MINOR: ssl: check parameter in ckch_conf_cmp()

Check prev and new parameters in ckch_conf_cmp() so we don't dereference
a NULL ptr. There is no risk since it's not used with a NULL ptr yet.

Also remove the check that are done later, and do it at the beginning of
the function.

Should fix issue #2572.
This commit is contained in:
William Lallemand 2024-05-21 11:01:59 +02:00
parent 140078c19d
commit d74ba7cc24

View File

@ -4168,6 +4168,9 @@ int ckch_conf_cmp(struct ckch_conf *prev, struct ckch_conf *new, char **err)
int ret = 0;
int i;
if (!prev || !new)
return 1;
/* compatibility check */
if (prev->used == CKCH_CONF_SET_EMPTY) {
@ -4197,8 +4200,8 @@ int ckch_conf_cmp(struct ckch_conf *prev, struct ckch_conf *new, char **err)
switch (ckch_conf_kws[i].type) {
case PARSE_TYPE_STR: {
char *avail1, *avail2;
avail1 = prev ? *(char **)((intptr_t)prev + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset) : NULL;
avail2 = new ? *(char **)((intptr_t)new + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset) : NULL;
avail1 = *(char **)((intptr_t)prev + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset);
avail2 = *(char **)((intptr_t)new + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset);
/* must alert when strcmp is wrong, or when one of the field is NULL */
if (((avail1 && avail2) && strcmp(avail1, avail2) != 0) || (!!avail1 ^ !!avail2)) {
@ -4217,8 +4220,8 @@ int ckch_conf_cmp(struct ckch_conf *prev, struct ckch_conf *new, char **err)
int q1, q2; /* final ocsp-update value (from default) */
o1 = prev ? *(int *)((intptr_t)prev + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset) : 0;
o2 = new ? *(int *)((intptr_t)new + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset) : 0;
o1 = *(int *)((intptr_t)prev + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset);
o2 = *(int *)((intptr_t)new + (ptrdiff_t)ckch_conf_kws[i].offset);
q1 = (o1 == SSL_SOCK_OCSP_UPDATE_DFLT) ? global_ssl.ocsp_update.mode : o1;
q2 = (o2 == SSL_SOCK_OCSP_UPDATE_DFLT) ? global_ssl.ocsp_update.mode : o2;