This patch adds the support for the PS algorithms when verifying JWT
signatures (rsa-pss). It was not managed during the first implementation
and previously raised an "Unmanaged algorithm" error.
The tests use the same rsa signature as the plain rsa tests (RS256 ...)
and the implementation simply adds a call to
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding in the function that manages rsa and ecdsa
signatures.
The signatures in the reg-test were built thanks to the PyJWT python
library once again.
The wrong return value was checked, resulting in dead code and
potential bugs.
It should fix GitHub issue #2005.
This patch should be backported up to 2.5.
When the JWT token signature is using ECDSA algorithm (ES256 for
instance), the signature is a direct concatenation of the R and S
parameters instead of OpenSSL's DER format (see section
3.4 of RFC7518).
The code that verified the signatures wrongly assumed that they came in
OpenSSL's format and it did not actually work.
We now have the extra step of converting the signature into a complete
ECDSA_SIG that can be fed into OpenSSL's digest verification functions.
The ECDSA signatures in the regtest had to be recalculated and it was
made via the PyJWT python library so that we don't end up checking
signatures that we built ourselves anymore.
This patch should fix GitHub issue #2001.
It should be backported up to branch 2.5.
With the CI occasionally slowing down, we're starting to see again some
spurious failures despite the long 1-second timeouts. This reports false
positives that are disturbing and doesn't provide as much value as this
could. However at this delay it already becomes a pain for developers
to wait for the tests to complete.
This commit adds support for the new environment variable
HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT that will allow anyone to modify the connect,
client and server timeouts. It was set to 5 seconds by default, which
should be plenty for quite some time in the CI. All relevant values
that were 200ms or above were replaced by this one. A few larger
values were left as they are special. One test for the set-timeout
action that used to rely on a fixed 1-sec value was extended to a
fixed 5-sec, as the timeout is normally not reached, but it needs
to be known to compare the old and new values.
A long-standing issue was reported in issue #1215.
In short, var() was initially internally declared as returning a string
because it was not possible by then to return "any type". As such, users
regularly get trapped thinking that when they're storing an integer there,
then the integer matching method automatically applies. Except that this
is not possible since this is related to the config parser and is decided
at boot time where the variable's type is not known yet.
As such, what is done is that the output being declared as type string,
the string match will automatically apply, and any value will first be
converted to a string. This results in several issues like:
http-request set-var(txn.foo) int(-1)
http-request deny if { var(txn.foo) lt 0 }
not working. This is because the string match on the second line will in
fact compare the string representation of the variable against strings
"lt" and "0", none of which matches.
The doc says that the matching method is mandatory, though that's not
the case in the code due to that default string type being permissive.
There's not even a warning when no explicit match is placed, because
this happens very deep in the expression evaluator and making a special
case just for "var" can reveal very complicated.
The set-var() converter already mandates a matching method, as the
following will be rejected:
... if { int(12),set-var(txn.truc) 12 }
while this one will work:
... if { int(12),set-var(txn.truc) -m int 12 }
As such, this patch this modifies var() to match the doc, returning the
type "any", and mandating the matching method, implying that this bogus
config which does not work:
http-request set-var(txn.foo) int(-1)
http-request deny if { var(txn.foo) lt 0 }
will need to be written like this:
http-request set-var(txn.foo) int(-1)
http-request deny if { var(txn.foo) -m int lt 0 }
This *will* break some configs (and even 3 of our regtests relied on
this), but except those which already match string exclusively, all
other ones are already broken and silently fail (and one of the 3
regtests, the one on FIX, was bogus regarding this).
In order to fix existing configs, one can simply append "-m str"
after a "var()" in an ACL or "if" expression:
http-request deny unless { var(txn.jwt_alg) "ES" }
must become:
http-request deny unless { var(txn.jwt_alg) -m str "ES" }
Most commonly, patterns such as "le", "lt", "ge", "gt", "eq", "ne" in
front of a number indicate that the intent was to match an integer,
and in this case "-m int" would be desired:
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.size) gt 3800 }
ought to become:
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.size) -m int gt 3800 }
This must not be backported, but if a solution is found to at least
detect this exact condition in the generic expression parser and
emit a warning, this could probably help spot configuration bugs.
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg41341.html
Cc: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Cc: Tim Düsterhus <tim@bastelstu.be>
The http_auth_bearer sample fetch can take a header name as parameter,
in which case it will try to extract a Bearer value out of the given
header name instead of the default "Authorization" one. In this case,
the extraction would not have worked because of a misuse of strncasecmp.
This patch fixes this by replacing the standard string functions by ist
ones.
It also properly manages the multiple spaces that could be found between
the scheme and its value.
No backport needed, that's part of JWT which is only in 2.5.
Co-authored-by: Tim Duesterhus <tim@bastelstu.be>
In order for all the error return values to be distributed on the same
side (instead of surrounding the success error code), the return values
for errors other than a simple verification failure are switched to
negative values. This way the result of the jwt_verify converter can be
compared strictly to 1 as well relative to 0 (any <= 0 return value is
an error).
The documentation was also modified to discourage conversion of the
return value into a boolean (which would definitely not work).
Tim reported that a decoding error from the base64 function wouldn't
be matched in case of bad input, and could possibly cause trouble
with -1 being passed in decoded_sig->data. In the case of HMAC+SHA
it is harmless as the comparison is made using memcmp() after checking
for length equality, but in the case of RSA/ECDSA this result is passed
as a size_t to EVP_DigetVerifyFinal() and may depend on the lib's mood.
The fix simply consists in checking the intermediary result before
storing it.
That's precisely what happens with one of the regtests which returned
0 instead of 4 on the intentionally defective token, so the regtest
was fixed as well.
No backport is needed as this is new in this release.
Remi Tricot-Le Breton
Willy Tarreau