mirror of https://github.com/ceph/ceph
1095 lines
47 KiB
ReStructuredText
1095 lines
47 KiB
ReStructuredText
===============================================================================
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A Detailed Documentation on How to Set up Ceph Kerberos Authentication
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===============================================================================
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This document provides details on the Kerberos authorization protocol. This is
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the 1st draft and we will try to keep it updated along with code changes that
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might take place.
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Several free implementations of this protocol are available (MIT, Heimdal,
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MS...), covering a wide range of operating systems. The Massachusetts
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Institute of Technology (MIT), where Kerberos was originally developed,
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continues to develop their Kerberos package and it is the implementation we
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chose to work with. `MIT Kerberos <http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/>`_.
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Please, provide feedback to Daniel Oliveira (doliveira@suse.com)
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*Last update: Dec 3, 2018*
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Background
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----------
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Before we get into *Kerberos details*, let us define a few terms so we can
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understand what to expect from it, *what it can and can't do*:
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Directory Services
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A directory service is a customizable information store that functions as
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a single point from which users can locate resources and services
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distributed throughout the network. This customizable information store
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also gives administrators a single point for managing its objects and their
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attributes. Although this information store appears as a single point to
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the users of the network, it is actually most often stored in a distributed
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form. A directory service consists of at least one *Directory Server and a
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Directory Client* and are implemented based on *X.500 standards*.
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*OpenLDAP, 389 Directory Server, MS Active Directory, NetIQ eDirectory* are
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some good examples.
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A directory service is often characterized as a *write-once-read-many-times
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service*, meaning the data that would normally be stored in an directory
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service would not be expected to change on every access.
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The database that forms a directory service *is not designed for
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transactional data*.
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LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol v3)
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LDAP is a set of LDAP Protocol Exchanges *(not an implementation of a
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server)* that defines the method by which data is accessed. LDAPv3 is a
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standard defined by the IETF in RFC 2251 and describes how data is
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represented in the Directory Service (the Data Model or DIT).
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Finally, it defines how data is loaded into (imported) and saved from
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(exported) a directory service (using LDIF). LDAP does not define how data
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is stored or manipulated. Data Store is an 'automagic' process as far as
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the standard is concerned and is generally handled by back-end modules.
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No Directory Service implementation has all the features of LDAP v3
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protocol implemented. All Directory Server implementations have their
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different problems and/or anomalies, and features that may not return
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results as another Directory Server implementation would.
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Authentication
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Authentication is about validating credentials (like User Name/ID and
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password) to verify the identity. The system determines whether one is what
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they say they are using their credentials.
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Usually, authentication is done by a username and password, and sometimes
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in conjunction with *(single, two, or multi) factors of authentication*,
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which refers to the various ways to be authenticated.
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Authorization
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Authorization occurs after the identity is successfully authenticated by
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the system, which ultimately gives one full permission to access the
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resources such as information, files, databases, and so forth, almost
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anything. It determines the ability to access the system and up to what
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extent (what kind of permissions/rights are given and to where/what).
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Auditing
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Auditing takes the results from both *authentication and authorization* and
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records them into an audit log. The audit log records records all actions
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taking by/during the authentication and authorization for later review by
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the administrators. While authentication and authorization are preventive
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systems (in which unauthorized access is prevented), auditing is a reactive
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system (in which it gives detailed log of how/when/where someone accessed
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the environment).
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Kerberos (KRB v5)
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Kerberos is a network *authentication protocol*. It is designed to provide
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strong authentication for client/server applications by using secret-key
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cryptography (symmetric key). A free implementation of this protocol is
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available from the MIT. However, Kerberos is available in many commercial
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products as well.
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It was designed to provide secure authentication to services over an
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insecure network. Kerberos uses tickets to authenticate a user, or service
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application and never transmits passwords over the network in the clear.
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So both client and server can prove their identity without sending any
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unencrypted secrets over the network.
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Kerberos can be used for single sign-on (SSO). The idea behind SSO is
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simple, we want to login just once and be able to use any service that we
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are entitled to, without having to login on each of those services.
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Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
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SASL **(RFC 4422)** is a framework that helps developers to implement
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different authentication mechanisms (implementing a series of challenges
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and responses), allowing both clients and servers to negotiate a mutually
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acceptable mechanism for each connection, instead of hard-coding them.
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Examples of SASL mechanisms:
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* ANONYMOUS **(RFC 4505)**
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- For guest access, meaning *unauthenticated*
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* CRAM-MD5 **(RFC 2195)**
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- Simple challenge-response scheme based on *HMAC-MD5*.
