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, CT_EXTENSION_TYPE, ssl_sock_sctl_add_cbk, NULL, sctl, ssl_sock_sctl_parse_cbk, NULL))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, sctl_ex_index, sctl);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
|
|
{
|
|
struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
BIO *write_bio;
|
|
(void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
|
|
/* Please note that BoringSSL defines this macro to zero so don't
|
|
* change this to #if and do not assign a default value to this macro!
|
|
*/
|
|
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
|
|
/* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
|
|
if ((conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == 0) {
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) {
|
|
if (!(ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) {
|
|
/* Long certificate chains optimz
|
|
If write and read bios are different, we
|
|
consider that the buffering was activated,
|
|
so we rise the output buffer size from 4k
|
|
to 16k */
|
|
write_bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
|
|
if (write_bio != SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) {
|
|
BIO_set_write_buffer_size(write_bio, 16384);
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Callback is called for each certificate of the chain during a verify
|
|
ok is set to 1 if preverify detect no error on current certificate.
|
|
Returns 0 to break the handshake, 1 otherwise. */
|
|
int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL *ssl;
|
|
struct connection *conn;
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
int err, depth;
|
|
|
|
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x_store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
|
|
conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE;
|
|
|
|
if (ok) /* no errors */
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x_store);
|
|
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x_store);
|
|
|
|
/* check if CA error needs to be ignored */
|
|
if (depth > 0) {
|
|
if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(ctx->xprt_st)) {
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CA_ERROR_TO_ST(err);
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err < 64 && __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ca_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CA_FAIL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(ctx->xprt_st))
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(err);
|
|
|
|
/* check if certificate error needs to be ignored */
|
|
if (err < 64 && __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->crt_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CRT_FAIL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
|
|
static void ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len,
|
|
SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* test heartbeat received (write_p is set to 0
|
|
for a received record) */
|
|
if ((content_type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) && (write_p == 0)) {
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
const unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
unsigned int payload;
|
|
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if this is a CVE-2014-0160 exploitation attempt. */
|
|
if (*p != TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (len < 1 + 2 + 16) /* 1 type + 2 size + 0 payload + 16 padding */
|
|
goto kill_it;
|
|
|
|
payload = (p[1] * 256) + p[2];
|
|
if (3 + payload + 16 <= len)
|
|
return; /* OK no problem */
|
|
kill_it:
|
|
/* We have a clear heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160), the
|
|
* advertised payload is larger than the advertised packet
|
|
* length, so we have garbage in the buffer between the
|
|
* payload and the end of the buffer (p+len). We can't know
|
|
* if the SSL stack is patched, and we don't know if we can
|
|
* safely wipe out the area between p+3+len and payload.
|
|
* So instead, we prevent the response from being sent by
|
|
* setting the max_send_fragment to 0 and we report an SSL
|
|
* error, which will kill this connection. It will be reported
|
|
* above as SSL_ERROR_SSL while an other handshake failure with
|
|
* a heartbeat message will be reported as SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl->max_send_fragment = 0;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_sock_parse_clienthello(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len,
|
|
SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_capture *capture;
|
|
unsigned char *msg;
|
|
unsigned char *end;
|
|
size_t rec_len;
|
|
|
|
/* This function is called for "from client" and "to server"
|
|
* connections. The combination of write_p == 0 and content_type == 22
|
|
* is only available during "from client" connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* "write_p" is set to 0 is the bytes are received messages,
|
|
* otherwise it is set to 1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (write_p != 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* content_type contains the type of message received or sent
|
|
* according with the SSL/TLS protocol spec. This message is
|
|
* encoded with one byte. The value 256 (two bytes) is used
|
|
* for designing the SSL/TLS record layer. According with the
|
|
* rfc6101, the expected message (other than 256) are:
|
|
* - change_cipher_spec(20)
|
|
* - alert(21)
|
|
* - handshake(22)
|
|
* - application_data(23)
|
|
* - (255)
|
|
* We are interessed by the handshake and specially the client
|
|
* hello.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (content_type != 22)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* The message length is at least 4 bytes, containing the
|
|
* message type and the message length.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len < 4)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* First byte of the handshake message id the type of
|
|
* message. The known types are:
|
|
* - hello_request(0)
|
|
* - client_hello(1)
|
|
* - server_hello(2)
|
|
* - certificate(11)
|
|
* - server_key_exchange (12)
|
|
* - certificate_request(13)
|
|
* - server_hello_done(14)
|
|
* We are interested by the client hello.
|
|
*/
|
|
msg = (unsigned char *)buf;
|
|
if (msg[0] != 1)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Next three bytes are the length of the message. The total length
|
|
* must be this decoded length + 4. If the length given as argument
|
|
* is not the same, we abort the protocol dissector.
|
|
*/
|
|
rec_len = (msg[1] << 16) + (msg[2] << 8) + msg[3];
|
|
if (len < rec_len + 4)
|
|
return;
|
|
msg += 4;
|
|
end = msg + rec_len;
|
|
if (end < msg)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Expect 2 bytes for protocol version (1 byte for major and 1 byte
|
|
* for minor, the random, composed by 4 bytes for the unix time and
|
|
* 28 bytes for unix payload. So we jump 1 + 1 + 4 + 28.
|
|
*/
|
|
msg += 1 + 1 + 4 + 28;
|
|
if (msg > end)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Next, is session id:
|
|
* if present, we have to jump by length + 1 for the size information
|
|
* if not present, we have to jump by 1 only
|
|
*/
|
|
if (msg[0] > 0)
|
|
msg += msg[0];
|
|
msg += 1;
|
|
if (msg > end)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Next two bytes are the ciphersuite length. */
|
|
if (msg + 2 > end)
|
|
return;
|
|
rec_len = (msg[0] << 8) + msg[1];
|
|
msg += 2;
|
|
if (msg + rec_len > end || msg + rec_len < msg)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
capture = pool_alloc_dirty(pool_head_ssl_capture);
|
|
if (!capture)
|
|
return;
|
|
/* Compute the xxh64 of the ciphersuite. */
|
|
capture->xxh64 = XXH64(msg, rec_len, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Capture the ciphersuite. */
|
|
capture->ciphersuite_len = (global_ssl.capture_cipherlist < rec_len) ?
|
|
global_ssl.capture_cipherlist : rec_len;
|
|
memcpy(capture->ciphersuite, msg, capture->ciphersuite_len);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, ssl_capture_ptr_index, capture);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
static void ssl_init_keylog(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version,
|
|
int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len,
|
|
SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_keylog *keylog;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_keylog_index))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
keylog = pool_alloc(pool_head_ssl_keylog);
|
|
if (!keylog)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
memset(keylog, 0, sizeof(*keylog));
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, ssl_keylog_index, keylog)) {
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog, keylog);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Callback is called for ssl protocol analyse */
|
|
void ssl_sock_msgcbk(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
struct ssl_sock_msg_callback *cbk;
|
|
|
|
/* Try to call all callback functions that were registered by using
|
|
* ssl_sock_register_msg_callback().
|
|
*/
|
|
list_for_each_entry(cbk, &ssl_sock_msg_callbacks, list) {
|
|
cbk->func(conn, write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
static int ssl_sock_srv_select_protos(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct server *srv = arg;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, (unsigned char *)srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str,
|
|
srv->ssl_ctx.npn_len) == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
/* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of
|
|
* negotiable protocols for NPN.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
|
|
unsigned int *len, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = arg;
|
|
|
|
*data = (const unsigned char *)conf->npn_str;
|
|
*len = conf->npn_len;
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
/* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of
|
|
* negotiable protocols for ALPN.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
|
|
unsigned char *outlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *server,
|
|
unsigned int server_len, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = arg;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_select_next_proto((unsigned char**) out, outlen, (const unsigned char *)conf->alpn_str,
|
|
conf->alpn_len, server, server_len) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
}
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
#ifndef SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES
|
|
|
|
/* Configure a DNS SAN extenion on a certificate. */
|
|
int ssl_sock_add_san_ext(X509V3_CTX* ctx, X509* cert, const char *servername) {
|
|
int failure = 0;
|
|
X509_EXTENSION *san_ext = NULL;
|
|
CONF *conf = NULL;
|
|
struct buffer *san_name = get_trash_chunk();
|
|
|
|
conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
|
|
if (!conf) {
|
|
failure = 1;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Build an extension based on the DNS entry above */
|
|
chunk_appendf(san_name, "DNS:%s", servername);
|
|
san_ext = X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(conf, ctx, NID_subject_alt_name, san_name->area);
|
|
if (!san_ext) {
|
|
failure = 1;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add the extension */
|
|
if (!X509_add_ext(cert, san_ext, -1 /* Add to end */)) {
|
|
failure = 1;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Success */
|
|
failure = 0;
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
if (NULL != san_ext) X509_EXTENSION_free(san_ext);
|
|
if (NULL != conf) NCONF_free(conf);
|
|
|
|
return failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create a X509 certificate with the specified servername and serial. This
|
|
* function returns a SSL_CTX object or NULL if an error occurs. */
|
|
static SSL_CTX *
|
|
ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *cacert = bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->cert;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *capkey = bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->key;
|
|
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
|
|
X509 *newcrt = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
SSL *tmp_ssl = NULL;
|
|
CONF *ctmp = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
const EVP_MD *digest;
|
|
X509V3_CTX ctx;
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
int key_type;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the private key of the default certificate and use it */
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L)
|
|
pkey = SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(bind_conf->default_ctx);
|
|
#else
|
|
tmp_ssl = SSL_new(bind_conf->default_ctx);
|
|
if (tmp_ssl)
|
|
pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(tmp_ssl);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!pkey)
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Create the certificate */
|
|
if (!(newcrt = X509_new()))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Set version number for the certificate (X509v3) and the serial
|
|
* number */
|
|
if (X509_set_version(newcrt, 2L) != 1)
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(newcrt), _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&ssl_ctx_serial, 1));
|
|
|
|
/* Set duration for the certificate */
|
|
if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) ||
|
|
!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* set public key in the certificate */
|
|
if (X509_set_pubkey(newcrt, pkey) != 1)
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Set issuer name from the CA */
|
|
if (!(name = X509_get_subject_name(cacert)))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
if (X509_set_issuer_name(newcrt, name) != 1)
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Set the subject name using the same, but the CN */
|
|
name = X509_NAME_dup(name);
|
|
if (X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
|
|
(const unsigned char *)servername,
|
|
-1, -1, 0) != 1) {
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name);
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (X509_set_subject_name(newcrt, name) != 1) {
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name);
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name);
|
|
|
|
/* Add x509v3 extensions as specified */
|
|
ctmp = NCONF_new(NULL);
|
|
X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cacert, newcrt, NULL, NULL, 0);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < X509V3_EXT_SIZE; i++) {
|
|
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
|
|
|
|
if (!(ext = X509V3_EXT_nconf(ctmp, &ctx, x509v3_ext_names[i], x509v3_ext_values[i])))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
if (!X509_add_ext(newcrt, ext, -1)) {
|
|
X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add SAN extension */
|
|
if (ssl_sock_add_san_ext(&ctx, newcrt, servername)) {
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sign the certificate with the CA private key */
|
|
|
|
key_type = EVP_PKEY_base_id(capkey);
|
|
|
|
if (key_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
digest = EVP_sha1();
|
|
else if (key_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
digest = EVP_sha256();
|
|
else if (key_type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
|
digest = EVP_sha256();
|
|
else {
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
int nid;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(capkey, &nid) <= 0)
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
if (!(digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
#else
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(X509_sign(newcrt, capkey, digest)))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Create and set the new SSL_CTX */
|
|
if (!(ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ssl_ctx, newcrt))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx))
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
|
|
/* Build chaining the CA cert and the rest of the chain, keep these order */
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert)
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ssl_ctx, bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->cert)) {
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->chain) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->chain); i++) {
|
|
X509 *chain_cert = sk_X509_value(bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->chain, i);
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ssl_ctx, chain_cert)) {
|
|
goto mkcert_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (newcrt) X509_free(newcrt);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ssl_ctx, ssl_get_tmp_dh);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *ecdhe = (bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe ? bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE);
|
|
EC_KEY *ecc;
|
|
int nid;
|
|
|
|
if ((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdhe)) == NID_undef)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (!(ecc = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl_ctx, ecc);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(ecc);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
end:
|
|
return ssl_ctx;
|
|
|
|
mkcert_error:
|
|
if (ctmp) NCONF_free(ctmp);
|
|
if (tmp_ssl) SSL_free(tmp_ssl);
|
|
if (ssl_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
|
|
if (newcrt) X509_free(newcrt);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *
|
|
ssl_sock_create_cert(struct connection *conn, const char *servername, unsigned int key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bind_conf *bind_conf = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf;
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, ctx->ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do a lookup for a certificate in the LRU cache used to store generated
|
|
* certificates and immediately assign it to the SSL session if not null. */
|
|
SSL_CTX *
|
|
ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct lru64 *lru = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) {
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
lru = lru64_lookup(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->cert, 0);
|
|
if (lru && lru->domain) {
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, (SSL_CTX *)lru->data);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
return (SSL_CTX *)lru->data;
|
|
}
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Same as <ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert> but without SSL session. This
|
|
* function is not thread-safe, it should only be used to check if a certificate
|
|
* exists in the lru cache (with no warranty it will not be removed by another
|
|
* thread). It is kept for backward compatibility. */
|
|
SSL_CTX *
|
|
ssl_sock_get_generated_cert(unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(key, bind_conf, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set a certificate int the LRU cache used to store generated
|
|
* certificate. Return 0 on success, otherwise -1 */
|
|
int
|
|
ssl_sock_set_generated_cert(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct lru64 *lru = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) {
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
lru = lru64_get(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->cert, 0);
|
|
if (!lru) {
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (lru->domain && lru->data)
|
|
lru->free((SSL_CTX *)lru->data);
|
|
lru64_commit(lru, ssl_ctx, bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->cert, 0, (void (*)(void *))SSL_CTX_free);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the key of the certificate. */
|
|
unsigned int
|
|
ssl_sock_generated_cert_key(const void *data, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
return XXH32(data, len, ssl_ctx_lru_seed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a cert and immediately assign it to the SSL session so that the cert's
|
|
* refcount is maintained regardless of the cert's presence in the LRU cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl_sock_generate_certificate(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *cacert = bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch->cert;
|
|
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
|
|
struct lru64 *lru = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int key;
|
|
|
|
key = ssl_sock_generated_cert_key(servername, strlen(servername));
|
|
if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) {
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
lru = lru64_get(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, cacert, 0);
|
|
if (lru && lru->domain)
|
|
ssl_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)lru->data;
|
|
if (!ssl_ctx && lru) {
|
|
ssl_ctx = ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, ssl);
|
|
lru64_commit(lru, ssl_ctx, cacert, 0, (void (*)(void *))SSL_CTX_free);
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ssl_ctx);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
ssl_ctx = ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, ssl);
|
|
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ssl_ctx);
|
|
/* No LRU cache, this CTX will be released as soon as the session dies */
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl_sock_generate_certificate_from_conn(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int key;
|
|
struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
|
|
if (conn_get_dst(conn)) {
|
|
key = ssl_sock_generated_cert_key(conn->dst, get_addr_len(conn->dst));
|
|
if (ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(key, bind_conf, ssl))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES */
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL)
|
|
|
|
static void ctx_set_SSLv3_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c)
|
|
{
|
|
#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
|
|
c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, SSLv3_server_method())
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, SSLv3_client_method());
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv10_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_server_method())
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_client_method());
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv11_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
|
|
c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_1_server_method())
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_1_client_method());
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv12_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
|
|
c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_2_server_method())
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_2_client_method());
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
/* TLSv1.2 is the last supported version in this context. */
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv13_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {}
|
|
/* Unusable in this context. */
|
|
static void ssl_set_SSLv3_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv10_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv11_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv12_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv13_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {}
|
|
#else /* openssl >= 1.1.0 */
|
|
|
|
static void ctx_set_SSLv3_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, SSL3_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ssl_set_SSLv3_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, SSL3_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv10_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv10_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv11_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_1_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_1_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv11_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_1_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_1_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv12_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv12_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ctx_set_TLSv13_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {
|
|
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
static void ssl_set_TLSv13_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {
|
|
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
|
|
c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_3_VERSION)
|
|
: SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
static void ctx_set_None_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { }
|
|
static void ssl_set_None_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { }
|
|
|
|
struct methodVersions methodVersions[] = {
|
|
{0, 0, ctx_set_None_func, ssl_set_None_func, "NONE"}, /* CONF_TLSV_NONE */
|
|
{SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, MC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3, ctx_set_SSLv3_func, ssl_set_SSLv3_func, "SSLv3"}, /* CONF_SSLV3 */
|
|
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10, ctx_set_TLSv10_func, ssl_set_TLSv10_func, "TLSv1.0"}, /* CONF_TLSV10 */
|
|
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11, ctx_set_TLSv11_func, ssl_set_TLSv11_func, "TLSv1.1"}, /* CONF_TLSV11 */
|
|
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12, ctx_set_TLSv12_func, ssl_set_TLSv12_func, "TLSv1.2"}, /* CONF_TLSV12 */
|
|
{SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV13, ctx_set_TLSv13_func, ssl_set_TLSv13_func, "TLSv1.3"}, /* CONF_TLSV13 */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_sock_switchctx_set(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(ctx), ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk);
|
|
SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, SSL_dup_CA_list(SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(ctx)));
|
|
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if ((HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bind_conf *s = priv;
|
|
(void)al; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) || s->generate_certs)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL *ssl = ctx->ssl;
|
|
#else
|
|
static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
#endif
|
|
struct connection *conn;
|
|
struct bind_conf *s;
|
|
const uint8_t *extension_data;
|
|
size_t extension_len;
|
|
int has_rsa_sig = 0, has_ecdsa_sig = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *wildp = NULL;
|
|
const uint8_t *servername;
|
|
size_t servername_len;
|
|
struct ebmb_node *node, *n, *node_ecdsa = NULL, *node_rsa = NULL, *node_anonymous = NULL;
|
|
int allow_early = 0;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
s = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ssl_conf.early_data)
|
|
allow_early = 1;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
if (SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
|
|
&extension_data, &extension_len)) {
|
|
#else
|
|
if (SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, &extension_data, &extension_len)) {
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* The server_name extension was given too much extensibility when it
|
|
* was written, so parsing the normal case is a bit complex.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
if (extension_len <= 2)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
/* Extract the length of the supplied list of names. */
|
|
len = (*extension_data++) << 8;
|
|
len |= *extension_data++;
|
|
if (len + 2 != extension_len)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The list in practice only has a single element, so we only consider
|
|
* the first one.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len == 0 || *extension_data++ != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
extension_len = len - 1;
|
|
/* Now we can finally pull out the byte array with the actual hostname. */
|
|
if (extension_len <= 2)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
len = (*extension_data++) << 8;
|
|
len |= *extension_data++;
|
|
if (len == 0 || len + 2 > extension_len || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
|
|
|| memchr(extension_data, 0, len) != NULL)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
servername = extension_data;
|
|
servername_len = len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
#if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate_from_conn(s, ssl)) {
|
|
goto allow_early;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* without SNI extension, is the default_ctx (need SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) */
|
|
if (!s->strict_sni) {
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
goto allow_early;
|
|
}
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* extract/check clientHello information */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
if (SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, &extension_data, &extension_len)) {
|
|
#else
|
|
if (SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, &extension_data, &extension_len)) {
|
|
#endif
|
|
uint8_t sign;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
if (extension_len < 2)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
len = (*extension_data++) << 8;
|
|
len |= *extension_data++;
|
|
if (len + 2 != extension_len)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
if (len % 2 != 0)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
for (; len > 0; len -= 2) {
|
|
extension_data++; /* hash */
|
|
sign = *extension_data++;
|
|
switch (sign) {
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
|
has_rsa_sig = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
|
has_ecdsa_sig = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (has_ecdsa_sig && has_rsa_sig)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* without TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms extension (< TLSv1.2) */
|
|
has_rsa_sig = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (has_ecdsa_sig) { /* in very rare case: has ecdsa sign but not a ECDSA cipher */
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
const uint8_t *cipher_suites;
|
|
has_ecdsa_sig = 0;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
len = ctx->cipher_suites_len;
|
|
cipher_suites = ctx->cipher_suites;
|
|
#else
|
|
len = SSL_client_hello_get0_ciphers(ssl, &cipher_suites);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (len % 2 != 0)
|
|
goto abort;
|
|
for (; len != 0; len -= 2, cipher_suites += 2) {
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
uint16_t cipher_suite = (cipher_suites[0] << 8) | cipher_suites[1];
|
|
cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
|
|
#else
|
|
cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(ssl, cipher_suites);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (cipher && SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(cipher) == NID_auth_ecdsa) {
|
|
has_ecdsa_sig = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < trash.size && i < servername_len; i++) {
|
|
trash.area[i] = tolower(servername[i]);
|
|
if (!wildp && (trash.area[i] == '.'))
|
|
wildp = &trash.area[i];
|
|
}
|
|
trash.area[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
|
|
/* Look for an ECDSA, RSA and DSA certificate, first in the single
|
|
* name and if not found in the wildcard */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
if (i == 0) /* lookup in full qualified names */
|
|
node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.area);
|
|
else if (i == 1 && wildp) /* lookup in wildcards names */
|
|
node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp);
|
|
else
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
for (n = node; n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) {
|
|
|
|
/* lookup a not neg filter */
|
|
if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
|
|
struct sni_ctx *sni, *sni_tmp;
|
|
int skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (i == 1 && wildp) { /* wildcard */
|
|
/* If this is a wildcard, look for an exclusion on the same crt-list line */
|
|
sni = container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name);
|
|
list_for_each_entry(sni_tmp, &sni->ckch_inst->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) {
|
|
if (sni_tmp->neg && (!strcmp((const char *)sni_tmp->name.key, trash.area))) {
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (skip)
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch(container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->kinfo.sig) {
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
|
if (!node_ecdsa)
|
|
node_ecdsa = n;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
|
if (!node_rsa)
|
|
node_rsa = n;
|
|
break;
|
|
default: /* TLSEXT_signature_anonymous|dsa */
|
|
if (!node_anonymous)
|
|
node_anonymous = n;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Once the certificates are found, select them depending on what is
|
|
* supported in the client and by key_signature priority order: EDSA >
|
|
* RSA > DSA */
|
|
if (has_ecdsa_sig && node_ecdsa)
|
|
node = node_ecdsa;
|
|
else if (has_rsa_sig && node_rsa)
|
|
node = node_rsa;
|
|
else if (node_anonymous)
|
|
node = node_anonymous;
|
|
else if (node_ecdsa)
|
|
node = node_ecdsa; /* no ecdsa signature case (< TLSv1.2) */
|
|
else
|
|
node = node_rsa; /* no rsa signature case (far far away) */
|
|
|
|
if (node) {
|
|
/* switch ctx */
|
|
struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->conf;
|
|
ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
|
|
if (conf) {
|
|
methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.min].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MIN);
|
|
methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.max].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MAX);
|
|
if (conf->early_data)
|
|
allow_early = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
goto allow_early;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
#if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate(trash.area, s, ssl)) {
|
|
/* switch ctx done in ssl_sock_generate_certificate */
|
|
goto allow_early;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!s->strict_sni) {
|
|
/* no certificate match, is the default_ctx */
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
allow_early:
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
if (allow_early)
|
|
SSL_set_early_data_enabled(ssl, 1);
|
|
#else
|
|
if (!allow_early)
|
|
SSL_set_max_early_data(ssl, 0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 1;
|
|
abort:
|
|
/* abort handshake (was SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL) */
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
return ssl_select_cert_error;
|
|
#else
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
|
|
|
|
/* Sets the SSL ctx of <ssl> to match the advertised server name. Returns a
|
|
* warning when no match is found, which implies the default (first) cert
|
|
* will keep being used.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *priv)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *servername;
|
|
const char *wildp = NULL;
|
|
struct ebmb_node *node, *n;
|
|
struct bind_conf *s = priv;
|
|
int i;
|
|
(void)al; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
|
|
|
|
servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
#if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate_from_conn(s, ssl))
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (s->strict_sni)
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) {
|
|
if (!servername[i])
|
|
break;
|
|
trash.area[i] = tolower((unsigned char)servername[i]);
|
|
if (!wildp && (trash.area[i] == '.'))
|
|
wildp = &trash.area[i];
|
|
}
|
|
trash.area[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
node = NULL;
|
|
/* lookup in full qualified names */
|
|
for (n = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.area); n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) {
|
|
/* lookup a not neg filter */
|
|
if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
|
|
node = n;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!node && wildp) {
|
|
/* lookup in wildcards names */
|
|
for (n = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp); n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) {
|
|
/* lookup a not neg filter */
|
|
if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
|
|
node = n;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
#if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate(servername, s, ssl)) {
|
|
/* switch ctx done in ssl_sock_generate_certificate */
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (s->strict_sni) {
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* switch ctx */
|
|
ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* (!) OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
|
|
#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
|
|
static DH * ssl_get_dh_1024(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={
|
|
0xFA,0xF9,0x2A,0x22,0x2A,0xA7,0x7F,0xE1,0x67,0x4E,0x53,0xF7,
|
|
0x56,0x13,0xC3,0xB1,0xE3,0x29,0x6B,0x66,0x31,0x6A,0x7F,0xB3,
|
|
0xC2,0x68,0x6B,0xCB,0x1D,0x57,0x39,0x1D,0x1F,0xFF,0x1C,0xC9,
|
|
0xA6,0xA4,0x98,0x82,0x31,0x5D,0x25,0xFF,0x8A,0xE0,0x73,0x96,
|
|
0x81,0xC8,0x83,0x79,0xC1,0x5A,0x04,0xF8,0x37,0x0D,0xA8,0x3D,
|
|
0xAE,0x74,0xBC,0xDB,0xB6,0xA4,0x75,0xD9,0x71,0x8A,0xA0,0x17,
|
|
0x9E,0x2D,0xC8,0xA8,0xDF,0x2C,0x5F,0x82,0x95,0xF8,0x92,0x9B,
|
|
0xA7,0x33,0x5F,0x89,0x71,0xC8,0x2D,0x6B,0x18,0x86,0xC4,0x94,
|
|
0x22,0xA5,0x52,0x8D,0xF6,0xF6,0xD2,0x37,0x92,0x0F,0xA5,0xCC,
|
|
0xDB,0x7B,0x1D,0x3D,0xA1,0x31,0xB7,0x80,0x8F,0x0B,0x67,0x5E,
|
|
0x36,0xA5,0x60,0x0C,0xF1,0x95,0x33,0x8B,
|
|
};
|
|
static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={
|
|
0x02,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *p;
|
|
BIGNUM *g;
|
|
DH *dh = DH_new();
|
|
if (dh) {
|
|
p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof dh1024_p, NULL);
|
|
g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof dh1024_g, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!p || !g) {
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
dh = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DH *ssl_get_dh_2048(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char dh2048_p[]={
|
|
0xEC,0x86,0xF8,0x70,0xA0,0x33,0x16,0xEC,0x05,0x1A,0x73,0x59,
|
|
0xCD,0x1F,0x8B,0xF8,0x29,0xE4,0xD2,0xCF,0x52,0xDD,0xC2,0x24,
|
|
0x8D,0xB5,0x38,0x9A,0xFB,0x5C,0xA4,0xE4,0xB2,0xDA,0xCE,0x66,
|
|
0x50,0x74,0xA6,0x85,0x4D,0x4B,0x1D,0x30,0xB8,0x2B,0xF3,0x10,
|
|
0xE9,0xA7,0x2D,0x05,0x71,0xE7,0x81,0xDF,0x8B,0x59,0x52,0x3B,
|
|
0x5F,0x43,0x0B,0x68,0xF1,0xDB,0x07,0xBE,0x08,0x6B,0x1B,0x23,
|
|
0xEE,0x4D,0xCC,0x9E,0x0E,0x43,0xA0,0x1E,0xDF,0x43,0x8C,0xEC,
|
|
0xBE,0xBE,0x90,0xB4,0x51,0x54,0xB9,0x2F,0x7B,0x64,0x76,0x4E,
|
|
0x5D,0xD4,0x2E,0xAE,0xC2,0x9E,0xAE,0x51,0x43,0x59,0xC7,0x77,
|
|
0x9C,0x50,0x3C,0x0E,0xED,0x73,0x04,0x5F,0xF1,0x4C,0x76,0x2A,
|
|
0xD8,0xF8,0xCF,0xFC,0x34,0x40,0xD1,0xB4,0x42,0x61,0x84,0x66,
|
|
0x42,0x39,0x04,0xF8,0x68,0xB2,0x62,0xD7,0x55,0xED,0x1B,0x74,
|
|
0x75,0x91,0xE0,0xC5,0x69,0xC1,0x31,0x5C,0xDB,0x7B,0x44,0x2E,
|
|
0xCE,0x84,0x58,0x0D,0x1E,0x66,0x0C,0xC8,0x44,0x9E,0xFD,0x40,
|
|
0x08,0x67,0x5D,0xFB,0xA7,0x76,0x8F,0x00,0x11,0x87,0xE9,0x93,
|
|
0xF9,0x7D,0xC4,0xBC,0x74,0x55,0x20,0xD4,0x4A,0x41,0x2F,0x43,
|
|
0x42,0x1A,0xC1,0xF2,0x97,0x17,0x49,0x27,0x37,0x6B,0x2F,0x88,
|
|
0x7E,0x1C,0xA0,0xA1,0x89,0x92,0x27,0xD9,0x56,0x5A,0x71,0xC1,
|
|
0x56,0x37,0x7E,0x3A,0x9D,0x05,0xE7,0xEE,0x5D,0x8F,0x82,0x17,
|
|
0xBC,0xE9,0xC2,0x93,0x30,0x82,0xF9,0xF4,0xC9,0xAE,0x49,0xDB,
|
|
0xD0,0x54,0xB4,0xD9,0x75,0x4D,0xFA,0x06,0xB8,0xD6,0x38,0x41,
|
|
0xB7,0x1F,0x77,0xF3,
|
|
};
|
|
static unsigned char dh2048_g[]={
|
|
0x02,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *p;
|
|
BIGNUM *g;
|
|
DH *dh = DH_new();
|
|
if (dh) {
|
|
p = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof dh2048_p, NULL);
|
|
g = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof dh2048_g, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!p || !g) {
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
dh = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DH *ssl_get_dh_4096(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static unsigned char dh4096_p[]={
|
|
0xDE,0x16,0x94,0xCD,0x99,0x58,0x07,0xF1,0xF7,0x32,0x96,0x11,
|
|
0x04,0x82,0xD4,0x84,0x72,0x80,0x99,0x06,0xCA,0xF0,0xA3,0x68,
|
|
0x07,0xCE,0x64,0x50,0xE7,0x74,0x45,0x20,0x80,0x5E,0x4D,0xAD,
|
|
0xA5,0xB6,0xED,0xFA,0x80,0x6C,0x3B,0x35,0xC4,0x9A,0x14,0x6B,
|
|
0x32,0xBB,0xFD,0x1F,0x17,0x8E,0xB7,0x1F,0xD6,0xFA,0x3F,0x7B,
|
|
0xEE,0x16,0xA5,0x62,0x33,0x0D,0xED,0xBC,0x4E,0x58,0xE5,0x47,
|
|
0x4D,0xE9,0xAB,0x8E,0x38,0xD3,0x6E,0x90,0x57,0xE3,0x22,0x15,
|
|
0x33,0xBD,0xF6,0x43,0x45,0xB5,0x10,0x0A,0xBE,0x2C,0xB4,0x35,
|
|
0xB8,0x53,0x8D,0xAD,0xFB,0xA7,0x1F,0x85,0x58,0x41,0x7A,0x79,
|
|
0x20,0x68,0xB3,0xE1,0x3D,0x08,0x76,0xBF,0x86,0x0D,0x49,0xE3,
|
|
0x82,0x71,0x8C,0xB4,0x8D,0x81,0x84,0xD4,0xE7,0xBE,0x91,0xDC,
|
|
0x26,0x39,0x48,0x0F,0x35,0xC4,0xCA,0x65,0xE3,0x40,0x93,0x52,
|
|
0x76,0x58,0x7D,0xDD,0x51,0x75,0xDC,0x69,0x61,0xBF,0x47,0x2C,
|
|
0x16,0x68,0x2D,0xC9,0x29,0xD3,0xE6,0xC0,0x99,0x48,0xA0,0x9A,
|
|
0xC8,0x78,0xC0,0x6D,0x81,0x67,0x12,0x61,0x3F,0x71,0xBA,0x41,
|
|
0x1F,0x6C,0x89,0x44,0x03,0xBA,0x3B,0x39,0x60,0xAA,0x28,0x55,
|
|
0x59,0xAE,0xB8,0xFA,0xCB,0x6F,0xA5,0x1A,0xF7,0x2B,0xDD,0x52,
|
|
0x8A,0x8B,0xE2,0x71,0xA6,0x5E,0x7E,0xD8,0x2E,0x18,0xE0,0x66,
|
|
0xDF,0xDD,0x22,0x21,0x99,0x52,0x73,0xA6,0x33,0x20,0x65,0x0E,
|
|
0x53,0xE7,0x6B,0x9B,0xC5,0xA3,0x2F,0x97,0x65,0x76,0xD3,0x47,
|
|
0x23,0x77,0x12,0xB6,0x11,0x7B,0x24,0xED,0xF1,0xEF,0xC0,0xE2,
|
|
0xA3,0x7E,0x67,0x05,0x3E,0x96,0x4D,0x45,0xC2,0x18,0xD1,0x73,
|
|
0x9E,0x07,0xF3,0x81,0x6E,0x52,0x63,0xF6,0x20,0x76,0xB9,0x13,
|
|
0xD2,0x65,0x30,0x18,0x16,0x09,0x16,0x9E,0x8F,0xF1,0xD2,0x10,
|
|
0x5A,0xD3,0xD4,0xAF,0x16,0x61,0xDA,0x55,0x2E,0x18,0x5E,0x14,
|
|
0x08,0x54,0x2E,0x2A,0x25,0xA2,0x1A,0x9B,0x8B,0x32,0xA9,0xFD,
|
|
0xC2,0x48,0x96,0xE1,0x80,0xCA,0xE9,0x22,0x17,0xBB,0xCE,0x3E,
|
|
0x9E,0xED,0xC7,0xF1,0x1F,0xEC,0x17,0x21,0xDC,0x7B,0x82,0x48,
|
|
0x8E,0xBB,0x4B,0x9D,0x5B,0x04,0x04,0xDA,0xDB,0x39,0xDF,0x01,
|
|
0x40,0xC3,0xAA,0x26,0x23,0x89,0x75,0xC6,0x0B,0xD0,0xA2,0x60,
|
|
0x6A,0xF1,0xCC,0x65,0x18,0x98,0x1B,0x52,0xD2,0x74,0x61,0xCC,
|
|
0xBD,0x60,0xAE,0xA3,0xA0,0x66,0x6A,0x16,0x34,0x92,0x3F,0x41,
|
|
0x40,0x31,0x29,0xC0,0x2C,0x63,0xB2,0x07,0x8D,0xEB,0x94,0xB8,
|
|
0xE8,0x47,0x92,0x52,0x93,0x6A,0x1B,0x7E,0x1A,0x61,0xB3,0x1B,
|
|
0xF0,0xD6,0x72,0x9B,0xF1,0xB0,0xAF,0xBF,0x3E,0x65,0xEF,0x23,
|
|
0x1D,0x6F,0xFF,0x70,0xCD,0x8A,0x4C,0x8A,0xA0,0x72,0x9D,0xBE,
|
|
0xD4,0xBB,0x24,0x47,0x4A,0x68,0xB5,0xF5,0xC6,0xD5,0x7A,0xCD,
|
|
0xCA,0x06,0x41,0x07,0xAD,0xC2,0x1E,0xE6,0x54,0xA7,0xAD,0x03,
|
|
0xD9,0x12,0xC1,0x9C,0x13,0xB1,0xC9,0x0A,0x43,0x8E,0x1E,0x08,
|
|
0xCE,0x50,0x82,0x73,0x5F,0xA7,0x55,0x1D,0xD9,0x59,0xAC,0xB5,
|
|
0xEA,0x02,0x7F,0x6C,0x5B,0x74,0x96,0x98,0x67,0x24,0xA3,0x0F,
|
|
0x15,0xFC,0xA9,0x7D,0x3E,0x67,0xD1,0x70,0xF8,0x97,0xF3,0x67,
|
|
0xC5,0x8C,0x88,0x44,0x08,0x02,0xC7,0x2B,
|
|
};
|
|
static unsigned char dh4096_g[]={
|
|
0x02,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *p;
|
|
BIGNUM *g;
|
|
DH *dh = DH_new();
|
|
if (dh) {
|
|
p = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_p, sizeof dh4096_p, NULL);
|
|
g = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_g, sizeof dh4096_g, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!p || !g) {
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
dh = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns Diffie-Hellman parameters matching the private key length
|
|
but not exceeding global_ssl.default_dh_param */
|
|
static DH *ssl_get_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
DH *dh = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
|
|
int type;
|
|
|
|
type = pkey ? EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) : EVP_PKEY_NONE;
|
|
|
|
/* The keylen supplied by OpenSSL can only be 512 or 1024.
