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45f40bac4c
This commit introduces a new global setting named
harden.reject_privileged_ports.{tcp|quic}. When active, communications
with clients which use privileged source ports are forbidden. Such
behavior is considered suspicious as it can be used as spoofing or
DNS/NTP amplication attack.
Value is configured per transport protocol. For each TCP and QUIC
distinct code locations are impacted by this setting. The first one is
in sock_accept_conn() which acts as a filter for all TCP based
communications just after accept() returns a new connection. The second
one is dedicated for QUIC communication in quic_recv(). In both cases,
if a privileged source port is used and setting is disabled, received
message is silently dropped.
By default, protection are disabled for both protocols. This is to be
able to backport it without breaking changes on stable release.
This should be backported as it is an interesting security feature yet
relatively simple to implement.
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| .. | ||
| design-thoughts | ||
| internals | ||
| lua-api | ||
| 51Degrees-device-detection.txt | ||
| acl.fig | ||
| architecture.txt | ||
| coding-style.txt | ||
| configuration.txt | ||
| cookie-options.txt | ||
| DeviceAtlas-device-detection.txt | ||
| gpl.txt | ||
| haproxy.1 | ||
| intro.txt | ||
| lgpl.txt | ||
| linux-syn-cookies.txt | ||
| lua.txt | ||
| management.txt | ||
| netscaler-client-ip-insertion-protocol.txt | ||
| network-namespaces.txt | ||
| peers-v2.0.txt | ||
| peers.txt | ||
| proxy-protocol.txt | ||
| queuing.fig | ||
| regression-testing.txt | ||
| seamless_reload.txt | ||
| SOCKS4.protocol.txt | ||
| SPOE.txt | ||
| WURFL-device-detection.txt | ||