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haproxy/reg-tests/converter/mqtt.vtc

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REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
varnishtest "mqtt converters Test"
REGTESTS: Fix required versions for several scripts The following scripts require HAProxy 2.4 : * cache/caching_rules.vtc * cache/post_on_entry.vtc * cache/vary.vtc * checks/1be_40srv_odd_health_checks.vtc * checks/40be_2srv_odd_health_checks.vtc * checks/4be_1srv_health_checks.vtc * converter/fix.vtc * converter/mqtt.vtc * http-messaging/protocol_upgrade.vtc * http-messaging/websocket.vtc * http-set-timeout/set_timeout.vtc * log/log_uri.vtc However it may change is features are backported.
2020-12-15 16:13:39 +00:00
#REQUIRE_VERSION=2.4
REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
feature ignore_unknown_macro
server s1 {
BUG/MINOR: mqtt: Fix parser for string with more than 127 characters Parsing of too long strings (> 127 characters) was buggy because of a wrong cast on the length bytes. To fix the bug, we rely on mqtt_read_2byte_int() function. This way, the string length is properly decoded. This patch should partely fix the issue #1310. It must be backported to 2.4.
2021-06-28 13:26:00 +00:00
# MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet (id: test_subaaaaaa... [len = 200])
recv 215
REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
sendhex "20020000"
close
BUG/MINOR: mqtt: Support empty client ID in CONNECT message As specified by the MQTT specification (MQTT-3.1.3-6), the client ID may be empty. That means the length of the client ID string may be 0. However, The MQTT parser does not support empty strings. So, to fix the bug, the mqtt_read_string() function may now parse empty string. 2 bytes must be found to decode the string length, but the length may be 0 now. It is the caller responsibility to test the string emptiness if necessary. In addition, in mqtt_parse_connect(), the client ID may be empty now. This patch should partely fix the issue #1310. It must be backported to 2.4.
2021-06-28 13:37:59 +00:00
# MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet (id: <empty> - username: test - passwd: passwd)
REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
accept
BUG/MINOR: mqtt: Support empty client ID in CONNECT message As specified by the MQTT specification (MQTT-3.1.3-6), the client ID may be empty. That means the length of the client ID string may be 0. However, The MQTT parser does not support empty strings. So, to fix the bug, the mqtt_read_string() function may now parse empty string. 2 bytes must be found to decode the string length, but the length may be 0 now. It is the caller responsibility to test the string emptiness if necessary. In addition, in mqtt_parse_connect(), the client ID may be empty now. This patch should partely fix the issue #1310. It must be backported to 2.4.
2021-06-28 13:37:59 +00:00
recv 28
REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
sendhex "20020000"
close
# MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub - username: test - passwd: passwd - will_topic: willtopic - will_payload: willpayload)
accept
recv 60
sendhex "20020000"
close
# MQTT 5.0 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub)
accept
recv 26
sendhex "200600000322000a"
# MQTT 5.0 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub - username: test - passwd: passwd)
accept
recv 40
sendhex "200600000322000a"
# MQTT 5.0 complex CONNECT/CONNACK packet
accept
recv 128
sendhex "20250000221100000078217fff24012501270000ffff22000a2600016100016226000163000164"
close
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNACK packet with invalid flags (!= 0x00)
accept
recv 22
sendhex "21020000"
expect_close
} -start
server s2 {
# MQTT 5.0 complex CONNECT packet
recv 128
sendhex "20250000221100000078217fff24012501270000ffff22000a2600016100016226000163000164"
} -start
haproxy h1 -conf {
defaults
mode tcp
timeout connect 1s
timeout client 1s
timeout server 1s
frontend fe1
bind "fd@${fe1}"
tcp-request inspect-delay 1s
tcp-request content reject unless { req.payload(0,0),mqtt_is_valid }
default_backend be1
frontend fe2
bind "fd@${fe2}"
tcp-request inspect-delay 1s
tcp-request content reject unless { req.payload(0,0),mqtt_is_valid }
tcp-request content set-var(req.flags) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,flags)
tcp-request content set-var(req.protoname) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,protocol_name)
tcp-request content set-var(req.protovsn) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,protocol_version)