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It does not establish any security layer. *Less secure than
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DIGEST-MD5 and GSSAPI.*
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* DIGEST-MD5 **(RFC 2831)**
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- HTTP Digest compatible *(partially)* challenge-response scheme
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based upon MD5, offering a *data security layer*. It is preferred
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over PLAIN text passwords, protecting against plain text attacks.
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It is a mandatory authentication method for LDAPv3 servers.
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* EXTERNAL **(RFCs 4422, 5246, 4301, 2119)**
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- Where *authentication is implicit* in the context (i.e; for
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protocols using IPsec or TLS [TLS/SSL to performing certificate-
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based authentication] already). This method uses public keys for
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strong authentication.
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* GS2 **(RFC 5801)**
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- Family of mechanisms supports arbitrary GSS-API mechanisms in
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SASL
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* NTLM (MS Proprietary)
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- MS Windows NT LAN Manager authentication mechanism
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* OAuth 1.0/2.0 **(RFCs 5849, 6749, 7628)**
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- Authentication protocol for delegated resource access
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* OTP **(RFC 2444)**
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- One-time password mechanism *(obsoletes the SKEY mechanism)*
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* PLAIN **(RFC 4616)**
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- Simple Cleartext password mechanism **(RFC 4616)**. This is not a
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preferred mechanism for most applications because of its relative
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lack of strength.
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* SCRAM **(RFCs 5802, 7677)**
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- Modern challenge-response scheme based mechanism with channel
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binding support
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Generic Security Services Application Program Interface (GSSAPI)
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GSSAPI **(RFCs 2078, 2743, 2744, 4121, 4752)** is widely used by protocol
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implementers as a way to implement Kerberos v5 support in their
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applications. It provides a generic interface and message format that can
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encapsulate authentication exchanges from any authentication method that
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has a GSSAPI-compliant library.
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It does not define a protocol, authentication, or security mechanism
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itself; it instead makes it easier for application programmers to support
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multiple authentication mechanisms by providing a uniform, generic API for
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security services. It is a set of functions that include both an API and a
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methodology for approaching authentication, aiming to insulate application
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protocols from the specifics of security protocols as much as possible.
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*Microsoft Windows Kerberos* implementation does not include GSSAPI support
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but instead includes a *Microsoft-specific API*, the *Security Support
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Provider Interface (SSPI)*. In Windows, an SSPI client can communicate with
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a *GSSAPI server*.
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*Most applications that support GSSAPI also support Kerberos v5.*
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Simple and Protected GSSAPI Negotiation Mechanism (SPNEGO)
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As we can see, GSSAPI solves the problem of providing a single API to
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different authentication mechanisms. However, it does not solve the problem
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of negotiating which mechanism to use. In fact for GSSAPI to work, the two
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applications communicating with each other must know in advance what
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authentication mechanism they plan to use, which usually is not a problem
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if only one mechanism is supported (meaning Kerberos v5).
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However, if there are multiple mechanisms to choose from, a method is
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needed to securely negotiate an authentication mechanism that is mutually
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supported between both client and server; which is where
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*SPNEGO (RFC 2478, 4178)* makes a difference.
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*SPNEGO* provides a framework for two parties that are engaged in
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authentication to select from a set of possible authentication mechanisms,
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in a manner that preserves the opaque nature of the security protocols to
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the application protocol that uses it.
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It is a security protocol that uses a *GSSAPI authentication mechanism* and
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negotiates among several available authentication mechanisms in an
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implementation, selecting one for use to satisfy the authentication needs
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of the application protocol.
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It is a *meta protocol* that travels entirely in other application
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protocols; it is never used directly without an application protocol.
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*Why is this important and why do we care? Like, at all?*
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Having this background information in mind, we can easily describe things
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like:
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1. *Ceph Kerberos authentication* is based totally on MIT *Kerberos*
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implementation using *GSSAPI*.
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2. At the moment we are still using *Kerberos default backend
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database*, however we plan on adding LDAP as a backend which would
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provide us with *authentication with GSSAPI (KRB5)* and *authorization
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with LDAP (LDAPv3)*, via *SASL mechanism*.
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Before We Start
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---------------
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We assume the environment already has some external services up and running
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properly:
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* Kerberos needs to be properly configured, which also means (for both
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every server and KDC):
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- Time Synchronization (either using `NTP <http://www.ntp.org/>`_ or `chrony <https://chrony.tuxfamily.org/>`_).
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+ Not only Kerberos, but also Ceph depends and relies on time
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synchronization.
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- DNS resolution
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+ Both *(forward and reverse)* zones, with *fully qualified domain
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name (fqdn)* ``(hostname + domain.name)``
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+ KDC discover can be set up to to use DNS ``(srv resources)`` as
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service location protocol *(RFCs 2052, 2782)*, as well as *host
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or domain* to the *appropriate realm* ``(txt record)``.
