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MEDIUM: ssl/cli: apply SSL configuration on SSL_CTX during commit

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Apply the configuration of the ssl_bind_conf on the generated SSL_CTX.
It's a little bit hacky at the moment because the ssl_sock_prepare_ctx()
function was made for the configuration parsing, not for being using at
runtime. Only the 'verify' bind keyword seems to cause a file access so
we prevent it before calling the function.
This commit is contained in:
William Lallemand 2019-11-21 16:30:34 +01:00 committed by William Lallemand
parent 8b453912ce
commit 8ef0c2a569
1 changed files with 22 additions and 1 deletions
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23
src/ssl_sock.c
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@ -10061,6 +10061,7 @@ static int cli_io_handler_commit_cert(struct appctx *appctx)
struct ckch_store *old_ckchs, *new_ckchs = NULL;
struct ckch_inst *ckchi, *ckchis;
struct buffer *trash = alloc_trash_chunk();
struct sni_ctx *sc0, *sc0s;
if (trash == NULL)
goto error;
@ -10103,6 +10104,7 @@ static int cli_io_handler_commit_cert(struct appctx *appctx)
/* walk through the old ckch_inst and creates new ckch_inst using the updated ckchs */
list_for_each_entry_from(ckchi, &old_ckchs->ckch_inst, by_ckchs) {
struct ckch_inst *new_inst;
int verify = 0;
/* it takes a lot of CPU to creates SSL_CTXs, so we yield every 10 CKCH instances */
if (y >= 10) {
@ -10111,6 +10113,15 @@ static int cli_io_handler_commit_cert(struct appctx *appctx)
goto yield;
}
/* prevent ssl_sock_prepare_ctx() to do file access which is only for verify (crl/ca file) */
verify = (ckchi->ssl_conf && ckchi->ssl_conf->verify) ? ckchi->ssl_conf->verify : ckchi->bind_conf->ssl_conf.verify;
if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) {
memprintf(&err, "%sCan't commit a certificate which use the 'verify' bind SSL option [%s:%d]\n", err ? err : "", ckchi->bind_conf->file, ckchi->bind_conf->line);
errcode |= ERR_FATAL | ERR_ABORT;
goto error;
}
if (new_ckchs->multi)
errcode |= ckch_inst_new_load_multi_store(new_ckchs->path, new_ckchs, ckchi->bind_conf, ckchi->ssl_conf, NULL, 0, &new_inst, &err);
else
@ -10123,6 +10134,17 @@ static int cli_io_handler_commit_cert(struct appctx *appctx)
if (ckchi->is_default)
new_inst->is_default = 1;
/* we need to initialize the SSL_CTX generated */
/* TODO: the prepare_ctx function need to be reworked to be safer there */
list_for_each_entry_safe(sc0, sc0s, &ckchi->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) {
if (!sc0->order) { /* we initiliazed only the first SSL_CTX because it's the same in the other sni_ctx's */
errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(ckchi->bind_conf, ckchi->ssl_conf, sc0->ctx, &err);
if (errcode & ERR_CODE)
goto error;
}
}
/* display one dot per new instance */
chunk_appendf(trash, ".");
/* link the new ckch_inst to the duplicate */
@ -10149,7 +10171,6 @@ static int cli_io_handler_commit_cert(struct appctx *appctx)
/* delete the old sni_ctx, the old ckch_insts and the ckch_store */
list_for_each_entry_safe(ckchi, ckchis, &old_ckchs->ckch_inst, by_ckchs) {
struct sni_ctx *sc0, *sc0s;
HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &ckchi->bind_conf->sni_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(sc0, sc0s, &ckchi->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) {