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haproxy/reg-tests/connection/proxy_protocol_tlv_validation.vtc

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BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
varnishtest "Check that the TLVs are properly validated"
REGTESTS: Fix proxy_protocol_tlv_validation Remaining data after the PROXYv2 header now trigger a parsing error in the H1 multiplexer Thus the required version for this test is now set to 2.4.
2020-10-20 07:10:25 +00:00
#REQUIRE_VERSION=2.4
REGTEST: make the PROXY TLV validation depend on version 2.2 Regtest proxy_protocol_tlv_validation was added by commit 488ee7fb6e ("BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths") but it relies on a trick involving http-after-response to append a header after a 400-badreq response, which is not possible in earlier versions, so make it depend on 2.2.
2020-03-31 14:36:20 +00:00
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
feature ignore_unknown_macro
# We need one HAProxy for each test, because apparently the connection by
# the client is reused, leading to connection resets.
haproxy h1 -conf {
defaults
mode http
REGTESTS: extend the default I/O timeouts and make them overridable With the CI occasionally slowing down, we're starting to see again some spurious failures despite the long 1-second timeouts. This reports false positives that are disturbing and doesn't provide as much value as this could. However at this delay it already becomes a pain for developers to wait for the tests to complete. This commit adds support for the new environment variable HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT that will allow anyone to modify the connect, client and server timeouts. It was set to 5 seconds by default, which should be plenty for quite some time in the CI. All relevant values that were 200ms or above were replaced by this one. A few larger values were left as they are special. One test for the set-timeout action that used to rely on a fixed 1-sec value was extended to a fixed 5-sec, as the timeout is normally not reached, but it needs to be known to compare the old and new values.
2021-11-18 16:46:22 +00:00
timeout connect "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout client "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout server "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
frontend a
bind "fd@${fe1}" accept-proxy
http-after-response set-header echo %[fc_pp_authority,hex]
http-request return status 200
} -start
# Validate that a correct header passes
client c1 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# PROXY v2 signature
sendhex "0d 0a 0d 0a 00 0d 0a 51 55 49 54 0a"
# version + PROXY
sendhex "21"
# TCP4
sendhex "11"
# length of the address (12) + length of the TLV (8)
sendhex "00 14"
# 127.0.0.1 42 127.0.0.1 1337
sendhex "7F 00 00 01 7F 00 00 01 00 2A 05 39"
# PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY + length of the value + "12345"
sendhex "02 00 05 31 32 33 34 35"
txreq -url "/"
rxresp
expect resp.http.echo == "3132333435"
} -run
haproxy h2 -conf {
defaults
mode http
REGTESTS: extend the default I/O timeouts and make them overridable With the CI occasionally slowing down, we're starting to see again some spurious failures despite the long 1-second timeouts. This reports false positives that are disturbing and doesn't provide as much value as this could. However at this delay it already becomes a pain for developers to wait for the tests to complete. This commit adds support for the new environment variable HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT that will allow anyone to modify the connect, client and server timeouts. It was set to 5 seconds by default, which should be plenty for quite some time in the CI. All relevant values that were 200ms or above were replaced by this one. A few larger values were left as they are special. One test for the set-timeout action that used to rely on a fixed 1-sec value was extended to a fixed 5-sec, as the timeout is normally not reached, but it needs to be known to compare the old and new values.
2021-11-18 16:46:22 +00:00
timeout connect "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout client "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout server "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
frontend a
bind "fd@${fe1}" accept-proxy
http-after-response set-header echo %[fc_pp_authority,hex]
http-request return status 200
} -start
REGTESTS: Fix proxy_protocol_tlv_validation Remaining data after the PROXYv2 header now trigger a parsing error in the H1 multiplexer Thus the required version for this test is now set to 2.4.
2020-10-20 07:10:25 +00:00
# Validate that a TLV after the end of the PROXYv2 header is not parsed
# and handle by the HTTP parser, leading to a 400 bad request error
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
client c2 -connect ${h2_fe1_sock} {
# PROXY v2 signature
sendhex "0d 0a 0d 0a 00 0d 0a 51 55 49 54 0a"
# version + PROXY
sendhex "21"
# TCP4
sendhex "11"
# length of the address (12) + length of the TLV (8)
sendhex "00 14"
# 127.0.0.1 42 127.0.0.1 1337
sendhex "7F 00 00 01 7F 00 00 01 00 2A 05 39"
# PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY + length of the value + "12345"
sendhex "02 00 05 31 32 33 34 35"
# after the end of the PROXYv2 header: PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY + length of the value + "54321"
sendhex "02 00 05 35 34 33 32 31"
txreq -url "/"
rxresp
REGTESTS: Fix proxy_protocol_tlv_validation Remaining data after the PROXYv2 header now trigger a parsing error in the H1 multiplexer Thus the required version for this test is now set to 2.4.
2020-10-20 07:10:25 +00:00
expect resp.status == 400
expect resp.http.echo == <undef>
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
} -run
haproxy h3 -conf {
defaults
mode http
REGTESTS: extend the default I/O timeouts and make them overridable With the CI occasionally slowing down, we're starting to see again some spurious failures despite the long 1-second timeouts. This reports false positives that are disturbing and doesn't provide as much value as this could. However at this delay it already becomes a pain for developers to wait for the tests to complete. This commit adds support for the new environment variable HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT that will allow anyone to modify the connect, client and server timeouts. It was set to 5 seconds by default, which should be plenty for quite some time in the CI. All relevant values that were 200ms or above were replaced by this one. A few larger values were left as they are special. One test for the set-timeout action that used to rely on a fixed 1-sec value was extended to a fixed 5-sec, as the timeout is normally not reached, but it needs to be known to compare the old and new values.
2021-11-18 16:46:22 +00:00
timeout connect "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout client "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout server "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
frontend a
bind "fd@${fe1}" accept-proxy
http-after-response set-header echo %[fc_pp_authority,hex]
http-request return status 200
} -start
# Validate that a TLV length exceeding the PROXYv2 length fails
client c3 -connect ${h3_fe1_sock} {
# PROXY v2 signature
sendhex "0d 0a 0d 0a 00 0d 0a 51 55 49 54 0a"
# version + PROXY
sendhex "21"
# TCP4
sendhex "11"
# length of the address (12) + too small length of the TLV (8)
sendhex "00 14"
# 127.0.0.1 42 127.0.0.1 1337
sendhex "7F 00 00 01 7F 00 00 01 00 2A 05 39"
# PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY + length of the value + "1234512345"
sendhex "02 00 0A 31 32 33 34 35 31 32 33 34 35"
txreq -url "/"
expect_close
} -run
haproxy h4 -conf {
defaults
mode http
REGTESTS: extend the default I/O timeouts and make them overridable With the CI occasionally slowing down, we're starting to see again some spurious failures despite the long 1-second timeouts. This reports false positives that are disturbing and doesn't provide as much value as this could. However at this delay it already becomes a pain for developers to wait for the tests to complete. This commit adds support for the new environment variable HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT that will allow anyone to modify the connect, client and server timeouts. It was set to 5 seconds by default, which should be plenty for quite some time in the CI. All relevant values that were 200ms or above were replaced by this one. A few larger values were left as they are special. One test for the set-timeout action that used to rely on a fixed 1-sec value was extended to a fixed 5-sec, as the timeout is normally not reached, but it needs to be known to compare the old and new values.
2021-11-18 16:46:22 +00:00
timeout connect "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout client "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
timeout server "${HAPROXY_TEST_TIMEOUT-5s}"
BUG/MAJOR: proxy_protocol: Properly validate TLV lengths This patch fixes PROXYv2 parsing when the payload of the TCP connection is fused with the PROXYv2 header within a single recv() call. Previously HAProxy ignored the PROXYv2 header length when attempting to parse the TLV, possibly interpreting the first byte of the payload as a TLV type. This patch adds proper validation. It ensures that: 1. TLV parsing stops when the end of the PROXYv2 header is reached. 2. TLV lengths cannot exceed the PROXYv2 header length. 3. The PROXYv2 header ends together with the last TLV, not allowing for "stray bytes" to be ignored. A reg-test was added to ensure proper behavior. This patch tries to find the sweat spot between a small and easily backportable one, and a cleaner one that's more easily adaptable to older versions, hence why it merges the "if" and "while" blocks which causes a reindent of the whole block. It should be used as-is for versions 1.9 to 2.1, the block about PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY should be dropped for 2.0 and the block about CRC32C should be dropped for 1.8. This bug was introduced when TLV parsing was added. This happened in commit b3e54fe387c7c1ea750f39d3029672d640c499f9. This commit was first released with HAProxy 1.6-dev1. A similar issue was fixed in commit 7209c204bd6f3c49132264c7a58f689cdc741c12. This patch must be backported to HAProxy 1.6+.
2020-03-05 21:55:20 +00:00
frontend a
bind "fd@${fe1}" accept-proxy
http-after-response set-header echo %[fc_pp_authority,hex]
http-request return status 200
} -start
# Validate that TLVs not ending with the PROXYv2 header fail
client c4 -connect ${h4_fe1_sock} {
# PROXY v2 signature
sendhex "0d 0a 0d 0a 00 0d 0a 51 55 49 54 0a"
# version + PROXY
sendhex "21"
# TCP4
sendhex "11"
# length of the address (12) + too big length of the TLV (8)
sendhex "00 14"
# 127.0.0.1 42 127.0.0.1 1337
sendhex "7F 00 00 01 7F 00 00 01 00 2A 05 39"
# PP2_TYPE_AUTHORITY + length of the value + "1234"
sendhex "02 00 04 31 32 33 34"
txreq -url "/"
expect_close
} -run
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