We now have functions to retrieve one block and one line from
either the input or the output part of a buffer. They return
up to two (pointer,length) values in case the buffer wraps.
These modifications are done for resolving cross-dependent
includes in the upcoming LUA code.
<proto/channel.h> misses <types/channel.h>.
<types/acl.h> doesn't use <types/session.h> because the session
is already declared in the file as undefined pointer.
appsession.c misses <unistd.h> to use "write()".
Declare undefined pointer "struct session" for <types/proxy.h>
and <types/queue.h>. These includes dont need the detail of this
struct.
It applies to the channel and it doesn't erase outgoing data, only
pending unread data, which is strictly equivalent to what recv()
does with MSG_TRUNC, so that new name is more accurate and intuitive.
This name more accurately reminds that it applies to a channel and not
to a buffer, and that what is returned may be used as a max number of
bytes to pass to recv().
This applies to the channel, not the buffer, so let's fix this name.
Warning, the function's name happens to be the same as the old one
which was mistakenly used during 1.5.
This function's name was poorly chosen and is confusing to the point of
being suspiciously used at some places. The operations it does always
consider the ability to forward pending input data before receiving new
data. This is not obvious at all, especially at some places where it was
used when consuming outgoing data to know if the buffer has any chance
to ever get the missing data. The code needs to be re-audited with that
in mind. Care must be taken with existing code since the polarity of the
function was switched with the renaming.
channel_reserved is confusingly named. It is used to know whether or
not the rewrite area is left intact for situations where we want to
ensure we can use it before proceeding. Let's rename it to fix this
confusion.
Option http-send-name-header is still hurting. If a POST request has to be
redispatched when this option is used, and the next server's name is larger
than the initial one, and the POST body fills the buffer, it becomes
impossible to rewrite the server's name in the buffer when redispatching.
In 1.4, this is worse, the process may crash because of a negative size
computation for the memmove().
The only solution to fix this is to refrain from eating the reserve before
we're certain that we won't modify the buffer anymore. And the condition for
that is that the connection is established.
This patch introduces "channel_may_send()" which helps to detect whether it's
safe to eat the reserve or not. This condition is used by channel_in_transit()
introduced by recent patches.
This patch series must be backported into 1.5, and a simpler version must be
backported into 1.4 where fixing the bug is much easier since there were no
channels by then. Note that in 1.4 the severity is major.
This function returns the amount of bytes in transit in a channel's buffer,
which is the amount of outgoing data plus the amount of incoming data bound
to the forward limit.
We know that all incoming data are going to be purged if to_forward
is greater than them, not only if greater than the buffer size. This
buf has no direct impact on this version, but it participates to some
bugs affecting http-send-name-header since 1.4. This fix will have to
be backported down to 1.4 albeit in a different form.
The buffer_max_len() function is subject to an integer overflow in this
calculus :
int ret = global.tune.maxrewrite - chn->to_forward - chn->buf->o;
- chn->to_forward may be up to 2^31 - 1
- chn->buf->o may be up to chn->buf->size
- global.tune.maxrewrite is by definition smaller than chn->buf->size
Thus here we can subtract (2^31 + buf->o) (highly negative) from something
slightly positive, and result in ret being larger than expected.
Fortunately in 1.5 and 1.6, this is only used by bi_avail() which itself
is used by applets which do not set high values for to_forward so this
problem does not happen there. However in 1.4 the equivalent computation
was used to limit the size of a read and can result in a read overflow
when combined with the nasty http-send-name-header feature.
This fix must be backported to 1.5 and 1.4.
bi_swpbuf() swaps the buffer passed in argument with the one attached to
the channel, but only if this last one is empty. The idea is to avoid a
copy when buffers can simply be swapped.
Till now we'd consider a buffer full even if it had size==0 due to pointing
to buf.size. Now we change this : if buf_wanted is present, it means that we
have already tried to allocate a buffer but failed. Thus the buffer must be
considered full so that we stop trying to poll for reads on it. Otherwise if
it's empty, it's buf_empty and we report !full since we may allocate it on
the fly.
Channels are now created with a valid pointer to a buffer before the
buffer is allocated. This buffer is a global one called "buf_empty" and
of size zero. Thus it prevents any activity from being performed on
the buffer and still ensures that chn->buf may always be dereferenced.
b_free() also resets the buffer to &buf_empty, and was split into
b_drop() which does not reset the buffer.
We'll soon need to be able to switch buffers without touching the
channel, so let's move buffer initialization out of channel_init().
We had the same in compressoin.c.
We store the time stamp of last read in the channel in order to
be able to measure some bit rate and pause lengths. We only use
16 bits which were unused for this. We don't need more, as it
allows us to measure with a millisecond precision for up to 65s.
These ones are only reset during transfers. There is a low but non-null
risk that a first full read causes the previous value to be reused and
immediately to immediately set the CF_STREAMER flag. The impact is only
to increase earlier than expected the SSL record size and to use splice().
This bug was already present in 1.4, so a backport is possible.
Since 1.5-dev12 and commit 3bf1b2b8 (MAJOR: channel: stop relying on
BF_FULL to take action), the HTTP parser switched to channel_full()
instead of BF_FULL to decide whether a buffer had enough room to start
parsing a request or response. The problem is that channel_full()
intentionally ignores outgoing data, so a corner case exists where a
large response might still be left in a response buffer with just a
few bytes left (much less than the reserve), enough to accept a second
response past the last data, but not enough to permit the HTTP processor
to add some headers. Since all the processing relies on this space being
available, we can get some random crashes when clients pipeline requests.
The analysis of a core from haproxy configured with 20480 bytes buffers
shows this : with enough "luck", when sending back the response for the
first request, the client is slow, the TCP window is congested, the socket
buffers are full, and haproxy's buffer fills up. We still have 20230 bytes
of response data in a 20480 response buffer. The second request is sent to
the server which returns 214 bytes which fit in the small 250 bytes left
in this buffer. And the buffer arrangement makes it possible to escape all
the controls in http_wait_for_response() :
|<------ response buffer = 20480 bytes ------>|
[ 2/2 | 3 | 4 | 1/2 ]
^ start of circular buffer
1/2 = beginning of previous response (18240)
2/2 = end of previous response (1990)
3 = current response (214)
4 = free space (36)
- channel_full() returns false (20230 bytes are going to leave)
- the response headers does not wrap at the end of the buffer
- the remaining linear room after the headers is larger than the
reserve, because it's the previous response which wraps :
=> response is processed
Header rewriting causes it to reach 260 bytes, 10 bytes larger than what
the buffer could hold. So all computations during header addition are
wrong and lead to the corruption we've observed.
All the conditions are very hard to meet (which explains why it took
almost one year for this bug to show up) and are almost impossible to
reproduce on purpose on a test platform. But the bug is clearly there.
This issue was reported by Dinko Korunic who kindly devoted a lot of
time to provide countless traces and cores, and to experiment with
troubleshooting patches to knock the bug down. Thanks Dinko!
No backport is needed, but all 1.5-dev versions between dev12 and dev18
included must be upgraded. A workaround consists in setting option
forceclose to prevent pipelined requests from being processed.
Hijackers were functions designed to inject data into channels in the
distant past. They became unused around 1.3.16, and since there has
not been any user of this mechanism to date, it's uncertain whether
the mechanism still works (and it's not really useful anymore). So
better remove it as well as the pointer it uses in the channel struct.
Most calls to channel_forward() are performed with short byte counts and
are already optimized in channel_forward() taking just a few instructions.
Thus it's a waste of CPU cycles to call a function for this, let's just
inline the short byte count case and fall back to the common one for
remaining situations.
Doing so has increased the chunked encoding parser's performance by 12% !
With this commit, we now separate the channel from the buffer. This will
allow us to replace buffers on the fly without touching the channel. Since
nobody is supposed to keep a reference to a buffer anymore, doing so is not
a problem and will also permit some copy-less data manipulation.
Interestingly, these changes have shown a 2% performance increase on some
workloads, probably due to a better cache placement of data.
This is a massive rename of most functions which should make use of the
word "channel" instead of the word "buffer" in their names.
In concerns the following ones (new names) :
unsigned long long channel_forward(struct channel *buf, unsigned long long bytes);
static inline void channel_init(struct channel *buf)
static inline int channel_input_closed(struct channel *buf)
static inline int channel_output_closed(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_check_timeouts(struct channel *b)
static inline void channel_erase(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_shutr_now(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_shutw_now(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_abort(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_stop_hijacker(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_auto_connect(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_dont_connect(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_auto_close(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_dont_close(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_auto_read(struct channel *buf)
static inline void channel_dont_read(struct channel *buf)
unsigned long long channel_forward(struct channel *buf, unsigned long long bytes)
Some functions provided by channel.[ch] have kept their "buffer" name because
they are really designed to act on the buffer according to some information
gathered from the channel. They have been moved together to the same place in
the file for better readability but they were not changed at all.
The "buffer" memory pool was also renamed "channel".
Get rid of these confusing BF_* flags. Now channel naming should clearly
be used everywhere appropriate.
No code was changed, only a renaming was performed. The comments about
channel operations was updated.
These functions do not depend on the channel flags anymore thus they're
much better suited to be used on plain buffers. Move them from channel
to buffer.
This is similar to the recent removal of BF_OUT_EMPTY. This flag was very
problematic because it relies on permanently changing information such as the
to_forward value, so it had to be updated upon every change to the buffers.
Previous patch already got rid of its users.
One part of the change is sensible : the flag was also part of BF_MASK_STATIC,
which is used by process_session() to rescan all analysers in case the flag's
status changes. At first glance, none of the analysers seems to change its
mind base on this flag when it is subject to change, so it seems fine not to
add variation checks here. Otherwise it's possible that checking the buffer's
input and output is more reliable than checking the flag's replacement.
This flag was very problematic because it was composite in that both changes
to the pipe or to the buffer had to cause this flag to be updated, which is
not always simple (eg: there may not even be a channel attached to a buffer
at all).
There were not that many users of this flags, mostly setters. So the flag got
replaced with a macro which reports whether the channel is empty or not, by
checking both the pipe and the buffer.
One part of the change is sensible : the flag was also part of BF_MASK_STATIC,
which is used by process_session() to rescan all analysers in case the flag's
status changes. At first glance, none of the analysers seems to change its
mind base on this flag when it is subject to change, so it seems fine not to
add variation checks here. Otherwise it's possible that checking the buffer's
output size is more useful than checking the flag's replacement.