tcp-request content set-var(req.clientid) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,client_identifier)
tcp-request content set-var(req.willtopic) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,will_topic)
tcp-request content set-var(req.willbody) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,will_payload)
tcp-request content set-var(req.user) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,username)
tcp-request content set-var(req.pass) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,password)
tcp-request content set-var(req.maxpktsz) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,39)
tcp-request content set-var(req.reqpbinfo) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,23)
tcp-request content set-var(req.ctype) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,3)
tcp-request content set-var(req.willrsptopic) req.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connect,8)
tcp-request content reject if ! { var(req.protoname) "MQTT" } || ! { var(req.protovsn) "5" }
tcp-request content reject if ! { var(req.flags) "238" } || ! { var(req.clientid) "test_sub" }
tcp-request content reject if ! { var(req.user) "test" } || ! { var(req.pass) "passwd" }
tcp-request content reject if ! { var(req.willtopic) "willtopic" } || ! { var(req.willbody) "willpayload" }
tcp-request content reject if ! { var(req.maxpktsz) "20" } || ! { var(req.reqpbinfo) "1" }
tcp-request content reject if ! { var(req.ctype) "text/plain" } || ! { var(req.willrsptopic) "willrsptopic" }
default_backend be2
backend be1
server s1 ${s1_addr}:${s1_port}
tcp-response inspect-delay 1s
tcp-response content reject unless { res.payload(0,0),mqtt_is_valid }
backend be2
server s2 ${s2_addr}:${s2_port}
tcp-response inspect-delay 1s
tcp-response content reject unless { res.payload(0,0),mqtt_is_valid }
tcp-response content set-var(res.flags) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,flags)
tcp-response content set-var(res.protovsn) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,protocol_version)
tcp-response content set-var(res.rcode) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,reason_code)
tcp-response content set-var(res.sessexpint) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,17)
tcp-response content set-var(res.recvmax) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,33)
tcp-response content set-var(res.maxqos) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,36)
tcp-response content set-var(res.retainavail) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,37)
tcp-response content set-var(res.maxpktsz) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,39)
tcp-response content set-var(res.topicaliasmax) res.payload(0,0),mqtt_field_value(connack,34)
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.protovsn) "5" } || ! { var(res.flags) "0" }
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.rcode) "0" } || ! { var(res.sessexpint) "120" }
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.recvmax) "32767" } || ! { var(res.maxqos) "1" }
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.retainavail) "1" } || ! { var(res.maxpktsz) "65535" }
tcp-response content reject if ! { var(res.topicaliasmax) "10" }
} -start
client c1_311_1 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Valid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub)
BUG/MINOR: mqtt: Fix parser for string with more than 127 characters Parsing of too long strings (> 127 characters) was buggy because of a wrong cast on the length bytes. To fix the bug, we rely on mqtt_read_2byte_int() function. This way, the string length is properly decoded. This patch should partely fix the issue #1310. It must be backported to 2.4.
2021-06-28 13:26:00 +00:00
sendhex "10d40100044d5154540402003c00c8746573745f737562616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161"
REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
recv 4
expect_close
} -run
client c1_311_2 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
BUG/MINOR: mqtt: Support empty client ID in CONNECT message As specified by the MQTT specification (MQTT-3.1.3-6), the client ID may be empty. That means the length of the client ID string may be 0. However, The MQTT parser does not support empty strings. So, to fix the bug, the mqtt_read_string() function may now parse empty string. 2 bytes must be found to decode the string length, but the length may be 0 now. It is the caller responsibility to test the string emptiness if necessary. In addition, in mqtt_parse_connect(), the client ID may be empty now. This patch should partely fix the issue #1310. It must be backported to 2.4.
