BUILD: ssl_sock: remove build warnings on potential null-derefs

When building with -Wnull-dereferences, gcc sees some cases where a
pointer is dereferenced after a check may set it to null. While all of
these are already guarded by either a preliminary test or the code's
construction (eg: listeners code being called only on listeners), it
cannot be blamed for not "seeing" this, so better use the unguarded
calls everywhere this happens, particularly after checks. This is a
step towards building with -Wextra.
This commit is contained in:
Willy Tarreau 2018-09-20 10:57:52 +02:00
parent 4ae4923c3e
commit 07d94e48d9

View File

@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned
int ret = -1; /* error by default */
conn = SSL_get_ex_data(s, ssl_app_data_index);
ref = objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->keys_ref;
ref = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->keys_ref;
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock);
keys = ref->tlskeys;
@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store)
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(depth);
}
if (objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ca_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
if (__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ca_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store)
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(err);
/* check if certificate error needs to be ignored */
if (objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->crt_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
if (__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->crt_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
@ -1807,7 +1807,7 @@ ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL
SSL_CTX *
ssl_sock_create_cert(struct connection *conn, const char *servername, unsigned int key)
{
struct bind_conf *bind_conf = objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf;
struct bind_conf *bind_conf = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf;
return ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, conn->xprt_ctx);
}
@ -3893,7 +3893,7 @@ static int ssl_sess_new_srv_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
struct server *s;
s = objt_server(conn->target);
s = __objt_server(conn->target);
if (!(s->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_REUSE)) {
int len;
@ -4398,7 +4398,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
servername = SSL_get_servername(conn->xprt_ctx, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
sni = servername;
if (!servername) {
servername = objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.verify_host;
servername = __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.verify_host;
if (!servername)
return ok;
}
@ -4939,7 +4939,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
retry_connect:
/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx);
conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx);
if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
if (may_retry--) {
pool_gc(NULL);
@ -4974,13 +4974,13 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
}
SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
const unsigned char *ptr = objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr;
SSL_SESSION *sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &ptr, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].size);
if(sess && !SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, sess)) {
if (__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
const unsigned char *ptr = __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr;
SSL_SESSION *sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &ptr, __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].size);
if (sess && !SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, sess)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
free(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
} else if (sess) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
@ -4998,7 +4998,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
retry_accept:
/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->initial_ctx);
conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->initial_ctx);
if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
if (may_retry--) {
pool_gc(NULL);
@ -5321,9 +5321,9 @@ reneg_ok:
ERR_clear_error();
/* free resumed session if exists */
if (objt_server(conn->target) && objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
if (objt_server(conn->target) && __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) {
free(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr);
__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL;
}
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */