RepoMirrors/haproxy
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy.git/ synced 2024-12-22 20:32:12 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

BUG: dns: Prevent out-of-bounds read in dns_validate_dns_response()

Browse Source 
We need to make sure that the record length is not making us read
past the end of the data we received.
Before this patch we could for example read the 16 bytes
corresponding to an AAAA record from the non-initialized part of
the buffer, possibly accessing anything that was left on the stack,
or even past the end of the 8193-byte buffer, depending on the
value of accepted_payload_size.

To be backported to 1.8, probably also 1.7.
This commit is contained in:
Remi Gacogne 2018-12-05 17:56:29 +01:00 committed by Willy Tarreau
parent 2d19fbcab2
commit efbbdf7299
1 changed files with 5 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
src/dns.c
View File

@ -810,6 +810,11 @@ static int dns_validate_dns_response(unsigned char *resp, unsigned char *bufend,
/* Move forward 2 bytes for data len */
reader += 2;
if (reader + dns_answer_record->data_len >= bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
/* Analyzing record content */
switch (dns_answer_record->type) {
case DNS_RTYPE_A: