haproxy/src/client.c

564 lines
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C
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/*
* Client-side variables and functions.
*
* Copyright 2000-2008 Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <common/compat.h>
#include <common/config.h>
#include <common/time.h>
#include <types/global.h>
#include <proto/acl.h>
#include <proto/buffers.h>
#include <proto/client.h>
#include <proto/fd.h>
#include <proto/log.h>
#include <proto/hdr_idx.h>
#include <proto/proto_http.h>
#include <proto/session.h>
#include <proto/stream_sock.h>
#include <proto/task.h>
/* Retrieves the original destination address used by the client, and sets the
* SN_FRT_ADDR_SET flag.
*/
void get_frt_addr(struct session *s)
{
socklen_t namelen = sizeof(s->frt_addr);
if (get_original_dst(s->cli_fd, (struct sockaddr_in *)&s->frt_addr, &namelen) == -1)
getsockname(s->cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&s->frt_addr, &namelen);
s->flags |= SN_FRT_ADDR_SET;
}
/*
* FIXME: This should move to the STREAM_SOCK code then split into TCP and HTTP.
*/
/*
* this function is called on a read event from a listen socket, corresponding
* to an accept. It tries to accept as many connections as possible.
* It returns 0.
*/
int event_accept(int fd) {
struct listener *l = (struct listener *)fdtab[fd].owner;
struct proxy *p = (struct proxy *)l->private; /* attached frontend */
struct session *s;
struct http_txn *txn;
struct task *t;
int cfd;
int max_accept = global.tune.maxaccept;
while (p->feconn < p->maxconn && max_accept--) {
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t laddr = sizeof(addr);
if ((cfd = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &laddr)) == -1) {
switch (errno) {
case EAGAIN:
case EINTR:
case ECONNABORTED:
return 0; /* nothing more to accept */
case ENFILE:
send_log(p, LOG_EMERG,
"Proxy %s reached system FD limit at %d. Please check system tunables.\n",
p->id, maxfd);
return 0;
case EMFILE:
send_log(p, LOG_EMERG,
"Proxy %s reached process FD limit at %d. Please check 'ulimit-n' and restart.\n",
p->id, maxfd);
return 0;
case ENOBUFS:
case ENOMEM:
send_log(p, LOG_EMERG,
"Proxy %s reached system memory limit at %d sockets. Please check system tunables.\n",
p->id, maxfd);
return 0;
default:
return 0;
}
}
if ((s = pool_alloc2(pool2_session)) == NULL) { /* disable this proxy for a while */
Alert("out of memory in event_accept().\n");
EV_FD_CLR(fd, DIR_RD);
p->state = PR_STIDLE;
goto out_close;
}
/* if this session comes from a known monitoring system, we want to ignore
* it as soon as possible, which means closing it immediately for TCP.
*/
s->flags = 0;
if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET &&
p->mon_mask.s_addr &&
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_addr.s_addr & p->mon_mask.s_addr) == p->mon_net.s_addr) {
if (p->mode == PR_MODE_TCP) {
close(cfd);
pool_free2(pool2_session, s);
continue;
}
s->flags |= SN_MONITOR;
}
if ((t = pool_alloc2(pool2_task)) == NULL) { /* disable this proxy for a while */
Alert("out of memory in event_accept().\n");
EV_FD_CLR(fd, DIR_RD);
p->state = PR_STIDLE;
goto out_free_session;
}
s->cli_addr = addr;
if (cfd >= global.maxsock) {
Alert("accept(): not enough free sockets. Raise -n argument. Giving up.\n");
goto out_free_task;
}
if ((fcntl(cfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) == -1) ||
(setsockopt(cfd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY,
(char *) &one, sizeof(one)) == -1)) {
Alert("accept(): cannot set the socket in non blocking mode. Giving up\n");
goto out_free_task;
}
if (p->options & PR_O_TCP_CLI_KA)
setsockopt(cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *) &one, sizeof(one));
if (p->options & PR_O_TCP_NOLING)
setsockopt(cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (struct linger *) &nolinger, sizeof(struct linger));
task_init(t);
t->process = process_session;
t->context = s;
s->task = t;
s->be = s->fe = p;
/* in HTTP mode, content switching requires that the backend
* first points to the same proxy as the frontend. However, in
* TCP mode there will be no header processing so any default
* backend must be assigned if set.