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+ Even though these DNS entries/settings are not required to run a
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``Kerberos realm``, they certainly help to eliminate the need for
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manual configuration on all clients.
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+ This is extremely important, once most of the Kerberos issues are
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usually related to name resolution. Kerberos is very picky when
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checking on systems names and host lookups.
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* Whenever possible, in order to avoid a *single point of failure*, set up
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a *backup, secondary, or slave*, for every piece/part in the
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infrastructure ``(ntp, dns, and kdc servers)``.
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Also, the following *Kerberos terminology* is important:
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* Ticket
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- Tickets or Credentials, are a set of information that can be used to
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verify the client's identity. Kerberos tickets may be stored in a
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file, or they may exist only in memory.
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- The first ticket obtained is a ticket-granting ticket (TGT), which
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allows the clients to obtain additional tickets. These additional
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tickets give the client permission for specific services. The
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requesting and granting of these additional tickets happens
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transparently.
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+ The TGT, which expires at a specified time, permits the client to
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obtain additional tickets, which give permission for specific
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services. The requesting and granting of these additional tickets
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is user-transparent.
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* Key Distribution Center (KDC).
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- The KDC creates a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) for the client,
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encrypts it using the client's password as the key, and sends the
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encrypted TGT back to the client. The client then attempts to decrypt
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the TGT, using its password. If the client successfully decrypts the
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TGT (i.e., if the client gave the correct password), it keeps the
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decrypted TGT, which indicates proof of the client's identity.
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- The KDC is comprised of three components:
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+ Kerberos database, which stores all the information about the
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principals and the realm they belong to, among other things.
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+ Authentication service (AS)
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+ Ticket-granting service (TGS)
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* Client
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- Either a *user, host or a service* who sends a request for a ticket.
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* Principal
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- It is a unique identity to which Kerberos can assign tickets.
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Principals can have an arbitrary number of components. Each component
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is separated by a component separator, generally ``/``. The last
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component is the *realm*, separated from the rest of the principal by
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the realm separator, generally ``@``.
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- If there is no realm component in the principal, then it will be
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assumed that the principal is in the default realm for the context in
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which it is being used.
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- Usually, a principal is divided into three parts:
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+ The ``primary``, the ``instance``, and the ``realm``
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+ The format of a typical Kerberos V5 principal is
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``primary/instance@REALM``.
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+ The ``primary`` is the first part of the principal. In the case
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of a user, it's the same as the ``username``. For a host, the
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primary is the word ``host``. For Ceph, will use ``ceph`` as a
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primary name which makes it easier to organize and identify Ceph
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related principals.
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+ The ``instance`` is an optional string that qualifies the
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primary. The instance is separated from the primary by a slash
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``/``. In the case of a user, the instance is usually ``null``,
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but a user might also have an additional principal, with an
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instance called ``admin``, which one uses to administrate a
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database.
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The principal ``johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM`` is completely separate
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from the principal ``johndoe/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM``, with a
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separate password, and separate permissions. In the case of a
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host, the instance is the fully qualified hostname,
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i.e., ``osd1.MYDOMAIN.COM``.
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+ The ``realm`` is the Kerberos realm. Usually, the Kerberos realm
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is the domain name, in *upper-case letters*. For example, the
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machine ``osd1.MYDOMAIN.COM`` would be in the realm
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``MYDOMAIN.COM``.
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* Keytab
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- A keytab file stores the actual encryption key that can be used in
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lieu of a password challenge for a given principal. Creating keytab
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files are useful for noninteractive principals, such as *Service
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Principal Names*, which are often associated with long-running
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processes like Ceph daemons. A keytab file does not have to be a
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"1:1 mapping" to a single principal. Multiple different principal
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keys can be stored in a single keytab file:
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+ The keytab file allows a user/service to authenticate without
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knowledge of the password. Due to this, *keytabs should be
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protected* with appropriate controls to prevent unauthorized
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users from authenticating with it.
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+ The default client keytab file is ``/etc/krb5.keytab``
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The 'Ceph side' of the things
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------------------------------
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In order to configure connections (from Ceph nodes) to the KDC:
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1. Login to the Kerberos client (Ceph server nodes) and confirm it is properly
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configured, by checking and editing ``/etc/krb5.conf`` file properly: ::
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/etc/krb5.conf
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[libdefaults]
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dns_canonicalize_hostname = false
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rdns = false
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forwardable = true
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dns_lookup_realm = true
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dns_lookup_kdc = true
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allow_weak_crypto = false
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default_realm = MYDOMAIN.COM
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default_ccache_name = KEYRING:persistent:%{uid}
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[realms]
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MYDOMAIN.COM = {
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kdc = kerberos.mydomain.com
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admin_server = kerberos.mydomain.com
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...