2021-06-28 13:37:59 +00:00
# Valid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet (id: <empty> - username: test - passwd: passwd)
sendhex "101a00044d51545404c2003c00000004746573740006706173737764"
REGTEST: converter: Add a regtest for MQTT converters This new script tests mqtt_is_valid() and mqtt_get_field_value() converters used to validate and extract information from a MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) message.
2020-10-30 16:46:00 +00:00
recv 4
expect_close
} -run
client c1_311_3 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Valid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub - username: test - passwd: passwd - will_topic: willtopic - will_payload: willpayload)
sendhex "103a00044d51545404ee003c0008746573745f737562000977696c6c746f706963000b77696c6c7061796c6f61640004746573740006706173737764"
recv 4
expect_close
} -run
client c1_50_1 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Valid MQTT 5.0 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub)
sendhex "101800044d5154540502003c032100140008746573745f737562"
recv 8
expect_close
} -run
client c1_50_2 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Valid MQTT 5.0 CONNECT packet (id: test_sub - username: test - passwd: passwd)
sendhex "102600044d51545405c2003c032100140008746573745f7375620004746573740006706173737764"
recv 8
expect_close
} -run
client c1_50_3 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Valid MQTT 5.0 complex CONNECT/CONNACK packet
sendhex "107e00044d51545405ee003c182700000014170126000161000162260001630001642100140008746573745f7375622a03000a746578742f706c61696e08000c77696c6c727370746f7069632600016500016626000167000168000977696c6c746f706963000b77696c6c7061796c6f61640004746573740006706173737764"
recv 39
expect_close
} -run
client c2_311_1 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 PINREQ
sendhex "d000"
expect_close
} -run
client c2_311_2 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT packet with invalid flags (!= 0x00)
sendhex "111400044d5154540402003c0008746573745f737562"
expect_close
} -run
client c2_311_3 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNACK packet with invalid flags (!= 0x00)
sendhex "101400044d5154540402003c0008746573745f737562"
expect_close
} -run
client c2_311_4 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT with too long remaing_length ( > 4 bytes)
sendhex "10ffffffff1400044d5154540402003c0008746573745f737562"
expect_close
} -run
client c2_311_4 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT with not matching ( 0x13 != 0x14)
sendhex "101300044d5154540402003c000874657374a5f737562"
expect_close
} -run
client c2_311_4 -connect ${h1_fe1_sock} {
# Invalid MQTT 3.1.1 CONNECT with not matching ( 0x18 != 0x14)
sendhex "101800044d5154540402003c000874657374a5f737562ffffffff"
expect_close
} -run
client c2_50_1 -connect ${h1_fe2_sock} {
# complex MQTT 5.0 CONNECT/CONNACK packet
# - CONNECT :
# client-id : test_sub
# username : test
# password : passwd
# will-topic : willtopic
# will-payload: willpayload
# connect props:
# maximum-packet-size : 20
# request-problem-information: 1
# user-property : name=a value=b
# user-property : name=c value=d
# will props:
# content-type : text/plain
# response-topic: willrsptopic
# user-property : name=e value=f
# user-property : name=g value=h
# - CONNACK :
# flags : 0x00
# reason-code: 0x00
# connack props:
# session-Expiry-interval: 120
# receive-maximum : 32767
# maximum-qos : 1
# retain-available : 1
# maximum-packet-size : 65535
# topic-alias-maximum : 10
# user-property : name=a value=b
# user-property : name=c value=d
sendhex "107e00044d51545405ee003c182700000014170126000161000162260001630001642100140008746573745f7375622a03000a746578742f706c61696e08000c77696c6c727370746f7069632600016500016626000167000168000977696c6c746f706963000b77696c6c7061796c6f61640004746573740006706173737764"
recv 39
expect_close
} -run