*/
if (p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) {
[MAJOR] implement tcp request content inspection Some people need to inspect contents of TCP requests before deciding to forward a connection or not. A future extension of this demand might consist in selecting a server farm depending on the protocol detected in the request. For this reason, a new state CL_STINSPECT has been added on the client side. It is immediately entered upon accept() if the statement "tcp-request inspect-delay <xxx>" is found in the frontend configuration. Haproxy will then wait up to this amount of time trying to find a matching ACL, and will either accept or reject the connection depending on the "tcp-request content <action> {if|unless}" rules, where <action> is either "accept" or "reject". Note that it only waits that long if no definitive verdict can be found earlier. That generally implies calling a fetch() function which does not have enough information to decode some contents, or a match() function which only finds the beginning of what it's looking for. It is only at the ACL level that partial data may be processed as such, because we need to distinguish between MISS and FAIL *before* applying the term negation. Thus it is enough to add "| ACL_PARTIAL" to the last argument when calling acl_exec_cond() to indicate that we expect ACL_PAT_MISS to be returned if some data is missing (for fetch() or match()). This is the only case we may return this value. For this reason, the ACL check in process_cli() has become a lot simpler. A new ACL "req_len" of type "int" has been added. Right now it is already possible to drop requests which talk too early (eg: for SMTP) or which don't talk at all (eg: HTTP/SSL). Also, the acl fetch() functions have been extended in order to permit reporting of missing data in case of fetch failure, using the ACL_TEST_F_MAY_CHANGE flag. The default behaviour is unchanged, and if no rule matches, the request is accepted. As a side effect, all layer 7 fetching functions have been cleaned up so that they now check for the validity of the layer 7 pointer before dereferencing it.
2008-07-14 21:54:42 +00:00
if (s->fe->tcp_req.inspect_delay)
s->cli_state = CL_STINSPECT;
else
s->cli_state = CL_STHEADERS;
} else {
/* We must assign any default backend now since
* there will be no header processing.
*/
if (p->mode == PR_MODE_TCP) {
if (p->defbe.be)
s->be = p->defbe.be;
s->flags |= SN_BE_ASSIGNED;
}
[MAJOR] implement tcp request content inspection Some people need to inspect contents of TCP requests before deciding to forward a connection or not. A future extension of this demand might consist in selecting a server farm depending on the protocol detected in the request. For this reason, a new state CL_STINSPECT has been added on the client side. It is immediately entered upon accept() if the statement "tcp-request inspect-delay <xxx>" is found in the frontend configuration. Haproxy will then wait up to this amount of time trying to find a matching ACL, and will either accept or reject the connection depending on the "tcp-request content <action> {if|unless}" rules, where <action> is either "accept" or "reject". Note that it only waits that long if no definitive verdict can be found earlier. That generally implies calling a fetch() function which does not have enough information to decode some contents, or a match() function which only finds the beginning of what it's looking for. It is only at the ACL level that partial data may be processed as such, because we need to distinguish between MISS and FAIL *before* applying the term negation. Thus it is enough to add "| ACL_PARTIAL" to the last argument when calling acl_exec_cond() to indicate that we expect ACL_PAT_MISS to be returned if some data is missing (for fetch() or match()). This is the only case we may return this value. For this reason, the ACL check in process_cli() has become a lot simpler. A new ACL "req_len" of type "int" has been added. Right now it is already possible to drop requests which talk too early (eg: for SMTP) or which don't talk at all (eg: HTTP/SSL). Also, the acl fetch() functions have been extended in order to permit reporting of missing data in case of fetch failure, using the ACL_TEST_F_MAY_CHANGE flag. The default behaviour is unchanged, and if no rule matches, the request is accepted. As a side effect, all layer 7 fetching functions have been cleaned up so that they now check for the validity of the layer 7 pointer before dereferencing it.
2008-07-14 21:54:42 +00:00
if (s->fe->tcp_req.inspect_delay)
s->cli_state = CL_STINSPECT;
else
s->cli_state = CL_STDATA; /* no HTTP headers for non-HTTP proxies */
}
s->srv_state = SV_STIDLE;
s->req = s->rep = NULL; /* will be allocated later */
s->cli_fd = cfd;
s->srv_fd = -1;
s->srv = s->prev_srv = s->srv_conn = NULL;
s->pend_pos = NULL;
s->conn_retries = s->be->conn_retries;
/* FIXME: the logs are horribly complicated now, because they are
* defined in <p>, <p>, and later <be> and <be>.