|
|
See ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() in ssl/s3_srvr.c
|
|
*/
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
|
|
keylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keylen > global_ssl.default_dh_param) {
|
|
keylen = global_ssl.default_dh_param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keylen >= 4096) {
|
|
dh = local_dh_4096;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (keylen >= 2048) {
|
|
dh = local_dh_2048;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
dh = local_dh_1024;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DH * ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(const char *filename)
|
|
{
|
|
DH *dh = NULL;
|
|
BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
|
|
|
|
if (in == NULL)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_read_filename(in, filename) <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
if (in)
|
|
BIO_free(in);
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
return dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_sock_load_global_dh_param_from_file(const char *filename)
|
|
{
|
|
global_dh = ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(filename);
|
|
|
|
if (global_dh) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* This function allocates a sni_ctx and adds it to the ckch_inst */
|
|
static int ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst,
|
|
struct bind_conf *s, struct ssl_bind_conf *conf,
|
|
struct pkey_info kinfo, char *name, int order)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sni_ctx *sc;
|
|
int wild = 0, neg = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (*name == '!') {
|
|
neg = 1;
|
|
name++;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*name == '*') {
|
|
wild = 1;
|
|
name++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* !* filter is a nop */
|
|
if (neg && wild)
|
|
return order;
|
|
if (*name) {
|
|
int j, len;
|
|
len = strlen(name);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < len && j < trash.size; j++)
|
|
trash.area[j] = tolower((unsigned char)name[j]);
|
|
if (j >= trash.size)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
trash.area[j] = 0;
|
|
|
|
sc = malloc(sizeof(struct sni_ctx) + len + 1);
|
|
if (!sc)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
memcpy(sc->name.key, trash.area, len + 1);
|
|
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
|
|
sc->ctx = ctx;
|
|
sc->conf = conf;
|
|
sc->kinfo = kinfo;
|
|
sc->order = order++;
|
|
sc->neg = neg;
|
|
sc->wild = wild;
|
|
sc->name.node.leaf_p = NULL;
|
|
sc->ckch_inst = ckch_inst;
|
|
LIST_ADDQ(&ckch_inst->sni_ctx, &sc->by_ckch_inst);
|
|
}
|
|
return order;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Insert the sni_ctxs that are listed in the ckch_inst, in the bind_conf's sni_ctx tree
|
|
* This function can't return an error.
|
|
*
|
|
* *CAUTION*: The caller must lock the sni tree if called in multithreading mode
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_sock_load_cert_sni(struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst, struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sni_ctx *sc0, *sc0b, *sc1;
|
|
struct ebmb_node *node;
|
|
int def = 0;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(sc0, sc0b, &ckch_inst->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) {
|
|
|
|
/* ignore if sc0 was already inserted in a tree */
|
|
if (sc0->name.node.leaf_p)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for duplicates. */
|
|
if (sc0->wild)
|
|
node = ebst_lookup(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx, (char *)sc0->name.key);
|
|
else
|
|
node = ebst_lookup(&bind_conf->sni_ctx, (char *)sc0->name.key);
|
|
|
|
for (; node; node = ebmb_next_dup(node)) {
|
|
sc1 = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
|
|
if (sc1->ctx == sc0->ctx && sc1->conf == sc0->conf
|
|
&& sc1->neg == sc0->neg && sc1->wild == sc0->wild) {
|
|
/* it's a duplicate, we should remove and free it */
|
|
LIST_DEL(&sc0->by_ckch_inst);
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(sc0->ctx);
|
|
free(sc0);
|
|
sc0 = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if duplicate, ignore the insertion */
|
|
if (!sc0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (sc0->wild)
|
|
ebst_insert(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx, &sc0->name);
|
|
else
|
|
ebst_insert(&bind_conf->sni_ctx, &sc0->name);
|
|
|
|
/* replace the default_ctx if required with the first ctx */
|
|
if (ckch_inst->is_default && !def) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->default_ctx);
|
|
SSL_CTX_up_ref(sc0->ctx);
|
|
bind_conf->default_ctx = sc0->ctx;
|
|
def = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* tree used to store the ckchs ordered by filename/bundle name
|
|
*/
|
|
struct eb_root ckchs_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE;
|
|
|
|
/* tree of crtlist (crt-list/directory) */
|
|
struct eb_root crtlists_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Loads Diffie-Hellman parameter from a ckchs to an SSL_CTX.
|
|
* If there is no DH parameter available in the ckchs, the global
|
|
* DH parameter is loaded into the SSL_CTX and if there is no
|
|
* DH parameter available in ckchs nor in global, the default
|
|
* DH parameters are applied on the SSL_CTX.
|
|
* Returns a bitfield containing the flags:
|
|
* ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case
|
|
* ERR_ALERT if a reason of the error is availabine in err
|
|
* ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err
|
|
* The value 0 means there is no error nor warning and
|
|
* the operation succeed.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
static int ssl_sock_load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch,
|
|
const char *path, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
DH *dh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ckch && ckch->dh) {
|
|
dh = ckch->dh;
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load the DH parameter specified in '%s'",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1);
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s, SSL library will use an automatically generated DH parameter.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
#else
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s, DH ciphers won't be available.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
#endif
|
|
ret |= ERR_WARN;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) {
|
|
/* store a pointer to the DH params to avoid complaining about
|
|
ssl-default-dh-param not being set for this SSL_CTX */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, dh);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (global_dh) {
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, global_dh)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to use the global DH parameter for certificate '%s'",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1);
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s, SSL library will use an automatically generated DH parameter.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
#else
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s, DH ciphers won't be available.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
#endif
|
|
ret |= ERR_WARN;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
if (global_ssl.default_dh_param && global_ssl.default_dh_param <= 1024) {
|
|
/* we are limited to DH parameter of 1024 bits anyway */
|
|
if (local_dh_1024 == NULL)
|
|
local_dh_1024 = ssl_get_dh_1024();
|
|
|
|
if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load default 1024 bits DH parameter for certificate '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
ret |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, local_dh_1024)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load default 1024 bits DH parameter for certificate '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1);
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s, SSL library will use an automatically generated DH parameter.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
#else
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s, DH ciphers won't be available.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
#endif
|
|
ret |= ERR_WARN;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, ssl_get_tmp_dh);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Loads the info in ckch into ctx
|
|
* Returns a bitfield containing the flags:
|
|
* ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case
|
|
* ERR_ALERT if the reason of the error is available in err
|
|
* ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err
|
|
* The value 0 means there is no error nor warning and
|
|
* the operation succeed.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(const char *path, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, SSL_CTX *ctx, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
int errcode = 0;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *find_chain = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, ckch->key) <= 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL private key into SSL Context '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
return errcode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, ckch->cert)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate into SSL Context '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ckch->chain) {
|
|
find_chain = ckch->chain;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Find Certificate Chain in global */
|
|
struct issuer_chain *issuer;
|
|
issuer = ssl_get0_issuer_chain(ckch->cert);
|
|
if (issuer)
|
|
find_chain = issuer->chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!find_chain) {
|
|
/* always put a null chain stack in the SSL_CTX so it does not
|
|
* try to build the chain from the verify store */
|
|
find_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Load all certs in the ckch into the ctx_chain for the ssl_ctx */
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTX_set1_chain
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx, find_chain)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load chain certificate into SSL Context '%s'. Make sure you are linking against Openssl >= 1.0.2.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
{ /* legacy compat (< openssl 1.0.2) */
|
|
X509 *ca;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
|
|
chain = X509_chain_up_ref(find_chain);
|
|
while ((ca = sk_X509_shift(chain)))
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load chain certificate into SSL Context '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
X509_free(ca);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain
|
|
/* remove the Root CA from the SSL_CTX if the option is activated */
|
|
if (global_ssl.skip_self_issued_ca) {
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT|SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED|SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load chain certificate into SSL Context '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
/* store a NULL pointer to indicate we have not yet loaded
|
|
a custom DH param file */
|
|
if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
errcode |= ssl_sock_load_dh_params(ctx, ckch, path, err);
|
|
if (errcode & ERR_CODE) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load DH parameters from file '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
if (sctl_ex_index >= 0 && ckch->sctl) {
|
|
if (ssl_sock_load_sctl(ctx, ckch->sctl) < 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s '%s.sctl' is present but cannot be read or parsed'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) || defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
/* Load OCSP Info into context */
|
|
if (ckch->ocsp_response) {
|
|
if (ssl_sock_load_ocsp(ctx, ckch, find_chain) < 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%s '%s.ocsp' is present and activates OCSP but it is impossible to compute the OCSP certificate ID (maybe the issuer could not be found)'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
return errcode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function allocate a ckch_inst and create its snis
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns a bitfield containing the flags:
|
|
* ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case
|
|
* ERR_ALERT if the reason of the error is available in err
|
|
* ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err
|
|
*/
|
|
int ckch_inst_new_load_store(const char *path, struct ckch_store *ckchs, struct bind_conf *bind_conf,
|
|
struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, char **sni_filter, int fcount, struct ckch_inst **ckchi, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int order = 0;
|
|
X509_NAME *xname;
|
|
char *str;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
struct pkey_info kinfo = { .sig = TLSEXT_signature_anonymous, .bits = 0 };
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names;
|
|
#endif
|
|
struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch;
|
|
struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst = NULL;
|
|
int errcode = 0;
|
|
|
|
*ckchi = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!ckchs || !ckchs->ckch)
|
|
return ERR_FATAL;
|
|
|
|
ckch = ckchs->ckch;
|
|
|
|
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
errcode |= ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(path, ckch, ctx, err);
|
|
if (errcode & ERR_CODE)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ckch_inst = ckch_inst_new();
|
|
if (!ckch_inst) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ckch->cert);
|
|
if (pkey) {
|
|
kinfo.bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
|
|
switch(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
kinfo.sig = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
kinfo.sig = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
|
|
kinfo.sig = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fcount) {
|
|
while (fcount--) {
|
|
order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, kinfo, sni_filter[fcount], order);
|
|
if (order < 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
names = X509_get_ext_d2i(ckch->cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (names) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
|
|
if (name->type == GEN_DNS) {
|
|
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) {
|
|
order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, kinfo, str, order);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(str);
|
|
if (order < 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */
|
|
xname = X509_get_subject_name(ckch->cert);
|
|
i = -1;
|
|
while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
|
|
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i);
|
|
ASN1_STRING *value;
|
|
|
|
value = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
|
|
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, value) >= 0) {
|
|
order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, kinfo, str, order);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(str);
|
|
if (order < 0) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* we must not free the SSL_CTX anymore below, since it's already in
|
|
* the tree, so it will be discovered and cleaned in time.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
if (bind_conf->default_ctx) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sthis version of openssl cannot load multiple SSL certificates.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) {
|
|
bind_conf->default_ctx = ctx;
|
|
bind_conf->default_ssl_conf = ssl_conf;
|
|
ckch_inst->is_default = 1;
|
|
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* everything succeed, the ckch instance can be used */
|
|
ckch_inst->bind_conf = bind_conf;
|
|
ckch_inst->ssl_conf = ssl_conf;
|
|
ckch_inst->ckch_store = ckchs;
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ctx); /* we need to free the ctx since we incremented the refcount where it's used */
|
|
|
|
*ckchi = ckch_inst;
|
|
return errcode;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
/* free the allocated sni_ctxs */
|
|
if (ckch_inst) {
|
|
if (ckch_inst->is_default)
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
ckch_inst_free(ckch_inst);
|
|
ckch_inst = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return errcode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns a set of ERR_* flags possibly with an error in <err>. */
|
|
static int ssl_sock_load_ckchs(const char *path, struct ckch_store *ckchs,
|
|
struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf,
|
|
char **sni_filter, int fcount, struct ckch_inst **ckch_inst, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
int errcode = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* we found the ckchs in the tree, we can use it directly */
|
|
errcode |= ckch_inst_new_load_store(path, ckchs, bind_conf, ssl_conf, sni_filter, fcount, ckch_inst, err);
|
|
|
|
if (errcode & ERR_CODE)
|
|
return errcode;
|
|
|
|
ssl_sock_load_cert_sni(*ckch_inst, bind_conf);
|
|
|
|
/* succeed, add the instance to the ckch_store's list of instance */
|
|
LIST_ADDQ(&ckchs->ckch_inst, &((*ckch_inst)->by_ckchs));
|
|
return errcode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot. The work is only
|
|
* done once. Zero is returned if the operation fails. No error is returned
|
|
* if the random is said as not implemented, because we expect that openssl
|
|
* will use another method once needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_initialize_random()
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char random;
|
|
static int random_initialized = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!random_initialized && RAND_bytes(&random, 1) != 0)
|
|
random_initialized = 1;
|
|
|
|
return random_initialized;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Load a crt-list file, this is done in 2 parts:
|
|
* - store the content of the file in a crtlist structure with crtlist_entry structures
|
|
* - generate the instances by iterating on entries in the crtlist struct
|
|
*
|
|
* Nothing is locked there, this function is used in the configuration parser.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns a set of ERR_* flags possibly with an error in <err>.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(char *file, int dir, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crtlist *crtlist = NULL;
|
|
struct ebmb_node *eb;
|
|
struct crtlist_entry *entry = NULL;
|
|
struct bind_conf_list *bind_conf_node = NULL;
|
|
int cfgerr = 0;
|
|
char *end;
|
|
|
|
bind_conf_node = malloc(sizeof(*bind_conf_node));
|
|
if (!bind_conf_node) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sCan't alloc memory!\n", err && *err ? *err : "");
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_FATAL | ERR_ALERT;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
bind_conf_node->next = NULL;
|
|
bind_conf_node->bind_conf = bind_conf;
|
|
|
|
/* strip trailing slashes, including first one */
|
|
for (end = file + strlen(file) - 1; end >= file && *end == '/'; end--)
|
|
*end = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* look for an existing crtlist or create one */
|
|
eb = ebst_lookup(&crtlists_tree, file);
|
|
if (eb) {
|
|
crtlist = ebmb_entry(eb, struct crtlist, node);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* load a crt-list OR a directory */
|
|
if (dir)
|
|
cfgerr |= crtlist_load_cert_dir(file, bind_conf, &crtlist, err);
|
|
else
|
|
cfgerr |= crtlist_parse_file(file, bind_conf, curproxy, &crtlist, err);
|
|
|
|
if (!(cfgerr & ERR_CODE))
|
|
ebst_insert(&crtlists_tree, &crtlist->node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfgerr & ERR_CODE) {
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_FATAL | ERR_ALERT;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* generates ckch instance from the crtlist_entry */
|
|
list_for_each_entry(entry, &crtlist->ord_entries, by_crtlist) {
|
|
struct ckch_store *store;
|
|
struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst = NULL;
|
|
|
|
store = entry->node.key;
|
|
cfgerr |= ssl_sock_load_ckchs(store->path, store, bind_conf, entry->ssl_conf, entry->filters, entry->fcount, &ckch_inst, err);
|
|
if (cfgerr & ERR_CODE) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "error processing line %d in file '%s' : %s", entry->linenum, file, *err);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
LIST_ADDQ(&entry->ckch_inst, &ckch_inst->by_crtlist_entry);
|
|
ckch_inst->crtlist_entry = entry;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* add the bind_conf to the list */
|
|
bind_conf_node->next = crtlist->bind_conf;
|
|
crtlist->bind_conf = bind_conf_node;
|
|
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
error:
|
|
{
|
|
struct crtlist_entry *lastentry;
|
|
struct ckch_inst *inst, *s_inst;
|
|
|
|
lastentry = entry; /* which entry we tried to generate last */
|
|
if (lastentry) {
|
|
list_for_each_entry(entry, &crtlist->ord_entries, by_crtlist) {
|
|
if (entry == lastentry) /* last entry we tried to generate, no need to go further */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(inst, s_inst, &entry->ckch_inst, by_crtlist_entry) {
|
|
|
|
/* this was not generated for this bind_conf, skip */
|
|
if (inst->bind_conf != bind_conf)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* free the sni_ctx and instance */
|
|
ckch_inst_free(inst);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
free(bind_conf_node);
|
|
}
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns a set of ERR_* flags possibly with an error in <err>. */
|
|
int ssl_sock_load_cert(char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stat buf;
|
|
char fp[MAXPATHLEN+1];
|
|
int cfgerr = 0;
|
|
struct ckch_store *ckchs;
|
|
struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((ckchs = ckchs_lookup(path))) {
|
|
/* we found the ckchs in the tree, we can use it directly */
|
|
return ssl_sock_load_ckchs(path, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err);
|
|
}
|
|
if (stat(path, &buf) == 0) {
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode) == 0) {
|
|
ckchs = ckchs_load_cert_file(path, err);
|
|
if (!ckchs)
|
|
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_sock_load_ckchs(path, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(path, 1, bind_conf, bind_conf->frontend, err);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* stat failed, could be a bundle */
|
|
if (global_ssl.extra_files & SSL_GF_BUNDLE) {
|
|
char fp[MAXPATHLEN+1] = {0};
|
|
int n = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Load all possible certs and keys in separate ckch_store */
|
|
for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) {
|
|
struct stat buf;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = snprintf(fp, sizeof(fp), "%s.%s", path, SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[n]);
|
|
if (ret > sizeof(fp))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ((ckchs = ckchs_lookup(fp))) {
|
|
cfgerr |= ssl_sock_load_ckchs(fp, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (stat(fp, &buf) == 0) {
|
|
ckchs = ckchs_load_cert_file(fp, err);
|
|
if (!ckchs)
|
|
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
cfgerr |= ssl_sock_load_ckchs(fp, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sunable to stat SSL certificate from file '%s' : %s.\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", fp, strerror(errno));
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create an initial CTX used to start the SSL connection before switchctx */
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
|
long options =
|
|
SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 |
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION |
|
|
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE |
|
|
SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE |
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
|
|
SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA |
|
|
SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
|
|
long mode =
|
|
SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE |
|
|
SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER |
|
|
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS |
|
|
SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
|
|
struct tls_version_filter *conf_ssl_methods = &bind_conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods;
|
|
int i, min, max, hole;
|
|
int flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL;
|
|
int cfgerr = 0;
|
|
const int default_min_ver = CONF_TLSV12;
|
|
|
|
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
|
|
bind_conf->initial_ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (conf_ssl_methods->flags && (conf_ssl_methods->min || conf_ssl_methods->max))
|
|
ha_warning("Proxy '%s': no-sslv3/no-tlsv1x are ignored for bind '%s' at [%s:%d]. "
|
|
"Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n",
|
|
bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
else
|
|
flags = conf_ssl_methods->flags;
|
|
|
|
min = conf_ssl_methods->min;
|
|
max = conf_ssl_methods->max;
|
|
|
|
/* default minimum is TLSV12, */
|
|
if (!min) {
|
|
if (!max || (max >= default_min_ver)) {
|
|
min = default_min_ver;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ha_warning("Proxy '%s': Ambiguous configuration for bind '%s' at [%s:%d]: the ssl-min-ver value is not configured and the ssl-max-ver value is lower than the default ssl-min-ver value (%s). "
|
|
"Setting the ssl-min-ver to %s. Use 'ssl-min-ver' to fix this.\n",
|
|
bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line, methodVersions[default_min_ver].name, methodVersions[max].name);
|
|
min = max;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Real min and max should be determinate with configuration and openssl's capabilities */
|
|
if (min)
|
|
flags |= (methodVersions[min].flag - 1);
|
|
if (max)
|
|
flags |= ~((methodVersions[max].flag << 1) - 1);
|
|
/* find min, max and holes */
|
|
min = max = CONF_TLSV_NONE;
|
|
hole = 0;
|
|
for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++)
|
|
/* version is in openssl && version not disable in configuration */
|
|
if (methodVersions[i].option && !(flags & methodVersions[i].flag)) {
|
|
if (min) {
|
|
if (hole) {
|
|
ha_warning("Proxy '%s': SSL/TLS versions range not contiguous for bind '%s' at [%s:%d]. "
|
|
"Hole find for %s. Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n",
|
|
bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line,
|
|
methodVersions[hole].name);
|
|
hole = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
max = i;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
min = max = i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (min)
|
|
hole = i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!min) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s': all SSL/TLS versions are disabled for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* save real min/max in bind_conf */
|
|
conf_ssl_methods->min = min;
|
|
conf_ssl_methods->max = max;
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL)
|
|
/* Keep force-xxx implementation as it is in older haproxy. It's a
|
|
precautionary measure to avoid any surprise with older openssl version. */
|
|
if (min == max)
|
|
methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_SERVER);
|
|
else
|
|
for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) {
|
|
/* clear every version flags in case SSL_CTX_new()
|
|
* returns an SSL_CTX with disabled versions */
|
|
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, methodVersions[i].option);
|
|
|
|
if (flags & methodVersions[i].flag)
|
|
options |= methodVersions[i].option;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* openssl >= 1.1.0 */
|
|
/* set the max_version is required to cap TLS version or activate new TLS (v1.3) */
|
|
methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MIN);
|
|
methodVersions[max].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MAX);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS)
|
|
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
|
|
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_PREF_CLIE_CIPH)
|
|
options &= ~SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
|
|
options |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
mode |= SSL_MODE_ASYNC;
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, mode);
|
|
if (global_ssl.life_time)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, global_ssl.life_time);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
|
|
#elif defined(SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY)
|
|
if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY);
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk, NULL);
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
|
|
#else
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, bind_conf);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void sh_ssl_sess_free_blocks(struct shared_block *first, struct shared_block *block)
|
|
{
|
|
if (first == block) {
|
|
struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess = (struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *)first->data;
|
|
if (first->len > 0)
|
|
sh_ssl_sess_tree_delete(sh_ssl_sess);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* return first block from sh_ssl_sess */
|
|
static inline struct shared_block *sh_ssl_sess_first_block(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess)
|
|
{
|
|
return (struct shared_block *)((unsigned char *)sh_ssl_sess - ((struct shared_block *)NULL)->data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* store a session into the cache
|
|
* s_id : session id padded with zero to SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
|
|
* data: asn1 encoded session
|
|
* data_len: asn1 encoded session length
|
|
* Returns 1 id session was stored (else 0)
|
|
*/
|
|
static int sh_ssl_sess_store(unsigned char *s_id, unsigned char *data, int data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct shared_block *first;
|
|
struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess, *oldsh_ssl_sess;
|
|
|
|
first = shctx_row_reserve_hot(ssl_shctx, NULL, data_len + sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr));
|
|
if (!first) {
|
|
/* Could not retrieve enough free blocks to store that session */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* STORE the key in the first elem */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess = (struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *)first->data;
|
|
memcpy(sh_ssl_sess->key_data, s_id, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
|
|
first->len = sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr);
|
|
|
|
/* it returns the already existing node
|
|
or current node if none, never returns null */
|
|
oldsh_ssl_sess = sh_ssl_sess_tree_insert(sh_ssl_sess);
|
|
if (oldsh_ssl_sess != sh_ssl_sess) {
|
|
/* NOTE: Row couldn't be in use because we lock read & write function */
|
|
/* release the reserved row */
|
|
shctx_row_dec_hot(ssl_shctx, first);
|
|
/* replace the previous session already in the tree */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess = oldsh_ssl_sess;
|
|
/* ignore the previous session data, only use the header */
|
|
first = sh_ssl_sess_first_block(sh_ssl_sess);
|
|
shctx_row_inc_hot(ssl_shctx, first);
|
|
first->len = sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (shctx_row_data_append(ssl_shctx, first, NULL, data, data_len) < 0) {
|
|
shctx_row_dec_hot(ssl_shctx, first);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
shctx_row_dec_hot(ssl_shctx, first);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL callback used when a new session is created while connecting to a server */
|
|
static int ssl_sess_new_srv_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
|
|
{
|
|
struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
struct server *s;
|
|
|
|
s = __objt_server(conn->target);
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_REUSE)) {
|
|
int len;
|
|
unsigned char *ptr;
|
|
|
|
len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
|
if (s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr && s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].allocated_size >= len) {
|
|
ptr = s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr;
|
|
} else {
|
|
free(s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
|
|
ptr = s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = malloc(len);
|
|
s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].allocated_size = len;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
|
|
s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].size = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess,
|
|
&ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
free(s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
|
|
s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL callback used on new session creation */
|
|
int sh_ssl_sess_new_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char encsess[SHSESS_MAX_DATA_LEN]; /* encoded session */
|
|
unsigned char encid[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* encoded id */
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
int data_len;
|
|
unsigned int sid_length;
|
|
const unsigned char *sid_data;
|
|
|
|
/* Session id is already stored in to key and session id is known
|
|
* so we don't store it to keep size.
|
|
* note: SSL_SESSION_set1_id is using
|
|
* a memcpy so we need to use a different pointer
|
|
* than sid_data or sid_ctx_data to avoid valgrind
|
|
* complaining.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sid_data = SSL_SESSION_get_id(sess, &sid_length);
|
|
|
|
/* copy value in an other buffer */
|
|
memcpy(encid, sid_data, sid_length);
|
|
|
|
/* pad with 0 */
|
|
if (sid_length < SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
|
|
memset(encid + sid_length, 0, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH-sid_length);
|
|
|
|
/* force length to zero to avoid ASN1 encoding */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_set1_id(sess, encid, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* force length to zero to avoid ASN1 encoding */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(sess, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* check if buffer is large enough for the ASN1 encoded session */
|
|
data_len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
|
if (data_len > SHSESS_MAX_DATA_LEN)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
p = encsess;
|
|
|
|
/* process ASN1 session encoding before the lock */
|
|
i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
shctx_lock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
/* store to cache */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess_store(encid, encsess, data_len);
|
|
shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
err:
|
|
/* reset original length values */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_set1_id(sess, encid, sid_length);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(sess, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, strlen(SHCTX_APPNAME));
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* do not increment session reference count */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL callback used on lookup an existing session cause none found in internal cache */
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sh_ssl_sess_get_cb(SSL *ssl, __OPENSSL_110_CONST__ unsigned char *key, int key_len, int *do_copy)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess;
|
|
unsigned char data[SHSESS_MAX_DATA_LEN], *p;
|
|
unsigned char tmpkey[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
struct shared_block *first;
|
|
|
|
global.shctx_lookups++;
|
|
|
|
/* allow the session to be freed automatically by openssl */
|
|
*do_copy = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* tree key is zeros padded sessionid */
|
|
if (key_len < SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
memcpy(tmpkey, key, key_len);
|
|
memset(tmpkey + key_len, 0, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - key_len);
|
|
key = tmpkey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* lock cache */
|
|
shctx_lock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
|
|
/* lookup for session */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess = sh_ssl_sess_tree_lookup(key);
|
|
if (!sh_ssl_sess) {
|
|
/* no session found: unlock cache and exit */
|
|
shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
global.shctx_misses++;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* sh_ssl_sess (shared_block->data) is at the end of shared_block */
|
|
first = sh_ssl_sess_first_block(sh_ssl_sess);
|
|
|
|
shctx_row_data_get(ssl_shctx, first, data, sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr), first->len-sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr));
|
|
|
|
shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
|
|
/* decode ASN1 session */
|
|
p = data;
|
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, first->len-sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr));
|
|
/* Reset session id and session id contenxt */
|
|
if (sess) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_set1_id(sess, key, key_len);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(sess, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, strlen(SHCTX_APPNAME));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL callback used to signal session is no more used in internal cache */
|
|
void sh_ssl_sess_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess;
|
|
unsigned char tmpkey[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned int sid_length;
|
|
const unsigned char *sid_data;
|
|
(void)ctx;
|
|
|
|
sid_data = SSL_SESSION_get_id(sess, &sid_length);
|
|
/* tree key is zeros padded sessionid */
|
|
if (sid_length < SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
memcpy(tmpkey, sid_data, sid_length);
|
|
memset(tmpkey+sid_length, 0, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - sid_length);
|
|
sid_data = tmpkey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
shctx_lock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
|
|
/* lookup for session */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess = sh_ssl_sess_tree_lookup(sid_data);
|
|
if (sh_ssl_sess) {
|
|
/* free session */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess_tree_delete(sh_ssl_sess);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* unlock cache */
|
|
shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set session cache mode to server and disable openssl internal cache.
|
|
* Set shared cache callbacks on an ssl context.