*/
if (s->flags & SN_MONITOR)
s->logs.logwait = 0;
else
s->logs.logwait = p->to_log;
s->logs.accept_date = date; /* user-visible date for logging */
s->logs.tv_accept = now; /* corrected date for internal use */
tv_zero(&s->logs.tv_request);
s->logs.t_queue = -1;
s->logs.t_connect = -1;
s->logs.t_data = -1;
s->logs.t_close = 0;
s->logs.bytes_in = s->logs.bytes_out = 0;
s->logs.prx_queue_size = 0; /* we get the number of pending conns before us */
s->logs.srv_queue_size = 0; /* we will get this number soon */
s->data_source = DATA_SRC_NONE;
s->uniq_id = totalconn;
p->cum_feconn++; /* cum_beconn will be increased once assigned */
txn = &s->txn;
txn->flags = 0;
/* Those variables will be checked and freed if non-NULL in
* session.c:session_free(). It is important that they are
* properly initialized.
*/
txn->srv_cookie = NULL;
txn->cli_cookie = NULL;
txn->uri = NULL;
txn->req.cap = NULL;
txn->rsp.cap = NULL;
txn->hdr_idx.v = NULL;
txn->hdr_idx.size = txn->hdr_idx.used = 0;
if (p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) {
txn->status = -1;
txn->req.hdr_content_len = 0LL;
txn->rsp.hdr_content_len = 0LL;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE; /* at the very beginning of the request */
txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE; /* at the very beginning of the response */
txn->req.sol = txn->req.eol = NULL;
txn->req.som = txn->req.eoh = 0; /* relative to the buffer */
txn->auth_hdr.len = -1;
if (p->nb_req_cap > 0) {
if ((txn->req.cap = pool_alloc2(p->req_cap_pool)) == NULL)
goto out_fail_reqcap; /* no memory */
memset(txn->req.cap, 0, p->nb_req_cap*sizeof(char *));
}
if (p->nb_rsp_cap > 0) {
if ((txn->rsp.cap = pool_alloc2(p->rsp_cap_pool)) == NULL)
goto out_fail_rspcap; /* no memory */
memset(txn->rsp.cap, 0, p->nb_rsp_cap*sizeof(char *));
}
txn->hdr_idx.size = MAX_HTTP_HDR;
if ((txn->hdr_idx.v = pool_alloc2(p->hdr_idx_pool)) == NULL)
goto out_fail_idx; /* no memory */
hdr_idx_init(&txn->hdr_idx);
}
if ((p->mode == PR_MODE_TCP || p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP)
&& (p->logfac1 >= 0 || p->logfac2 >= 0)) {
if (p->to_log) {
/* we have the client ip */
if (s->logs.logwait & LW_CLIP)
if (!(s->logs.logwait &= ~LW_CLIP))
tcp_sess_log(s);
}
else if (s->cli_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
char pn[INET_ADDRSTRLEN], sn[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
if (!(s->flags & SN_FRT_ADDR_SET))
get_frt_addr(s);
if (inet_ntop(AF_INET, (const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&s->frt_addr)->sin_addr,
sn, sizeof(sn)) &&
inet_ntop(AF_INET, (const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&s->cli_addr)->sin_addr,
pn, sizeof(pn))) {
send_log(p, LOG_INFO, "Connect from %s:%d to %s:%d (%s/%s)\n",
pn, ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&s->cli_addr)->sin_port),
sn, ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&s->frt_addr)->sin_port),
p->id, (p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) ? "HTTP" : "TCP");
}
}
else {
char pn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], sn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
if (!(s->flags & SN_FRT_ADDR_SET))
get_frt_addr(s);
if (inet_ntop(AF_INET6, (const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&s->frt_addr)->sin6_addr,
sn, sizeof(sn)) &&
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, (const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&s->cli_addr)->sin6_addr,
pn, sizeof(pn))) {
send_log(p, LOG_INFO, "Connect from %s:%d to %s:%d (%s/%s)\n",
pn, ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&s->cli_addr)->sin6_port),
sn, ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&s->frt_addr)->sin6_port),
p->id, (p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) ? "HTTP" : "TCP");
}
}
}
if ((global.mode & MODE_DEBUG) && (!(global.mode & MODE_QUIET) || (global.mode & MODE_VERBOSE))) {
int len;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FRT_ADDR_SET))
get_frt_addr(s);
if (s->cli_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
char pn[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
inet_ntop(AF_INET,
(const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&s->cli_addr)->sin_addr,
pn, sizeof(pn));
len = sprintf(trash, "%08x:%s.accept(%04x)=%04x from [%s:%d]\n",
s->uniq_id, p->id, (unsigned short)fd, (unsigned short)cfd,
pn, ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&s->cli_addr)->sin_port));
}
else {
char pn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
(const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&s->cli_addr))->sin6_addr,
pn, sizeof(pn));
len = sprintf(trash, "%08x:%s.accept(%04x)=%04x from [%s:%d]\n",
s->uniq_id, p->id, (unsigned short)fd, (unsigned short)cfd,
pn, ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&s->cli_addr))->sin6_port));
}
write(1, trash, len);
}
if ((s->req = pool_alloc2(pool2_buffer)) == NULL)
goto out_fail_req; /* no memory */
buffer_init(s->req);
s->req->rlim += BUFSIZE;
[MAJOR] implement tcp request content inspection Some people need to inspect contents of TCP requests before deciding to forward a connection or not. A future extension of this demand might consist in selecting a server farm depending on the protocol detected in the request. For this reason, a new state CL_STINSPECT has been added on the client side. It is immediately entered upon accept() if the statement "tcp-request inspect-delay <xxx>" is found in the frontend configuration. Haproxy will then wait up to this amount of time trying to find a matching ACL, and will either accept or reject the connection depending on the "tcp-request content <action> {if|unless}" rules, where <action> is either "accept" or "reject". Note that it only waits that long if no definitive verdict can be found earlier. That generally implies calling a fetch() function which does not have enough information to decode some contents, or a match() function which only finds the beginning of what it's looking for. It is only at the ACL level that partial data may be processed as such, because we need to distinguish between MISS and FAIL *before* applying the term negation. Thus it is enough to add "| ACL_PARTIAL" to the last argument when calling acl_exec_cond() to indicate that we expect ACL_PAT_MISS to be returned if some data is missing (for fetch() or match()). This is the only case we may return this value. For this reason, the ACL check in process_cli() has become a lot simpler. A new ACL "req_len" of type "int" has been added. Right now it is already possible to drop requests which talk too early (eg: for SMTP) or which don't talk at all (eg: HTTP/SSL). Also, the acl fetch() functions have been extended in order to permit reporting of missing data in case of fetch failure, using the ACL_TEST_F_MAY_CHANGE flag. The default behaviour is unchanged, and if no rule matches, the request is accepted. As a side effect, all layer 7 fetching functions have been cleaned up so that they now check for the validity of the layer 7 pointer before dereferencing it.
2008-07-14 21:54:42 +00:00
if (p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) /* reserve some space for header rewriting */
s->req->rlim -= MAXREWRITE;
s->req->rto = s->fe->timeout.client;
s->req->wto = s->be->timeout.server;
s->req->cto = s->be->timeout.connect;
if ((s->rep = pool_alloc2(pool2_buffer)) == NULL)
goto out_fail_rep; /* no memory */
buffer_init(s->rep);
s->rep->rto = s->be->timeout.server;
s->rep->wto = s->fe->timeout.client;
s->rep->cto = TICK_ETERNITY;
fd_insert(cfd);
fdtab[cfd].owner = t;
fdtab[cfd].listener = l;
fdtab[cfd].state = FD_STREADY;
fdtab[cfd].cb[DIR_RD].f = l->proto->read;
fdtab[cfd].cb[DIR_RD].b = s->req;
fdtab[cfd].cb[DIR_WR].f = l->proto->write;
fdtab[cfd].cb[DIR_WR].b = s->rep;
fdtab[cfd].peeraddr = (struct sockaddr *)&s->cli_addr;
fdtab[cfd].peerlen = sizeof(s->cli_addr);
if ((p->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP && (s->flags & SN_MONITOR)) ||
(p->mode == PR_MODE_HEALTH && (p->options & PR_O_HTTP_CHK))) {
/* Either we got a request from a monitoring system on an HTTP instance,
* or we're in health check mode with the 'httpchk' option enabled. In
* both cases, we return a fake "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" response and we exit.
*/
struct chunk msg = { .str = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n\r\n", .len = 19 };
client_retnclose(s, &msg); /* forge a 200 response */
}
else if (p->mode == PR_MODE_HEALTH) { /* health check mode, no client reading */
struct chunk msg = { .str = "OK\n", .len = 3 };
client_retnclose(s, &msg); /* forge an "OK" response */
}
else {
EV_FD_SET(cfd, DIR_RD);
}
s->req->rex = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->req->wex = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->req->cex = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->rep->rex = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->rep->wex = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->txn.exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
[MAJOR] implement tcp request content inspection Some people need to inspect contents of TCP requests before deciding to forward a connection or not. A future extension of this demand might consist in selecting a server farm depending on the protocol detected in the request. For this reason, a new state CL_STINSPECT has been added on the client side. It is immediately entered upon accept() if the statement "tcp-request inspect-delay <xxx>" is found in the frontend configuration. Haproxy will then wait up to this amount of time trying to find a matching ACL, and will either accept or reject the connection depending on the "tcp-request content <action> {if|unless}" rules, where <action> is either "accept" or "reject". Note that it only waits that long if no definitive verdict can be found earlier. That generally implies calling a fetch() function which does not have enough information to decode some contents, or a match() function which only finds the beginning of what it's looking for. It is only at the ACL level that partial data may be processed as such, because we need to distinguish between MISS and FAIL *before* applying the term negation. Thus it is enough to add "| ACL_PARTIAL" to the last argument when calling acl_exec_cond() to indicate that we expect ACL_PAT_MISS to be returned if some data is missing (for fetch() or match()). This is the only case we may return this value. For this reason, the ACL check in process_cli() has become a lot simpler. A new ACL "req_len" of type "int" has been added. Right now it is already possible to drop requests which talk too early (eg: for SMTP) or which don't talk at all (eg: HTTP/SSL). Also, the acl fetch() functions have been extended in order to permit reporting of missing data in case of fetch failure, using the ACL_TEST_F_MAY_CHANGE flag. The default behaviour is unchanged, and if no rule matches, the request is accepted. As a side effect, all layer 7 fetching functions have been cleaned up so that they now check for the validity of the layer 7 pointer before dereferencing it.
2008-07-14 21:54:42 +00:00
s->inspect_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
t->expire = TICK_ETERNITY;
if (s->fe->timeout.client) {
if (EV_FD_ISSET(cfd, DIR_RD)) {
s->req->rex = tick_add(now_ms, s->fe->timeout.client);
t->expire = s->req->rex;
}
if (EV_FD_ISSET(cfd, DIR_WR)) {
s->rep->wex = tick_add(now_ms, s->fe->timeout.client);
t->expire = s->rep->wex;
}
}
if (s->cli_state == CL_STHEADERS && s->fe->timeout.httpreq) {
s->txn.exp = tick_add(now_ms, s->fe->timeout.httpreq);
t->expire = tick_first(t->expire, s->txn.exp);
}
[MAJOR] implement tcp request content inspection Some people need to inspect contents of TCP requests before deciding to forward a connection or not. A future extension of this demand might consist in selecting a server farm depending on the protocol detected in the request. For this reason, a new state CL_STINSPECT has been added on the client side. It is immediately entered upon accept() if the statement "tcp-request inspect-delay <xxx>" is found in the frontend configuration. Haproxy will then wait up to this amount of time trying to find a matching ACL, and will either accept or reject the connection depending on the "tcp-request content <action> {if|unless}" rules, where <action> is either "accept" or "reject". Note that it only waits that long if no definitive verdict can be found earlier. That generally implies calling a fetch() function which does not have enough information to decode some contents, or a match() function which only finds the beginning of what it's looking for. It is only at the ACL level that partial data may be processed as such, because we need to distinguish between MISS and FAIL *before* applying the term negation. Thus it is enough to add "| ACL_PARTIAL" to the last argument when calling acl_exec_cond() to indicate that we expect ACL_PAT_MISS to be returned if some data is missing (for fetch() or match()). This is the only case we may return this value. For this reason, the ACL check in process_cli() has become a lot simpler. A new ACL "req_len" of type "int" has been added. Right now it is already possible to drop requests which talk too early (eg: for SMTP) or which don't talk at all (eg: HTTP/SSL). Also, the acl fetch() functions have been extended in order to permit reporting of missing data in case of fetch failure, using the ACL_TEST_F_MAY_CHANGE flag. The default behaviour is unchanged, and if no rule matches, the request is accepted. As a side effect, all layer 7 fetching functions have been cleaned up so that they now check for the validity of the layer 7 pointer before dereferencing it.