|
|
* Shared context MUST be firstly initialized */
|
|
void ssl_set_shctx(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, strlen(SHCTX_APPNAME));
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_shctx) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER |
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL |
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
|
|
|
|
/* Set callbacks */
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, sh_ssl_sess_new_cb);
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, sh_ssl_sess_get_cb);
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, sh_ssl_sess_remove_cb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format
|
|
*
|
|
* The format is:
|
|
* * <Label> <space> <ClientRandom> <space> <Secret>
|
|
* We only need to copy the secret as there is a sample fetch for the ClientRandom
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
void SSL_CTX_keylog(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_keylog *keylog;
|
|
char *lastarg = NULL;
|
|
char *dst = NULL;
|
|
|
|
keylog = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_keylog_index);
|
|
if (!keylog)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
lastarg = strrchr(line, ' ');
|
|
if (lastarg == NULL || ++lastarg == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
dst = pool_alloc(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str);
|
|
if (!dst)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
strncpy(dst, lastarg, SSL_KEYLOG_MAX_SECRET_SIZE-1);
|
|
dst[SSL_KEYLOG_MAX_SECRET_SIZE-1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(line, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", strlen("CLIENT RANDOM ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->client_random)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->client_random = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET ", strlen("CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->client_early_traffic_secret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->client_early_traffic_secret = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET ", strlen("CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET ")) == 0) {
|
|
if(keylog->client_handshake_traffic_secret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->client_handshake_traffic_secret = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET ", strlen("SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->server_handshake_traffic_secret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->server_handshake_traffic_secret = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 ", strlen("CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->client_traffic_secret_0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->client_traffic_secret_0 = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 ", strlen("SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->server_traffic_secret_0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->server_traffic_secret_0 = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET ", strlen("EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->early_exporter_secret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->early_exporter_secret = dst;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(line, "EXPORTER_SECRET ", strlen("EXPORTER_SECRET ")) == 0) {
|
|
if (keylog->exporter_secret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
keylog->exporter_secret = dst;
|
|
} else {
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, dst);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function applies the SSL configuration on a SSL_CTX
|
|
* It returns an error code and fills the <err> buffer
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, SSL_CTX *ctx, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
struct proxy *curproxy = bind_conf->frontend;
|
|
int cfgerr = 0;
|
|
int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
|
struct ssl_bind_conf __maybe_unused *ssl_conf_cur;
|
|
const char *conf_ciphers;
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
const char *conf_ciphersuites;
|
|
#endif
|
|
const char *conf_curves = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_conf) {
|
|
struct tls_version_filter *conf_ssl_methods = &ssl_conf->ssl_methods;
|
|
int i, min, max;
|
|
int flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL;
|
|
|
|
/* Real min and max should be determinate with configuration and openssl's capabilities */
|
|
min = conf_ssl_methods->min ? conf_ssl_methods->min : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods.min;
|
|
max = conf_ssl_methods->max ? conf_ssl_methods->max : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods.max;
|
|
if (min)
|
|
flags |= (methodVersions[min].flag - 1);
|
|
if (max)
|
|
flags |= ~((methodVersions[max].flag << 1) - 1);
|
|
min = max = CONF_TLSV_NONE;
|
|
for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++)
|
|
if (methodVersions[i].option && !(flags & methodVersions[i].flag)) {
|
|
if (min)
|
|
max = i;
|
|
else
|
|
min = max = i;
|
|
}
|
|
/* save real min/max */
|
|
conf_ssl_methods->min = min;
|
|
conf_ssl_methods->max = max;
|
|
if (!min) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': all SSL/TLS versions are disabled for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch ((ssl_conf && ssl_conf->verify) ? ssl_conf->verify : bind_conf->ssl_conf.verify) {
|
|
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE:
|
|
verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL:
|
|
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED:
|
|
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk);
|
|
if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) {
|
|
char *ca_file = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ca_file) ? ssl_conf->ca_file : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ca_file;
|
|
char *ca_verify_file = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ca_verify_file) ? ssl_conf->ca_verify_file : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ca_verify_file;
|
|
char *crl_file = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->crl_file) ? ssl_conf->crl_file : bind_conf->ssl_conf.crl_file;
|
|
if (ca_file || ca_verify_file) {
|
|
/* set CAfile to verify */
|
|
if (ca_file && !ssl_set_verify_locations_file(ctx, ca_file)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set CA file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, ca_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ca_verify_file && !ssl_set_verify_locations_file(ctx, ca_verify_file)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set CA-no-names file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, ca_verify_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ca_file && !((ssl_conf && ssl_conf->no_ca_names) || bind_conf->ssl_conf.no_ca_names)) {
|
|
/* set CA names for client cert request, function returns void */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_dup_CA_list(ssl_get_client_ca_file(ca_file)));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': verify is enabled but no CA file specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
|
|
if (crl_file) {
|
|
X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_set_cert_crl_file(store, crl_file)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to configure CRL file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, crl_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
if(bind_conf->keys_ref) {
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ctx, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set callback for TLS ticket validation for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_shctx(ctx);
|
|
conf_ciphers = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ciphers) ? ssl_conf->ciphers : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ciphers;
|
|
if (conf_ciphers &&
|
|
!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf_ciphers)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, conf_ciphers, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
conf_ciphersuites = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ciphersuites) ? ssl_conf->ciphersuites : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ciphersuites;
|
|
if (conf_ciphersuites &&
|
|
!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, conf_ciphersuites)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, conf_ciphersuites, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
/* If tune.ssl.default-dh-param has not been set,
|
|
neither has ssl-default-dh-file and no static DH
|
|
params were in the certificate file. */
|
|
if (global_ssl.default_dh_param == 0 &&
|
|
global_dh == NULL &&
|
|
(ssl_dh_ptr_index == -1 ||
|
|
SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index) == NULL)) {
|
|
/* default to dh-param 2048 */
|
|
global_ssl.default_dh_param = 2048;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (global_ssl.default_dh_param >= 1024) {
|
|
if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) {
|
|
local_dh_1024 = ssl_get_dh_1024();
|
|
}
|
|
if (global_ssl.default_dh_param >= 2048) {
|
|
if (local_dh_2048 == NULL) {
|
|
local_dh_2048 = ssl_get_dh_2048();
|
|
}
|
|
if (global_ssl.default_dh_param >= 4096) {
|
|
if (local_dh_4096 == NULL) {
|
|
local_dh_4096 = ssl_get_dh_4096();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_infocbk);
|
|
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_msgcbk);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx, SSL_CTX_keylog);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
ssl_conf_cur = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->npn_str)
|
|
ssl_conf_cur = ssl_conf;
|
|
else if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.npn_str)
|
|
ssl_conf_cur = &bind_conf->ssl_conf;
|
|
if (ssl_conf_cur)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos, ssl_conf_cur);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
ssl_conf_cur = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->alpn_str)
|
|
ssl_conf_cur = ssl_conf;
|
|
else if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.alpn_str)
|
|
ssl_conf_cur = &bind_conf->ssl_conf;
|
|
if (ssl_conf_cur)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos, ssl_conf_cur);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list)
|
|
conf_curves = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->curves) ? ssl_conf->curves : bind_conf->ssl_conf.curves;
|
|
if (conf_curves) {
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx, conf_curves)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set SSL curves list to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, conf_curves, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
(void)SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
|
|
if (!conf_curves) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh;
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
const char *ecdhe = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ecdhe) ? ssl_conf->ecdhe :
|
|
(bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe ? bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe :
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (ecdhe == NULL) {
|
|
(void)SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1);
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
const char *ecdhe = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ecdhe) ? ssl_conf->ecdhe :
|
|
(bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe ? bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe :
|
|
ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
i = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdhe);
|
|
if (!i || ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(i)) == NULL)) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set elliptic named curve to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, ecdhe, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(const char *pattern, const char *hostname)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *pattern_wildcard, *pattern_left_label_end, *hostname_left_label_end;
|
|
size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Trivial case */
|
|
if (strcasecmp(pattern, hostname) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* The rest of this logic is based on RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
|
|
* (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3) */
|
|
|
|
pattern_wildcard = NULL;
|
|
pattern_left_label_end = pattern;
|
|
while (*pattern_left_label_end != '.') {
|
|
switch (*pattern_left_label_end) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
/* End of label not found */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case '*':
|
|
/* If there is more than one wildcards */
|
|
if (pattern_wildcard)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pattern_wildcard = pattern_left_label_end;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
pattern_left_label_end++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If it's not trivial and there is no wildcard, it can't
|
|
* match */
|
|
if (!pattern_wildcard)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure all labels match except the leftmost */
|
|
hostname_left_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
|
|
if (!hostname_left_label_end
|
|
|| strcasecmp(pattern_left_label_end, hostname_left_label_end) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the leftmost label of the hostname is long enough
|
|
* that the wildcard can match */
|
|
if (hostname_left_label_end - hostname < (pattern_left_label_end - pattern) - 1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Finally compare the string on either side of the
|
|
* wildcard */
|
|
prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
|
|
suffixlen = pattern_left_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1);
|
|
if ((prefixlen && (strncasecmp(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) != 0))
|
|
|| (suffixlen && (strncasecmp(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_left_label_end - suffixlen, suffixlen) != 0)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL *ssl;
|
|
struct connection *conn;
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ssl_ctx;
|
|
const char *servername;
|
|
const char *sni;
|
|
|
|
int depth;
|
|
X509 *cert;
|
|
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt_names;
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509_NAME *cert_subject;
|
|
char *str;
|
|
|
|
if (ok == 0)
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
|
|
conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
|
|
ssl_ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/* We're checking if the provided hostnames match the desired one. The
|
|
* desired hostname comes from the SNI we presented if any, or if not
|
|
* provided then it may have been explicitly stated using a "verifyhost"
|
|
* directive. If neither is set, we don't care about the name so the
|
|
* verification is OK.
|
|
*/
|
|
servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl_ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
|
|
sni = servername;
|
|
if (!servername) {
|
|
servername = __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.verify_host;
|
|
if (!servername)
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We only need to verify the CN on the actual server cert,
|
|
* not the indirect CAs */
|
|
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
|
|
if (depth != 0)
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
/* At this point, the cert is *not* OK unless we can find a
|
|
* hostname match */
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
|
|
/* It seems like this might happen if verify peer isn't set */
|
|
if (!cert)
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (alt_names) {
|
|
for (i = 0; !ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt_names); i++) {
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt_names, i);
|
|
if (name->type == GEN_DNS) {
|
|
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
|
|
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.ia5) >= 0) {
|
|
#else
|
|
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) {
|
|
#endif
|
|
ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(str);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(alt_names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert_subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
|
|
i = -1;
|
|
while (!ok && (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(cert_subject, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
|
|
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(cert_subject, i);
|
|
ASN1_STRING *value;
|
|
value = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
|
|
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, value) >= 0) {
|
|
ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(str);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* report the mismatch and indicate if SNI was used or not */
|
|
if (!ok && !conn->err_code)
|
|
conn->err_code = sni ? CO_ER_SSL_MISMATCH_SNI : CO_ER_SSL_MISMATCH;
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* prepare ssl context from servers options. Returns an error count */
|
|
int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct proxy *curproxy = srv->proxy;
|
|
int cfgerr = 0;
|
|
long options =
|
|
SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 |
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
|
|
long mode =
|
|
SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE |
|
|
SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER |
|
|
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS |
|
|
SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
|
|
int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
|
struct tls_version_filter *conf_ssl_methods = &srv->ssl_ctx.methods;
|
|
int i, min, max, hole;
|
|
int flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */
|
|
if (!ssl_initialize_random()) {
|
|
ha_alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n");
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Automatic memory computations need to know we use SSL there */
|
|
global.ssl_used_backend = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Initiate SSL context for current server */
|
|
if (!srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) {
|
|
if ((srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = calloc(1, global.nbthread*sizeof(*srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess))) == NULL) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] out of memory.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (srv->use_ssl == 1)
|
|
srv->xprt = &ssl_sock;
|
|
|
|
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to allocate ssl context.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
|
|
srv->id);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conf_ssl_methods->flags && (conf_ssl_methods->min || conf_ssl_methods->max))
|
|
ha_warning("config : %s '%s': no-sslv3/no-tlsv1x are ignored for server '%s'. "
|
|
"Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, srv->id);
|
|
else
|
|
flags = conf_ssl_methods->flags;
|
|
|
|
/* Real min and max should be determinate with configuration and openssl's capabilities */
|
|
if (conf_ssl_methods->min)
|
|
flags |= (methodVersions[conf_ssl_methods->min].flag - 1);
|
|
if (conf_ssl_methods->max)
|
|
flags |= ~((methodVersions[conf_ssl_methods->max].flag << 1) - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* find min, max and holes */
|
|
min = max = CONF_TLSV_NONE;
|
|
hole = 0;
|
|
for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++)
|
|
/* version is in openssl && version not disable in configuration */
|
|
if (methodVersions[i].option && !(flags & methodVersions[i].flag)) {
|
|
if (min) {
|
|
if (hole) {
|
|
ha_warning("config : %s '%s': SSL/TLS versions range not contiguous for server '%s'. "
|
|
"Hole find for %s. Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
methodVersions[hole].name);
|
|
hole = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
max = i;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
min = max = i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (min)
|
|
hole = i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!min) {
|
|
ha_alert("config : %s '%s': all SSL/TLS versions are disabled for server '%s'.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, srv->id);
|
|
cfgerr += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL)
|
|
/* Keep force-xxx implementation as it is in older haproxy. It's a
|
|
precautionary measure to avoid any surprise with older openssl version. */
|
|
if (min == max)
|
|
methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_CLIENT);
|
|
else
|
|
for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++)
|
|
if (flags & methodVersions[i].flag)
|
|
options |= methodVersions[i].option;
|
|
#else /* openssl >= 1.1.0 */
|
|
/* set the max_version is required to cap TLS version or activate new TLS (v1.3) */
|
|
methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MIN);
|
|
methodVersions[max].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MAX);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS)
|
|
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
mode |= SSL_MODE_ASYNC;
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, mode);
|
|
srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) {
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
|
|
ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
|
|
srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) <= 0) {
|
|
ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load ssl certificate from PEM file '%s'.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
|
|
srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) <= 0) {
|
|
ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': inconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n",
|
|
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
|
|
srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
|
|
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
|
|
switch (srv->ssl_ctx.verify) {
|
|
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE:
|
|
verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED:
|
|
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_verify(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx,
|
|
verify,
|
|
(srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host || (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) ? ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk : NULL);
|
|
if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) {
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file) {
|
|
/* set CAfile to verify */
|
|
if (!ssl_set_verify_locations_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file)) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to set CA file '%s'.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled by default but no CA file specified. If you're running on a LAN where you're certain to trust the server's certificate, please set an explicit 'verify none' statement on the 'server' line, or use 'ssl-server-verify none' in the global section to disable server-side verifications by default.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line);
|
|
else
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled but no CA file specified.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file) {
|
|
X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_set_cert_crl_file(store, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file)) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to configure CRL file '%s'.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT |
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, ssl_sess_new_srv_cb);
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers &&
|
|
!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s'.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites &&
|
|
!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s'.\n",
|
|
curproxy->id, srv->id,
|
|
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites);
|
|
cfgerr++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_srv_select_protos, srv);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, (unsigned char *)srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str, srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cfgerr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and prepares all certs. The pointer may
|
|
* be NULL, in which case nothing is done. Returns the number of errors
|
|
* encountered.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_prepare_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ebmb_node *node;
|
|
struct sni_ctx *sni;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
int errcode = 0;
|
|
char *errmsg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Automatic memory computations need to know we use SSL there */
|
|
global.ssl_used_frontend = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */
|
|
if (!ssl_initialize_random()) {
|
|
ha_alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n");
|
|
err++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Create initial_ctx used to start the ssl connection before do switchctx */
|
|
if (!bind_conf->initial_ctx) {
|
|
err += ssl_sock_initial_ctx(bind_conf);
|
|
/* It should not be necessary to call this function, but it's
|
|
necessary first to check and move all initialisation related
|
|
to initial_ctx in ssl_sock_initial_ctx. */
|
|
errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, NULL, bind_conf->initial_ctx, &errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
if (bind_conf->default_ctx)
|
|
errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, bind_conf->default_ssl_conf, bind_conf->default_ctx, &errmsg);
|
|
|
|
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx);
|
|
while (node) {
|
|
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
|
|
if (!sni->order && sni->ctx != bind_conf->default_ctx)
|
|
/* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence and
|
|
if it is not the default_ctx */
|
|
errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->conf, sni->ctx, &errmsg);
|
|
node = ebmb_next(node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx);
|
|
while (node) {
|
|
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
|
|
if (!sni->order && sni->ctx != bind_conf->default_ctx) {
|
|
/* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence and
|
|
if it is not the default_ctx */
|
|
errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->conf, sni->ctx, &errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
node = ebmb_next(node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (errcode & ERR_WARN) {
|
|
ha_warning("%s", errmsg);
|
|
} else if (errcode & ERR_CODE) {
|
|
ha_alert("%s", errmsg);
|
|
err++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(errmsg);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepares all the contexts for a bind_conf and allocates the shared SSL
|
|
* context if needed. Returns < 0 on error, 0 on success. The warnings and
|
|
* alerts are directly emitted since the rest of the stack does it below.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_prepare_bind_conf(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct proxy *px = bind_conf->frontend;
|
|
int alloc_ctx;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (!bind_conf->is_ssl) {
|
|
if (bind_conf->default_ctx) {
|
|
ha_warning("Proxy '%s': A certificate was specified but SSL was not enabled on bind '%s' at [%s:%d] (use 'ssl').\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) {
|
|
if (bind_conf->strict_sni && !bind_conf->generate_certs) {
|
|
ha_warning("Proxy '%s': no SSL certificate specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d], ssl connections will fail (use 'crt').\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s': no SSL certificate specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d] (use 'crt').\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_shctx && global.tune.sslcachesize) {
|
|
alloc_ctx = shctx_init(&ssl_shctx, global.tune.sslcachesize,
|
|
sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr) + SHSESS_BLOCK_MIN_SIZE, -1,
|
|
sizeof(*sh_ssl_sess_tree),
|
|
((global.nbthread > 1) || (!global_ssl.private_cache && (global.nbproc > 1))) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
if (alloc_ctx <= 0) {
|
|
if (alloc_ctx == SHCTX_E_INIT_LOCK)
|
|
ha_alert("Unable to initialize the lock for the shared SSL session cache. You can retry using the global statement 'tune.ssl.force-private-cache' but it could increase CPU usage due to renegotiations if nbproc > 1.\n");
|
|
else
|
|
ha_alert("Unable to allocate SSL session cache.\n");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* free block callback */
|
|
ssl_shctx->free_block = sh_ssl_sess_free_blocks;
|
|
/* init the root tree within the extra space */
|
|
sh_ssl_sess_tree = (void *)ssl_shctx + sizeof(struct shared_context);
|
|
*sh_ssl_sess_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE;
|
|
}
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
/* initialize all certificate contexts */
|
|
err += ssl_sock_prepare_all_ctx(bind_conf);
|
|
|
|
/* initialize CA variables if the certificates generation is enabled */
|
|
err += ssl_sock_load_ca(bind_conf);
|
|
|
|
return -err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* release ssl context allocated for servers. */
|
|
void ssl_sock_free_srv_ctx(struct server *srv)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str)
|
|
free(srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str)
|
|
free(srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < global.nbthread; i++)
|
|
free(srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[i].ptr);
|
|
free(srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (srv->ssl_ctx.ctx)
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and frees all the certs. The pointer may
|
|
* be NULL, in which case nothing is done. The default_ctx is nullified too.
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_sock_free_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ebmb_node *node, *back;
|
|
struct sni_ctx *sni;
|
|
|
|
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx);
|
|
while (node) {
|
|
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
|
|
back = ebmb_next(node);
|
|
ebmb_delete(node);
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx);
|
|
LIST_DEL(&sni->by_ckch_inst);
|
|
free(sni);
|
|
node = back;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx);
|
|
while (node) {
|
|
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
|
|
back = ebmb_next(node);
|
|
ebmb_delete(node);
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx);
|
|
LIST_DEL(&sni->by_ckch_inst);
|
|
free(sni);
|
|
node = back;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->initial_ctx);
|
|
bind_conf->initial_ctx = NULL;
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->default_ctx);
|
|
bind_conf->default_ctx = NULL;
|
|
bind_conf->default_ssl_conf = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssl_sock_deinit()
|
|
{
|
|
crtlist_deinit(); /* must be free'd before the ckchs */
|
|
ckch_deinit();
|
|
}
|
|
REGISTER_POST_DEINIT(ssl_sock_deinit);
|
|
|
|
/* Destroys all the contexts for a bind_conf. This is used during deinit(). */
|
|
void ssl_sock_destroy_bind_conf(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_sock_free_ca(bind_conf);
|
|
ssl_sock_free_all_ctx(bind_conf);
|
|
ssl_sock_free_ssl_conf(&bind_conf->ssl_conf);
|
|
free(bind_conf->ca_sign_file);
|
|
free(bind_conf->ca_sign_pass);
|
|
if (bind_conf->keys_ref && !--bind_conf->keys_ref->refcount) {
|
|
free(bind_conf->keys_ref->filename);
|
|
free(bind_conf->keys_ref->tlskeys);
|
|
LIST_DEL(&bind_conf->keys_ref->list);
|
|
free(bind_conf->keys_ref);
|
|
}
|
|
bind_conf->keys_ref = NULL;
|
|
bind_conf->ca_sign_pass = NULL;
|
|
bind_conf->ca_sign_file = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Load CA cert file and private key used to generate certificates */
|
|
int
|
|
ssl_sock_load_ca(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct proxy *px = bind_conf->frontend;
|
|
struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char *err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!bind_conf->generate_certs)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME && !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
if (global_ssl.ctx_cache) {
|
|
ssl_ctx_lru_tree = lru64_new(global_ssl.ctx_cache);
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_ctx_lru_seed = (unsigned int)time(NULL);
|
|
ssl_ctx_serial = now_ms;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!bind_conf->ca_sign_file) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s': cannot enable certificate generation, "
|
|
"no CA certificate File configured at [%s:%d].\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate cert structure */
|
|
ckch = calloc(1, sizeof(*ckch));
|
|
if (!ckch) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d]. Chain allocation failure\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try to parse file */
|
|
if (ssl_sock_load_files_into_ckch(bind_conf->ca_sign_file, ckch, &err)) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d]. Chain loading failed: %s\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line, err);
|
|
if (err) free(err);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fail if missing cert or pkey */
|
|
if ((!ckch->cert) || (!ckch->key)) {
|
|
ha_alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d]. Chain missing certificate or private key\n",
|
|
px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Final assignment to bind */
|
|
bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch = ckch;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
failed:
|
|
if (ckch) {
|
|
ssl_sock_free_cert_key_and_chain_contents(ckch);
|
|
free(ckch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bind_conf->generate_certs = 0;
|
|
ret++;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release CA cert and private key used to generate certificated */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_sock_free_ca(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
|
|
{
|
|
if (bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch) {
|
|
ssl_sock_free_cert_key_and_chain_contents(bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch);
|
|
free(bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch);
|
|
bind_conf->ca_sign_ckch = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is called if SSL * context is not yet allocated. The function
|
|
* is designed to be called before any other data-layer operation and sets the
|
|
* handshake flag on the connection. It is safe to call it multiple times.
|
|
* It returns 0 on success and -1 in error case.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn, void **xprt_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
/* already initialized */
|
|
if (*xprt_ctx)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx = pool_alloc(ssl_sock_ctx_pool);
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet = tasklet_new();
|
|
if (!ctx->wait_event.tasklet) {
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet->process = ssl_sock_io_cb;
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet->context = ctx;
|
|
ctx->wait_event.events = 0;
|
|
ctx->sent_early_data = 0;
|
|
ctx->early_buf = BUF_NULL;
|
|
ctx->conn = conn;
|
|
ctx->subs = NULL;
|
|
ctx->xprt_st = 0;
|
|
ctx->xprt_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Only work with sockets for now, this should be adapted when we'll
|
|
* add QUIC support.
|
|
*/
|
|
ctx->xprt = xprt_get(XPRT_RAW);
|
|
if (ctx->xprt->init) {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt->init(conn, &ctx->xprt_ctx) != 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (global.maxsslconn && sslconns >= global.maxsslconn) {
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_TOO_MANY;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If it is in client mode initiate SSL session
|
|
in connect state otherwise accept state */
|
|
if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
|
|
int may_retry = 1;
|
|
|
|
retry_connect:
|
|
/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
|
|
ctx->ssl = SSL_new(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx);
|
|
if (!ctx->ssl) {
|
|
if (may_retry--) {
|
|
pool_gc(NULL);
|
|
goto retry_connect;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->bio = BIO_new(ha_meth);
|
|
if (!ctx->bio) {
|
|
SSL_free(ctx->ssl);
|
|
ctx->ssl = NULL;
|
|
if (may_retry--) {
|
|
pool_gc(NULL);
|
|
goto retry_connect;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_data(ctx->bio, ctx);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(ctx->ssl, ctx->bio, ctx->bio);
|
|
|
|
/* set connection pointer */
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ctx->ssl, ssl_app_data_index, conn)) {
|
|
SSL_free(ctx->ssl);
|
|
ctx->ssl = NULL;
|
|
conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
|
|
if (may_retry--) {
|
|
pool_gc(NULL);
|
|
goto retry_connect;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(ctx->ssl);
|
|
if (__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
|
|
const unsigned char *ptr = __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &ptr, __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].size);
|
|
if (sess && !SSL_set_session(ctx->ssl, sess)) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
free(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
|
|
__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
|
|
} else if (sess) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* leave init state and start handshake */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
|
|
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sslconns, 1);
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalsslconns, 1);
|
|
*xprt_ctx = ctx;
|
|
/* Start the handshake */
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) {
|
|
int may_retry = 1;
|
|
|
|
retry_accept:
|
|
/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
|
|
ctx->ssl = SSL_new(__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->initial_ctx);
|
|
if (!ctx->ssl) {
|
|
if (may_retry--) {
|
|
pool_gc(NULL);
|
|
goto retry_accept;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->bio = BIO_new(ha_meth);
|
|
if (!ctx->bio) {
|
|
SSL_free(ctx->ssl);
|
|
ctx->ssl = NULL;
|
|
if (may_retry--) {
|
|
pool_gc(NULL);
|
|
goto retry_accept;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_set_data(ctx->bio, ctx);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(ctx->ssl, ctx->bio, ctx->bio);
|
|
|
|
/* set connection pointer */
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ctx->ssl, ssl_app_data_index, conn)) {
|
|
SSL_free(ctx->ssl);
|
|
ctx->ssl = NULL;
|
|
if (may_retry--) {
|
|
pool_gc(NULL);
|
|
goto retry_accept;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
|
|
if (__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) {
|
|
b_alloc(&ctx->early_buf);
|
|
SSL_set_max_early_data(ctx->ssl,
|
|
/* Only allow early data if we managed to allocate
|
|
* a buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
(!b_is_null(&ctx->early_buf)) ?
|
|
global.tune.bufsize - global.tune.maxrewrite : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_accept_state(ctx->ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* leave init state and start handshake */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
|
|
#ifdef SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sslconns, 1);
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalsslconns, 1);
|
|
*xprt_ctx = ctx;
|
|
/* Start the handshake */
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* don't know how to handle such a target */
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_TARGET;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (ctx && ctx->wait_event.tasklet)
|
|
tasklet_free(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is the callback which is used when an SSL handshake is pending. It
|
|
* updates the FD status if it wants some polling before being called again.
|
|
* It returns 0 if it fails in a fatal way or needs to poll to go further,
|
|
* otherwise it returns non-zero and removes itself from the connection's
|
|
* flags (the bit is provided in <flag> by the caller).
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct ssl_counters *counters = NULL;
|
|
struct ssl_counters *counters_px = NULL;
|
|
struct listener *li;
|
|
struct server *srv;
|
|
|
|
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* get counters */
|
|
switch (obj_type(conn->target)) {
|
|
case OBJ_TYPE_LISTENER:
|
|
li = objt_listener(conn->target);
|
|
counters = EXTRA_COUNTERS_GET(li->extra_counters, &ssl_stats_module);
|
|
counters_px = EXTRA_COUNTERS_GET(li->bind_conf->frontend->extra_counters_fe,
|
|
&ssl_stats_module);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case OBJ_TYPE_SERVER:
|
|
srv = objt_server(conn->target);
|
|
counters = EXTRA_COUNTERS_GET(srv->extra_counters, &ssl_stats_module);
|
|
counters_px = EXTRA_COUNTERS_GET(srv->proxy->extra_counters_be,
|
|
&ssl_stats_module);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!conn->xprt_ctx)
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we have early data. If we do, we have to read them
|
|
* before SSL_do_handshake() is called, And there's no way to
|
|
* detect early data, except to try to read them
|
|
*/
|
|
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS) {
|
|
size_t read_data = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
ret = SSL_read_early_data(ctx->ssl,
|
|
b_tail(&ctx->early_buf), b_room(&ctx->early_buf),
|
|
&read_data);
|
|
if (ret == SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR)
|
|
goto check_error;
|
|
if (read_data > 0) {
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
b_add(&ctx->early_buf, read_data);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH) {
|
|
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS;
|
|
if (!b_data(&ctx->early_buf))
|
|
b_free(&ctx->early_buf);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* If we use SSL_do_handshake to process a reneg initiated by
|
|
* the remote peer, it sometimes returns SSL_ERROR_SSL.
|
|
* Usually SSL_write and SSL_read are used and process implicitly
|
|
* the reneg handshake.
|
|
* Here we use SSL_peek as a workaround for reneg.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN) && SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) {
|
|
char c;
|
|
|
|
ret = SSL_peek(ctx->ssl, &c, 1);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
/* handshake may have not been completed, let's find why */
|
|
ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
|
|
/* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */
|
|
if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_SEND))
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
/* handshake may have been completed but we have
|
|
* no more data to read.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) {
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
goto reneg_ok;
|
|
}
|
|
/* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */
|
|
if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_RECV))
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_RECV, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC) {
|
|
ssl_async_process_fds(ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
|
|
/* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */
|
|
if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
|
|
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
|
|
if (!conn->err_code) {
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
|
/* do not handle empty handshakes in BoringSSL or LibreSSL */
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
#else
|
|
int empty_handshake;
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL)
|
|
/* use SSL_get_state() in OpenSSL >= 1.1.0; SSL_state() is broken */
|
|
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state = SSL_get_state((SSL *)ctx->ssl);
|
|
empty_handshake = state == TLS_ST_BEFORE;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* access packet_length directly in OpenSSL <= 1.0.2; SSL_state() is broken */
|
|
empty_handshake = !ctx->ssl->packet_length;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (empty_handshake) {
|
|
if (!errno) {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
|
|
else
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
|
|
else
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
|
|
else
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* BoringSSL or LibreSSL */
|
|
}
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */
|
|
/* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's
|
|
* buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on
|
|
* TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending
|
|
* data to avoid this as much as possible.
|
|
*/
|
|
conn_sock_drain(conn);
|
|
if (!conn->err_code)
|
|
conn->err_code = (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ?
|
|
CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* read some data: consider handshake completed */
|
|
goto reneg_ok;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_do_handshake(ctx->ssl);
|
|
check_error:
|
|
if (ret != 1) {
|
|
/* handshake did not complete, let's find why */
|
|
ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
|
|
/* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */
|
|
if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_SEND))
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
/* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */
|
|
if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_RECV))
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx,
|
|
SUB_RETRY_RECV, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC) {
|
|
ssl_async_process_fds(ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
|
|
/* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */
|
|
if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
|
|
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
|
|
if (!conn->err_code) {
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
|
/* do not handle empty handshakes in BoringSSL or LibreSSL */
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
#else
|
|
int empty_handshake;
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL)
|
|
/* use SSL_get_state() in OpenSSL >= 1.1.0; SSL_state() is broken */
|
|
OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state = SSL_get_state(ctx->ssl);
|
|
empty_handshake = state == TLS_ST_BEFORE;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* access packet_length directly in OpenSSL <= 1.0.2; SSL_state() is broken */
|
|
empty_handshake = !ctx->ssl->packet_length;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (empty_handshake) {
|
|
if (!errno) {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
|
|
else
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
|
|
else
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
|
|
else
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* BoringSSL or LibreSSL */
|
|
}
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */
|
|
/* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's
|
|
* buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on
|
|
* TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending
|
|
* data to avoid this as much as possible.
|
|
*/
|
|
conn_sock_drain(conn);
|
|
if (!conn->err_code)
|
|
conn->err_code = (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ?
|
|
CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
|
|
else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the server refused the early data, we have to send a
|
|
* 425 to the client, as we no longer have the data to sent
|
|
* them again.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_DATA) && (objt_server(conn->target))) {
|
|
if (SSL_get_early_data_status(ctx->ssl) == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EARLY_FAILED;
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
reneg_ok:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
/* ASYNC engine API doesn't support moving read/write
|
|
* buffers. So we disable ASYNC mode right after
|
|
* the handshake to avoid buffer overflow.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
SSL_clear_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Handshake succeeded */
|
|
if (!SSL_session_reused(ctx->ssl)) {
|
|
if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
|
|
update_freq_ctr(&global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec, 1);
|
|
if (global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr > global.ssl_be_keys_max)
|
|
global.ssl_be_keys_max = global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
update_freq_ctr(&global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec, 1);
|
|
if (global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr > global.ssl_fe_keys_max)
|
|
global.ssl_fe_keys_max = global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (counters) {
|
|
++counters->sess;
|
|
++counters_px->sess;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (counters) {
|
|
++counters->reused_sess;
|
|
++counters_px->reused_sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The connection is now established at both layers, it's time to leave */
|
|
conn->flags &= ~(flag | CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
out_error:
|
|
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
/* free resumed session if exists */
|
|
if (objt_server(conn->target) && __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
|
|
free(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
|
|
__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (counters) {
|
|
++counters->failed_handshake;
|
|
++counters_px->failed_handshake;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
|
|
if (!conn->err_code)
|
|
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called from the upper layer, to subscribe <es> to events <event_type>. The
|
|
* event subscriber <es> is not allowed to change from a previous call as long
|
|
* as at least one event is still subscribed. The <event_type> must only be a
|
|
* combination of SUB_RETRY_RECV and SUB_RETRY_SEND. It always returns 0,
|
|
* unless the transport layer was already released.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_subscribe(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int event_type, struct wait_event *es)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(event_type & ~(SUB_RETRY_SEND|SUB_RETRY_RECV));
|
|
BUG_ON(ctx->subs && ctx->subs != es);
|
|
|
|
ctx->subs = es;
|
|
es->events |= event_type;
|
|
|
|
/* we may have to subscribe to lower layers for new events */
|
|
event_type &= ~ctx->wait_event.events;
|
|
if (event_type && !(conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS))
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, event_type, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called from the upper layer, to unsubscribe <es> from events <event_type>.
|
|
* The <es> pointer is not allowed to differ from the one passed to the
|
|
* subscribe() call. It always returns zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_unsubscribe(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int event_type, struct wait_event *es)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(event_type & ~(SUB_RETRY_SEND|SUB_RETRY_RECV));
|
|
BUG_ON(ctx->subs && ctx->subs != es);
|
|
|
|
es->events &= ~event_type;
|
|
if (!es->events)
|
|
ctx->subs = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* If we subscribed, and we're not doing the handshake,
|
|
* then we subscribed because the upper layer asked for it,
|
|
* as the upper layer is no longer interested, we can
|
|
* unsubscribe too.
|
|
*/
|
|
event_type &= ctx->wait_event.events;
|
|
if (event_type && !(ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS))
|
|
conn_unsubscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, event_type, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The connection has been taken over, so destroy the old tasklet and create
|
|
* a new one. The original thread ID must be passed into orig_tid
|
|
* It should be called with the takeover lock for the old thread held.
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, and -1 on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_takeover(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int orig_tid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
struct tasklet *tl = tasklet_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!tl)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet->context = NULL;
|
|
tasklet_wakeup_on(ctx->wait_event.tasklet, orig_tid);
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet = tl;
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet->process = ssl_sock_io_cb;
|
|
ctx->wait_event.tasklet->context = ctx;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Use the provided XPRT as an underlying XPRT, and provide the old one.
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, and non-zero on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_add_xprt(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, void *toadd_ctx, const struct xprt_ops *toadd_ops, void **oldxprt_ctx, const struct xprt_ops **oldxprt_ops)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (oldxprt_ops != NULL)
|
|
*oldxprt_ops = ctx->xprt;
|
|
if (oldxprt_ctx != NULL)
|
|
*oldxprt_ctx = ctx->xprt_ctx;
|
|
ctx->xprt = toadd_ops;
|
|
ctx->xprt_ctx = toadd_ctx;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove the specified xprt. If if it our underlying XPRT, remove it and
|
|
* return 0, otherwise just call the remove_xprt method from the underlying
|
|
* XPRT.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_remove_xprt(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, void *toremove_ctx, const struct xprt_ops *newops, void *newctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->xprt_ctx == toremove_ctx) {
|
|
ctx->xprt_ctx = newctx;
|
|
ctx->xprt = newops;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return (ctx->xprt->remove_xprt(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, toremove_ctx, newops, newctx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct task *ssl_sock_io_cb(struct task *t, void *context, unsigned short state)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tasklet *tl = (struct tasklet *)t;
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = context;
|
|
struct connection *conn;
|
|
int conn_in_list;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
HA_SPIN_LOCK(OTHER_LOCK, &idle_conns[tid].takeover_lock);
|
|
if (tl->context == NULL) {
|
|
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(OTHER_LOCK, &idle_conns[tid].takeover_lock);
|
|
tasklet_free(tl);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
conn = ctx->conn;
|
|
conn_in_list = conn->flags & CO_FL_LIST_MASK;
|
|
if (conn_in_list)
|
|
MT_LIST_DEL(&conn->list);
|
|
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(OTHER_LOCK, &idle_conns[tid].takeover_lock);
|
|
/* First if we're doing an handshake, try that */
|
|
if (ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)
|
|
ssl_sock_handshake(ctx->conn, CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS);
|
|
/* If we had an error, or the handshake is done and I/O is available,
|
|
* let the upper layer know.
|
|
* If no mux was set up yet, then call conn_create_mux()
|
|
* we can't be sure conn_fd_handler() will be called again.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) ||
|
|
!(ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) {
|
|
int woke = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* On error, wake any waiter */
|
|
if (ctx->subs) {
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->subs->tasklet);
|
|
ctx->subs->events = 0;
|
|
woke = 1;
|
|
ctx->subs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we're the first xprt for the connection, let the
|
|
* upper layers know. If we have no mux, create it,
|
|
* and once we have a mux, call its wake method if we didn't
|
|
* woke a tasklet already.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ctx->conn->xprt_ctx == ctx) {
|
|
if (!ctx->conn->mux)
|
|
ret = conn_create_mux(ctx->conn);
|
|
if (ret >= 0 && !woke && ctx->conn->mux && ctx->conn->mux->wake)
|
|
ret = ctx->conn->mux->wake(ctx->conn);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
/* If we have early data and somebody wants to receive, let them */
|
|
else if (b_data(&ctx->early_buf) && ctx->subs &&
|
|
ctx->subs->events & SUB_RETRY_RECV) {
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->subs->tasklet);
|
|
ctx->subs->events &= ~SUB_RETRY_RECV;
|
|
if (!ctx->subs->events)
|
|
ctx->subs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
leave:
|
|
if (!ret && conn_in_list) {
|
|
struct server *srv = objt_server(conn->target);
|
|
|
|
if (conn_in_list == CO_FL_SAFE_LIST)
|
|
MT_LIST_ADDQ(&srv->safe_conns[tid], &conn->list);
|
|
else
|
|
MT_LIST_ADDQ(&srv->idle_conns[tid], &conn->list);
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Receive up to <count> bytes from connection <conn>'s socket and store them
|
|
* into buffer <buf>. Only one call to recv() is performed, unless the
|
|
* buffer wraps, in which case a second call may be performed. The connection's
|
|
* flags are updated with whatever special event is detected (error, read0,
|
|
* empty). The caller is responsible for taking care of those events and
|
|
* avoiding the call if inappropriate. The function does not call the
|
|
* connection's polling update function, so the caller is responsible for this.
|
|
*/
|
|
static size_t ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, struct buffer *buf, size_t count, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
|
size_t try, done = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
if (b_data(&ctx->early_buf)) {
|
|
try = b_contig_space(buf);
|
|
if (try > b_data(&ctx->early_buf))
|
|
try = b_data(&ctx->early_buf);
|
|
memcpy(b_tail(buf), b_head(&ctx->early_buf), try);
|
|
b_add(buf, try);
|
|
b_del(&ctx->early_buf, try);
|
|
if (b_data(&ctx->early_buf) == 0)
|
|
b_free(&ctx->early_buf);
|
|
return try;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS))
|
|
/* a handshake was requested */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* read the largest possible block. For this, we perform only one call
|
|
* to recv() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk,
|
|
* in which case we accept to do it once again. A new attempt is made on
|
|
* EINTR too.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
try = b_contig_space(buf);
|
|
if (!try)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (try > count)
|
|
try = count;
|
|
|
|
ret = SSL_read(ctx->ssl, b_tail(buf), try);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) {
|
|
/* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret > 0) {
|
|
b_add(buf, ret);
|
|
done += ret;
|
|
count -= ret;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret);
|
|
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
|
|
/* handshake is running, and it needs to enable write */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
/* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) {
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx,
|
|
SUB_RETRY_RECV,
|
|
&ctx->wait_event);
|
|
/* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable read */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
/* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
|
|
goto read0;
|
|
/* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure to clear the error
|
|
* stack before shutting down the connection for
|
|
* reading. */
|
|
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
|
|
goto clear_ssl_error;
|
|
/* otherwise it's a real error */
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
leave:
|
|
return done;
|
|
|
|
clear_ssl_error:
|
|
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
read0:
|
|
conn_sock_read0(conn);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
out_error:
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
|
|
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Send up to <count> pending bytes from buffer <buf> to connection <conn>'s
|
|
* socket. <flags> may contain some CO_SFL_* flags to hint the system about
|
|
* other pending data for example, but this flag is ignored at the moment.
|
|
* Only one call to send() is performed, unless the buffer wraps, in which case
|
|
* a second call may be performed. The connection's flags are updated with
|
|
* whatever special event is detected (error, empty). The caller is responsible
|
|
* for taking care of those events and avoiding the call if inappropriate. The
|
|
* function does not call the connection's polling update function, so the caller
|
|
* is responsible for this. The buffer's output is not adjusted, it's up to the
|
|
* caller to take care of this. It's up to the caller to update the buffer's
|
|
* contents based on the return value.
|
|
*/
|
|
static size_t ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, const struct buffer *buf, size_t count, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
|
size_t try, done;
|
|
|
|
done = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS))
|
|
/* a handshake was requested */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* send the largest possible block. For this we perform only one call
|
|
* to send() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk,
|
|
* in which case we accept to do it once again.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (count) {
|
|
#ifdef SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
|
|
size_t written_data;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
try = b_contig_data(buf, done);
|
|
if (try > count)
|
|
try = count;
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & CO_SFL_STREAMER) &&
|
|
!(ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED) &&
|
|
global_ssl.max_record && try > global_ssl.max_record) {
|
|
try = global_ssl.max_record;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* we need to keep the information about the fact that
|
|
* we're not limiting the upcoming send(), because if it
|
|
* fails, we'll have to retry with at least as many data.
|
|
*/
|
|
ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
|
|
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ctx->ssl) && conn_is_back(conn)) {
|
|
unsigned int max_early;
|
|
|
|
if (objt_listener(conn->target))
|
|
max_early = SSL_get_max_early_data(ctx->ssl);
|
|
else {
|
|
if (SSL_get0_session(ctx->ssl))
|
|
max_early = SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(SSL_get0_session(ctx->ssl));
|
|
else
|
|
max_early = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (try + ctx->sent_early_data > max_early) {
|
|
try -= (try + ctx->sent_early_data) - max_early;
|
|
if (try <= 0) {
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_write_early_data(ctx->ssl, b_peek(buf, done), try, &written_data);
|
|
if (ret == 1) {
|
|
ret = written_data;
|
|
ctx->sent_early_data += ret;
|
|
if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
/* Initiate the handshake, now */
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
ret = SSL_write(ctx->ssl, b_peek(buf, done), try);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) {
|
|
/* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret > 0) {
|
|
/* A send succeeded, so we can consider ourself connected */
|
|
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4L6;
|
|
ctx->xprt_st &= ~SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED;
|
|
count -= ret;
|
|
done += ret;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
|
|
if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) {
|
|
/* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable write */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event);
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
/* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
/* handshake is running, and it needs to enable read */
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
|
|
ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx,
|
|
SUB_RETRY_RECV,
|
|
&ctx->wait_event);
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
/* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/
|
|
if (global_ssl.async)
|
|
SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC);
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
leave:
|
|
return done;
|
|
|
|
out_error:
|
|
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_sock_close(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx) {
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
if (ctx->wait_event.events != 0)
|
|
ctx->xprt->unsubscribe(ctx->conn, ctx->xprt_ctx,
|
|
ctx->wait_event.events,
|
|
&ctx->wait_event);
|
|
if (ctx->subs) {
|
|
ctx->subs->events = 0;
|
|
tasklet_wakeup(ctx->subs->tasklet);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->xprt->close)
|
|
ctx->xprt->close(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx);
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_ASYNC
|
|
if (global_ssl.async) {
|
|
OSSL_ASYNC_FD all_fd[32], afd;
|
|
size_t num_all_fds = 0;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
SSL_get_all_async_fds(ctx->ssl, NULL, &num_all_fds);
|
|
if (num_all_fds > 32) {
|
|
send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_get_all_async_fds(ctx->ssl, all_fd, &num_all_fds);
|
|
|
|
/* If an async job is pending, we must try to
|
|
to catch the end using polling before calling
|
|
SSL_free */
|
|
if (num_all_fds && SSL_waiting_for_async(ctx->ssl)) {
|
|
for (i=0 ; i < num_all_fds ; i++) {
|
|
/* switch on an handler designed to
|
|
* handle the SSL_free
|
|
*/
|
|
afd = all_fd[i];
|
|
fdtab[afd].iocb = ssl_async_fd_free;
|
|
fdtab[afd].owner = ctx->ssl;
|
|
fd_want_recv(afd);
|
|
/* To ensure that the fd cache won't be used
|
|
* and we'll catch a real RD event.
|
|
*/
|
|
fd_cant_recv(afd);
|
|
}
|
|
tasklet_free(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx);
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&jobs, 1);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Else we can remove the fds from the fdtab
|
|
* and call SSL_free.
|
|
* note: we do a fd_stop_both and not a delete
|
|
* because the fd is owned by the engine.
|
|
* the engine is responsible to close
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i=0 ; i < num_all_fds ; i++)
|
|
fd_stop_both(all_fd[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL_free(ctx->ssl);
|
|
b_free(&ctx->early_buf);
|
|
tasklet_free(ctx->wait_event.tasklet);
|
|
pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx);
|
|
_HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sslconns, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function tries to perform a clean shutdown on an SSL connection, and in
|
|
* any case, flags the connection as reusable if no handshake was in progress.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ssl_sock_shutw(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int clean)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS))
|
|
return;
|
|
if (!clean)
|
|
/* don't sent notify on SSL_shutdown */
|
|
SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx->ssl, 1);
|
|
/* no handshake was in progress, try a clean ssl shutdown */
|
|
if (SSL_shutdown(ctx->ssl) <= 0) {
|
|
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
|
|
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* used for ppv2 pkey algo (can be used for logging) */
|
|
int ssl_sock_get_pkey_algo(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *out)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
X509 *crt;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
crt = SSL_get_certificate(ctx->ssl);
|
|
if (!crt)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return cert_get_pkey_algo(crt, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* used for ppv2 cert signature (can be used for logging) */
|
|
const char *ssl_sock_get_cert_sig(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
__OPENSSL_110_CONST__ ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm;
|
|
X509 *crt;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
crt = SSL_get_certificate(ctx->ssl);
|
|
if (!crt)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorithm, NULL, NULL, X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(crt));
|
|
return OBJ_nid2sn(OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* used for ppv2 authority */
|
|
const char *ssl_sock_get_sni(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
return SSL_get_servername(ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
|
|
#else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* used for logging/ppv2, may be changed for a sample fetch later */
|
|
const char *ssl_sock_get_cipher_name(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
return SSL_get_cipher_name(ctx->ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* used for logging/ppv2, may be changed for a sample fetch later */
|
|
const char *ssl_sock_get_proto_version(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
return SSL_get_version(ctx->ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_sock_set_alpn(struct connection *conn, const unsigned char *alpn, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
SSL_set_alpn_protos(ctx->ssl, alpn, len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sets advertised SNI for outgoing connections. Please set <hostname> to NULL
|
|
* to disable SNI.
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_sock_set_servername(struct connection *conn, const char *hostname)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
char *prev_name;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/* if the SNI changes, we must destroy the reusable context so that a
|
|
* new connection will present a new SNI. As an optimization we could
|
|
* later imagine having a small cache of ssl_ctx to hold a few SNI per
|
|
* server.
|
|
*/
|
|
prev_name = (char *)SSL_get_servername(ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
|
|
if ((!prev_name && hostname) ||
|
|
(prev_name && (!hostname || strcmp(hostname, prev_name) != 0)))
|
|
SSL_set_session(ctx->ssl, NULL);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ctx->ssl, hostname);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Extract peer certificate's common name into the chunk dest
|
|
* Returns
|
|
* the len of the extracted common name
|
|
* or 0 if no CN found in DN
|
|
* or -1 on error case (i.e. no peer certificate)
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_sock_get_remote_common_name(struct connection *conn,
|
|
struct buffer *dest)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
X509 *crt = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
const char find_cn[] = "CN";
|
|
const struct buffer find_cn_chunk = {
|
|
.area = (char *)&find_cn,
|
|
.data = sizeof(find_cn)-1
|
|
};
|
|
int result = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
|
|
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl);
|
|
if (!crt)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
name = X509_get_subject_name(crt);
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
result = ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &find_cn_chunk, 1, dest);
|
|
out:
|
|
if (crt)
|
|
X509_free(crt);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* returns 1 if client passed a certificate for this session, 0 if not */
|
|
int ssl_sock_get_cert_used_sess(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
X509 *crt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
|
|
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl);
|
|
if (!crt)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
X509_free(crt);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* returns 1 if client passed a certificate for this connection, 0 if not */
|
|
int ssl_sock_get_cert_used_conn(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
return SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE & ctx->xprt_st ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* returns result from SSL verify */
|
|
unsigned int ssl_sock_get_verify_result(struct connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
|
|
return (unsigned int)X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
|
|
ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
|
|
return (unsigned int)SSL_get_verify_result(ctx->ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Returns the application layer protocol name in <str> and <len> when known.
|
|
* Zero is returned if the protocol name was not found, otherwise non-zero is
|
|
* returned. The string is allocated in the SSL context and doesn't have to be
|
|
* freed by the caller. NPN is also checked if available since older versions
|
|
* of openssl (1.0.1) which are more common in field only support this one.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_sock_get_alpn(const struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, const char **str, int *len)
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || \
|
|
defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx;
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*str = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(ctx->ssl, (const unsigned char **)str, (unsigned *)len);
|
|
if (*str)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(ctx->ssl, (const unsigned char **)str, (unsigned *)len);
|
|
if (*str)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* "issuers-chain-path" load chain certificate in global */
|
|
int ssl_load_global_issuer_from_BIO(BIO *in, char *fp, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *ca;
|
|
X509_NAME *name = NULL;
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
|
|
struct issuer_chain *issuer;
|
|
struct eb64_node *node;
|
|
char *path;
|
|
u64 key;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
if (chain == NULL) {
|
|
chain = sk_X509_new_null();
|
|
skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(ca, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
|
|
name = X509_get_subject_name(ca);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(chain, ca)) {
|
|
X509_free(ca);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!chain) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "unable to load issuers-chain %s : pem certificate not found.\n", fp);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!skid) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "unable to load issuers-chain %s : SubjectKeyIdentifier not found.\n", fp);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "unable to load issuers-chain %s : SubjectName not found.\n", fp);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
key = XXH64(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(skid), ASN1_STRING_length(skid), 0);
|
|
for (node = eb64_lookup(&cert_issuer_tree, key); node; node = eb64_next(node)) {
|
|
issuer = container_of(node, typeof(*issuer), node);
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(name, X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(issuer->chain, 0)))) {
|
|
memprintf(err, "duplicate issuers-chain %s: %s already in store\n", fp, issuer->path);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
issuer = calloc(1, sizeof *issuer);
|
|
path = strdup(fp);
|
|
if (!issuer || !path) {
|
|
free(issuer);
|
|
free(path);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
issuer->node.key = key;
|
|
issuer->path = path;
|
|
issuer->chain = chain;
|
|
chain = NULL;
|
|
eb64_insert(&cert_issuer_tree, &issuer->node);
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
end:
|
|
if (skid)
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(skid);
|
|
if (chain)
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct issuer_chain* ssl_get0_issuer_chain(X509 *cert)
|
|
{
|
|
AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid;
|
|
struct issuer_chain *issuer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (akid && akid->keyid) {
|
|
struct eb64_node *node;
|
|
u64 hk;
|
|
hk = XXH64(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(akid->keyid), ASN1_STRING_length(akid->keyid), 0);
|
|
for (node = eb64_lookup(&cert_issuer_tree, hk); node; node = eb64_next(node)) {
|
|
struct issuer_chain *ti = container_of(node, typeof(*issuer), node);
|
|
if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(ti->chain, 0), cert) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
issuer = ti;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid);
|
|
}
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_free_global_issuers(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct eb64_node *node, *back;
|
|
struct issuer_chain *issuer;
|
|
|
|
node = eb64_first(&cert_issuer_tree);
|
|
while (node) {
|
|
issuer = container_of(node, typeof(*issuer), node);
|
|
back = eb64_next(node);
|
|
eb64_delete(node);
|
|
free(issuer->path);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(issuer->chain, X509_free);
|
|
free(issuer);
|
|
node = back;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
static int ssl_check_async_engine_count(void) {
|
|
int err_code = ERR_NONE;
|
|
|
|
if (global_ssl.async && (openssl_engines_initialized > 32)) {
|
|
ha_alert("ssl-mode-async only supports a maximum of 32 engines.\n");
|
|
err_code = ERR_ABORT;
|
|
}
|
|
return err_code;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* This function is used with TLS ticket keys management. It permits to browse
|
|
* each reference. The variable <getnext> must contain the current node,
|
|
* <end> point to the root node.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
static inline
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_list_get_next(struct tls_keys_ref *getnext, struct list *end)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref = getnext;
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
/* Get next list entry. */
|
|
ref = LIST_NEXT(&ref->list, struct tls_keys_ref *, list);
|
|
|
|
/* If the entry is the last of the list, return NULL. */
|
|
if (&ref->list == end)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return ref;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookup_ref(const char *reference)
|
|
{
|
|
int id;
|
|
char *error;
|
|
|
|
/* If the reference starts by a '#', this is numeric id. */
|
|
if (reference[0] == '#') {
|
|
/* Try to convert the numeric id. If the conversion fails, the lookup fails. */
|
|
id = strtol(reference + 1, &error, 10);
|
|
if (*error != '\0')
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the unique id lookup. */
|
|
return tlskeys_ref_lookupid(id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the string lookup. */
|
|
return tlskeys_ref_lookup(reference);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
|
|
static int cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files(struct appctx *appctx);
|
|
|
|
static inline int cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries(struct appctx *appctx) {
|
|
return cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files(appctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* dumps all tls keys. Relies on cli.i0 (non-null = only list file names), cli.i1
|
|
* (next index to be dumped), and cli.p0 (next key reference).
|
|
*/
|
|
static int cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files(struct appctx *appctx) {
|
|
|
|
struct stream_interface *si = appctx->owner;
|
|
|
|
switch (appctx->st2) {
|
|
case STAT_ST_INIT:
|
|
/* Display the column headers. If the message cannot be sent,
|
|
* quit the function with returning 0. The function is called
|
|
* later and restart at the state "STAT_ST_INIT".
|
|
*/
|
|
chunk_reset(&trash);
|
|
|
|
if (appctx->io_handler == cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries)
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "# id secret\n");
|
|
else
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "# id (file)\n");
|
|
|
|
if (ci_putchk(si_ic(si), &trash) == -1) {
|
|
si_rx_room_blk(si);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now, we start the browsing of the references lists.
|
|
* Note that the following call to LIST_ELEM return bad pointer. The only
|
|
* available field of this pointer is <list>. It is used with the function
|
|
* tlskeys_list_get_next() for retruning the first available entry
|
|
*/
|
|
if (appctx->ctx.cli.p0 == NULL) {
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = LIST_ELEM(&tlskeys_reference, struct tls_keys_ref *, list);
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = tlskeys_list_get_next(appctx->ctx.cli.p0, &tlskeys_reference);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
appctx->st2 = STAT_ST_LIST;
|
|
/* fall through */
|
|
|
|
case STAT_ST_LIST:
|
|
while (appctx->ctx.cli.p0) {
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref = appctx->ctx.cli.p0;
|
|
|
|
chunk_reset(&trash);
|
|
if (appctx->io_handler == cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries && appctx->ctx.cli.i1 == 0)
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "# ");
|
|
|
|
if (appctx->ctx.cli.i1 == 0)
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d (%s)\n", ref->unique_id, ref->filename);
|
|
|
|
if (appctx->io_handler == cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries) {
|
|
int head;
|
|
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
head = ref->tls_ticket_enc_index;
|
|
while (appctx->ctx.cli.i1 < TLS_TICKETS_NO) {
|
|
struct buffer *t2 = get_trash_chunk();
|
|
|
|
chunk_reset(t2);
|
|
/* should never fail here because we dump only a key in the t2 buffer */
|
|
if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) {
|
|
t2->data = a2base64((char *)(ref->tlskeys + (head + 2 + appctx->ctx.cli.i1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO),
|
|
sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_128),
|
|
t2->area, t2->size);
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d.%d %s\n", ref->unique_id, appctx->ctx.cli.i1,
|
|
t2->area);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256) {
|
|
t2->data = a2base64((char *)(ref->tlskeys + (head + 2 + appctx->ctx.cli.i1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO),
|
|
sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_256),
|
|
t2->area, t2->size);
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d.%d %s\n", ref->unique_id, appctx->ctx.cli.i1,
|
|
t2->area);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* This case should never happen */
|
|
chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d.%d <unknown>\n", ref->unique_id, appctx->ctx.cli.i1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ci_putchk(si_ic(si), &trash) == -1) {
|
|
/* let's try again later from this stream. We add ourselves into
|
|
* this stream's users so that it can remove us upon termination.
|
|
*/
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
si_rx_room_blk(si);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.i1++;
|
|
}
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.i1 = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ci_putchk(si_ic(si), &trash) == -1) {
|
|
/* let's try again later from this stream. We add ourselves into
|
|
* this stream's users so that it can remove us upon termination.
|
|
*/
|
|
si_rx_room_blk(si);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (appctx->ctx.cli.i0 == 0) /* don't display everything if not necessary */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* get next list entry and check the end of the list */
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = tlskeys_list_get_next(appctx->ctx.cli.p0, &tlskeys_reference);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
appctx->st2 = STAT_ST_FIN;
|
|
/* fall through */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
appctx->st2 = STAT_ST_FIN;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* sets cli.i0 to non-zero if only file lists should be dumped */
|
|
static int cli_parse_show_tlskeys(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private)
|
|
{
|
|
/* no parameter, shows only file list */
|
|
if (!*args[2]) {
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.i0 = 1;
|
|
appctx->io_handler = cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (args[2][0] == '*') {
|
|
/* list every TLS ticket keys */
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.i0 = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = tlskeys_ref_lookup_ref(args[2]);
|
|
if (!appctx->ctx.cli.p0)
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'show tls-keys' unable to locate referenced filename\n");
|
|
}
|
|
appctx->io_handler = cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cli_parse_set_tlskeys(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tls_keys_ref *ref;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Expect two parameters: the filename and the new new TLS key in encoding */
|
|
if (!*args[3] || !*args[4])
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' expects a filename and the new TLS key in base64 encoding.\n");
|
|
|
|
ref = tlskeys_ref_lookup_ref(args[3]);
|
|
if (!ref)
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' unable to locate referenced filename\n");
|
|
|
|
ret = base64dec(args[4], strlen(args[4]), trash.area, trash.size);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' received invalid base64 encoded TLS key.\n");
|
|
|
|
trash.data = ret;
|
|
if (ssl_sock_update_tlskey_ref(ref, &trash) < 0)
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' received a key of wrong size.\n");
|
|
|
|
return cli_msg(appctx, LOG_INFO, "TLS ticket key updated!\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int cli_parse_set_ocspresponse(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private)
|
|
{
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
char *err = NULL;
|
|
int i, j, ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!payload)
|
|
payload = args[3];
|
|
|
|
/* Expect one parameter: the new response in base64 encoding */
|
|
if (!*payload)
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl ocsp-response' expects response in base64 encoding.\n");
|
|
|
|
/* remove \r and \n from the payload */
|
|
for (i = 0, j = 0; payload[i]; i++) {
|
|
if (payload[i] == '\r' || payload[i] == '\n')
|
|
continue;
|
|
payload[j++] = payload[i];
|
|
}
|
|
payload[j] = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = base64dec(payload, j, trash.area, trash.size);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl ocsp-response' received invalid base64 encoded response.\n");
|
|
|
|
trash.data = ret;
|
|
if (ssl_sock_update_ocsp_response(&trash, &err)) {
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return cli_dynerr(appctx, memprintf(&err, "%s.\n", err));
|
|
else
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "Failed to update OCSP response.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return cli_msg(appctx, LOG_INFO, "OCSP Response updated!\n");
|
|
#else
|
|
return cli_err(appctx, "HAProxy was compiled against a version of OpenSSL that doesn't support OCSP stapling.\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* register cli keywords */
|
|
static struct cli_kw_list cli_kws = {{ },{
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
{ { "show", "tls-keys", NULL }, "show tls-keys [id|*]: show tls keys references or dump tls ticket keys when id specified", cli_parse_show_tlskeys, NULL },
|
|
{ { "set", "ssl", "tls-key", NULL }, "set ssl tls-key [id|keyfile] <tlskey>: set the next TLS key for the <id> or <keyfile> listener to <tlskey>", cli_parse_set_tlskeys, NULL },
|
|
#endif
|
|
{ { "set", "ssl", "ocsp-response", NULL }, NULL, cli_parse_set_ocspresponse, NULL },
|
|
{ { NULL }, NULL, NULL, NULL }
|
|
}};
|
|
|
|
INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, cli_register_kw, &cli_kws);
|
|
|
|
/* transport-layer operations for SSL sockets */
|
|
struct xprt_ops ssl_sock = {
|
|
.snd_buf = ssl_sock_from_buf,
|
|
.rcv_buf = ssl_sock_to_buf,
|
|
.subscribe = ssl_subscribe,
|
|
.unsubscribe = ssl_unsubscribe,
|
|
.remove_xprt = ssl_remove_xprt,
|
|
.add_xprt = ssl_add_xprt,
|
|
.rcv_pipe = NULL,
|
|
.snd_pipe = NULL,
|
|
.shutr = NULL,
|
|
.shutw = ssl_sock_shutw,
|
|
.close = ssl_sock_close,
|
|
.init = ssl_sock_init,
|
|
.prepare_bind_conf = ssl_sock_prepare_bind_conf,
|
|
.destroy_bind_conf = ssl_sock_destroy_bind_conf,
|
|
.prepare_srv = ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx,
|
|
.destroy_srv = ssl_sock_free_srv_ctx,
|
|
.get_alpn = ssl_sock_get_alpn,
|
|
.takeover = ssl_takeover,
|
|
.name = "SSL",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
enum act_return ssl_action_wait_for_hs(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
|
|
struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct connection *conn;
|
|
struct conn_stream *cs;
|
|
|
|
conn = objt_conn(sess->origin);
|
|
cs = objt_cs(s->si[0].end);
|
|
|
|
if (conn && cs) {
|
|
if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) {
|
|
cs->flags |= CS_FL_WAIT_FOR_HS;
|
|
s->req.flags |= CF_READ_NULL;
|
|
return ACT_RET_YIELD;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (ACT_RET_CONT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static enum act_parse_ret ssl_parse_wait_for_hs(const char **args, int *orig_arg, struct proxy *px, struct act_rule *rule, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
rule->action_ptr = ssl_action_wait_for_hs;
|
|
|
|
return ACT_RET_PRS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct action_kw_list http_req_actions = {ILH, {
|
|
{ "wait-for-handshake", ssl_parse_wait_for_hs },
|
|
{ /* END */ }
|
|
}};
|
|
|
|
INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, http_req_keywords_register, &http_req_actions);
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_sock_sctl_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ptr) {
|
|
chunk_destroy(ptr);
|
|
free(ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
static void ssl_sock_ocsp_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ocsp_cbk_arg *ocsp_arg;
|
|
|
|
if (ptr) {
|
|
ocsp_arg = ptr;
|
|
|
|
if (ocsp_arg->is_single) {
|
|
ssl_sock_free_ocsp(ocsp_arg->s_ocsp);
|
|
ocsp_arg->s_ocsp = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
|
|
ssl_sock_free_ocsp(ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[i]);
|
|
ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[i] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
free(ocsp_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_sock_capture_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_capture, ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
static void ssl_sock_keylog_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_keylog *keylog;
|
|
|
|
if (!ptr)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
keylog = ptr;
|
|
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->client_random);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->client_early_traffic_secret);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->client_handshake_traffic_secret);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->server_handshake_traffic_secret);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->client_traffic_secret_0);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->server_traffic_secret_0);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->exporter_secret);
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog_str, keylog->early_exporter_secret);
|
|
|
|
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_keylog, ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
__attribute__((constructor))
|
|
static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP) && !defined(SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)* cm;
|
|
int n;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers)
|
|
global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers);
|
|
if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers)
|
|
global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers);
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
|
|
if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites)
|
|
global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites);
|
|
if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites)
|
|
global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
xprt_register(XPRT_SSL, &ssl_sock);
|
|
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
|
SSL_library_init();
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP) && !defined(SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
|
|
cm = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
|
|
n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(cm);
|
|
while (n--) {
|
|
(void) sk_SSL_COMP_pop(cm);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(USE_THREAD) && (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
|
|
ssl_locking_init();
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
sctl_ex_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_sctl_free_func);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
ocsp_ex_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_ocsp_free_func);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ssl_app_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
ssl_capture_ptr_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_capture_free_func);
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
|
|
ssl_keylog_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_keylog_free_func);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
|
|
hap_register_post_check(ssl_check_async_engine_count);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0)
|
|
hap_register_post_check(tlskeys_finalize_config);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
global.ssl_session_max_cost = SSL_SESSION_MAX_COST;
|
|
global.ssl_handshake_max_cost = SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAX_COST;
|
|
|
|
hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_free_global_issuers);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
ssl_dh_ptr_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_free_dh);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_free_engines);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Load SSL string for the verbose & debug mode. */
|
|
ERR_load_SSL_strings();
|
|
ha_meth = BIO_meth_new(0x666, "ha methods");
|
|
BIO_meth_set_write(ha_meth, ha_ssl_write);
|
|
BIO_meth_set_read(ha_meth, ha_ssl_read);
|
|
BIO_meth_set_ctrl(ha_meth, ha_ssl_ctrl);
|
|
BIO_meth_set_create(ha_meth, ha_ssl_new);
|
|
BIO_meth_set_destroy(ha_meth, ha_ssl_free);
|
|
BIO_meth_set_puts(ha_meth, ha_ssl_puts);
|
|
BIO_meth_set_gets(ha_meth, ha_ssl_gets);
|
|
|
|
HA_SPIN_INIT(&ckch_lock);
|
|
|
|
/* Try to register dedicated SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks for
|
|
* heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160) and clienthello.
|
|
*/
|
|
hap_register_post_check(ssl_sock_register_msg_callbacks);
|
|
|
|
/* Try to free all callbacks that were registered by using
|
|
* ssl_sock_register_msg_callback().
|
|
*/
|
|
hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_sock_unregister_msg_callbacks);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute and register the version string */
|
|
static void ssl_register_build_options()
|
|
{
|
|
char *ptr = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
memprintf(&ptr, "Built with OpenSSL version : "
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
"BoringSSL");
|
|
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
|
|
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
|
|
"\nRunning on OpenSSL version : %s%s",
|
|
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION),
|
|
((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ OpenSSL_version_num()) >> 8) ? " (VERSIONS DIFFER!)" : "");
|
|
#endif
|
|
memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports TLS extensions : "
|
|
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
|
|
"no (library version too old)"
|
|
#elif defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
|
|
"no (disabled via OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)"
|
|
#else
|
|
"yes"
|
|
#endif
|
|
"", ptr);
|
|
|
|
memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports SNI : "
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
"yes"
|
|
#else
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
"no (because of OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)"
|
|
#else
|
|
"no (version might be too old, 0.9.8f min needed)"
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
"", ptr);
|
|
|
|
memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports :", ptr);
|
|
for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++)
|
|
if (methodVersions[i].option)
|
|
memprintf(&ptr, "%s %s", ptr, methodVersions[i].name);
|
|
|
|
hap_register_build_opts(ptr, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INITCALL0(STG_REGISTER, ssl_register_build_options);
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
void ssl_free_engines(void) {
|
|
struct ssl_engine_list *wl, *wlb;
|
|
/* free up engine list */
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(wl, wlb, &openssl_engines, list) {
|
|
ENGINE_finish(wl->e);
|
|
ENGINE_free(wl->e);
|
|
LIST_DEL(&wl->list);
|
|
free(wl);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
void ssl_free_dh(void) {
|
|
if (local_dh_1024) {
|
|
DH_free(local_dh_1024);
|
|
local_dh_1024 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (local_dh_2048) {
|
|
DH_free(local_dh_2048);
|
|
local_dh_2048 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (local_dh_4096) {
|
|
DH_free(local_dh_4096);
|
|
local_dh_4096 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (global_dh) {
|
|
DH_free(global_dh);
|
|
global_dh = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
__attribute__((destructor))
|
|
static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME && !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
|
|
if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) {
|
|
lru64_destroy(ssl_ctx_lru_tree);
|
|
HA_RWLOCK_DESTROY(&ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
|
|
ERR_remove_state(0);
|
|
ERR_free_strings();
|
|
|
|
EVP_cleanup();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) && (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
|
|
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
|
|
#endif
|
|
BIO_meth_free(ha_meth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Activate ssl on server <s>.
|
|
* do nothing if there is no change to apply
|
|
*
|
|
* Must be called with the server lock held.
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_sock_set_srv(struct server *s, signed char use_ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->use_ssl == use_ssl)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
s->use_ssl = use_ssl;
|
|
if (s->use_ssl == 1)
|
|
s->xprt = &ssl_sock;
|
|
else
|
|
s->xprt = s->check.xprt = s->agent.xprt = xprt_get(XPRT_RAW);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Local variables:
|
|
* c-indent-level: 8
|
|
* c-basic-offset: 8
|
|
* End:
|
|
*/
|