2008-07-14 21:54:42 +00:00
else if (s->cli_state == CL_STINSPECT && s->fe->tcp_req.inspect_delay) {
s->inspect_exp = tick_add(now_ms, s->fe->tcp_req.inspect_delay);
t->expire = tick_first(t->expire, s->inspect_exp);
}
if (p->mode != PR_MODE_HEALTH)
task_wakeup(t);
p->feconn++; /* beconn will be increased later */
if (p->feconn > p->feconn_max)
p->feconn_max = p->feconn;
if (s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) {
s->be->cum_beconn++;
s->be->beconn++;
if (s->be->beconn > s->be->beconn_max)
s->be->beconn_max = s->be->beconn;
}
actconn++;
totalconn++;
// fprintf(stderr, "accepting from %p => %d conn, %d total, task=%p\n", p, actconn, totalconn, t);
} /* end of while (p->feconn < p->maxconn) */
return 0;
/* Error unrolling */
out_fail_rep:
if (s->req)
pool_free2(pool2_buffer, s->req);
out_fail_req:
if (txn->hdr_idx.v != NULL)
pool_free2(p->hdr_idx_pool, txn->hdr_idx.v);
out_fail_idx:
if (txn->rsp.cap != NULL)
pool_free2(p->rsp_cap_pool, txn->rsp.cap);
out_fail_rspcap:
if (txn->req.cap != NULL)
pool_free2(p->req_cap_pool, txn->req.cap);
out_fail_reqcap:
out_free_task:
pool_free2(pool2_task, t);
out_free_session:
pool_free2(pool2_session, s);
out_close:
close(cfd);
return 0;
}
/************************************************************************/
/* All supported keywords must be declared here. */
/************************************************************************/
/* set test->ptr to point to the source IPv4/IPv6 address and test->i to the family */
static int
acl_fetch_src(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, int dir,
struct acl_expr *expr, struct acl_test *test)
{
test->i = l4->cli_addr.ss_family;
if (test->i == AF_INET)
test->ptr = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&l4->cli_addr)->sin_addr;
else
test->ptr = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&l4->cli_addr))->sin6_addr;
test->flags = ACL_TEST_F_READ_ONLY;
return 1;
}
/* set test->i to the connexion's source port */
static int
acl_fetch_sport(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, int dir,
struct acl_expr *expr, struct acl_test *test)
{
if (l4->cli_addr.ss_family == AF_INET)
test->i = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&l4->cli_addr)->sin_port);
else
test->i = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&l4->cli_addr))->sin6_port);
test->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
/* set test->ptr to point to the frontend's IPv4/IPv6 address and test->i to the family */
static int
acl_fetch_dst(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, int dir,
struct acl_expr *expr, struct acl_test *test)
{
if (!(l4->flags & SN_FRT_ADDR_SET))
get_frt_addr(l4);
test->i = l4->frt_addr.ss_family;
if (test->i == AF_INET)
test->ptr = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&l4->frt_addr)->sin_addr;
else
test->ptr = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&l4->frt_addr))->sin6_addr;
test->flags = ACL_TEST_F_READ_ONLY;
return 1;
}
/* set test->i to the frontend connexion's destination port */
static int
acl_fetch_dport(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, int dir,
struct acl_expr *expr, struct acl_test *test)
{
if (!(l4->flags & SN_FRT_ADDR_SET))
get_frt_addr(l4);
if (l4->frt_addr.ss_family == AF_INET)
test->i = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)&l4->frt_addr)->sin_port);
else
test->i = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&l4->frt_addr))->sin6_port);
test->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
/* set test->i to the number of connexions to the proxy */
static int
acl_fetch_dconn(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, int dir,
struct acl_expr *expr, struct acl_test *test)
{
test->i = px->feconn;
return 1;
}
/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten */
static struct acl_kw_list acl_kws = {{ },{
{ "src_port", acl_parse_int, acl_fetch_sport, acl_match_int },
{ "src", acl_parse_ip, acl_fetch_src, acl_match_ip },
{ "dst", acl_parse_ip, acl_fetch_dst, acl_match_ip },
{ "dst_port", acl_parse_int, acl_fetch_dport, acl_match_int },
#if 0
{ "src_limit", acl_parse_int, acl_fetch_sconn, acl_match_int },
#endif
{ "dst_conn", acl_parse_int, acl_fetch_dconn, acl_match_int },
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
}};
__attribute__((constructor))
static void __client_init(void)
{
acl_register_keywords(&acl_kws);
}
/*
* Local variables:
* c-indent-level: 8
* c-basic-offset: 8
* End:
*/