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}
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...
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2. Login to the *KDC Server* and confirm it is properly configured to
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authenticate to the Kerberos realm in question:
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a. Kerberos related DNS RRs: ::
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/var/lib/named/master/mydomain.com
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kerberos IN A 192.168.10.21
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kerberos-slave IN A 192.168.10.22
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_kerberos IN TXT "MYDOMAIN.COM"
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_kerberos._udp IN SRV 1 0 88 kerberos
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_kerberos._tcp IN SRV 1 0 88 kerberos
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_kerberos._udp IN SRV 20 0 88 kerberos-slave
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_kerberos-master._udp IN SRV 0 0 88 kerberos
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_kerberos-adm._tcp IN SRV 0 0 749 kerberos
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_kpasswd._udp IN SRV 0 0 464 kerberos
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...
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b. KDC configuration file: ::
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/var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf
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[kdcdefaults]
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kdc_ports = 750,88
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[realms]
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MYDOMAIN.COM = {
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acl_file = /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
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admin_keytab = FILE:/var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
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default_principal_flags = +postdateable +forwardable +renewable +proxiable
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+dup-skey -preauth -hwauth +service
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+tgt-based +allow-tickets -pwchange
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-pwservice
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dict_file = /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.dict
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key_stash_file = /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/.k5.MYDOMAIN.COM
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kdc_ports = 750,88
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max_life = 0d 10h 0m 0s
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max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s
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}
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...
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3. Still on the KDC Server, run the Kerberos administration utility;
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``kadmin.local`` so we can list all the principals already created. ::
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kadmin.local: listprincs
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K/M@MYDOMAIN.COM
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krbtgt/MYDOMAIN.COM@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/changepw@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/history@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/kerberos.mydomain.com@MYDOMAIN.COM
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root/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM
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...
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4. Add a *principal for each Ceph cluster node* we want to be authenticated by
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Kerberos:
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a. Adding principals: ::
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kadmin.local: addprinc -randkey ceph/ceph-mon1
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Principal "ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
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kadmin.local: addprinc -randkey ceph/ceph-osd1
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Principal "ceph/ceph-osd1@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
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kadmin.local: addprinc -randkey ceph/ceph-osd2
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Principal "ceph/ceph-osd2@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
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kadmin.local: addprinc -randkey ceph/ceph-osd3
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Principal "ceph/ceph-osd3@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
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kadmin.local: addprinc -randkey ceph/ceph-osd4
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Principal "ceph/ceph-osd4@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
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kadmin.local: listprincs
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K/M@MYDOMAIN.COM
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krbtgt/MYDOMAIN.COM@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/changepw@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/history@MYDOMAIN.COM
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kadmin/kerberos.mydomain.com@MYDOMAIN.COM
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root/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM
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ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM
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ceph/ceph-osd1@MYDOMAIN.COM
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ceph/ceph-osd2@MYDOMAIN.COM
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ceph/ceph-osd3@MYDOMAIN.COM
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ceph/ceph-osd4@MYDOMAIN.COM
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...
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|
|
b. This follows the same idea if we are creating a *user principal* ::
|
|
|
|
kadmin.local: addprinc johndoe
|
|
WARNING: no policy specified for johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM; defaulting to no policy
|
|
Enter password for principal "johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM":
|
|
Re-enter password for principal "johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM":
|
|
Principal "johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
5. Create a *keytab file* for each Ceph cluster node:
|
|
|
|
As the default client keytab file is ``/etc/krb5.keytab``, we will want to
|
|
use a different file name, so we especify which *keytab file to create* and
|
|
which *principal to export keys* from: ::
|
|
|
|
kadmin.local: ktadd -k /etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab ceph/ceph-mon1
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-mon1 with kvno 2, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-mon1 with kvno 2, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-mon1 with kvno 2, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-mon1 with kvno 2, encryption type arcfour-hmac added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab.
|
|
kadmin.local: ktadd -k /etc/gss_client_osd1.ktab ceph/ceph-osd1
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd1 with kvno 2, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd1.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd1 with kvno 2, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd1.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd1 with kvno 2, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd1.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd1 with kvno 2, encryption type arcfour-hmac added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd1.ktab.
|
|
kadmin.local: ktadd -k /etc/gss_client_osd2.ktab ceph/ceph-osd2
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd2 with kvno 2, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd2.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd2 with kvno 2, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd2.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd2 with kvno 2, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd2.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd2 with kvno 2, encryption type arcfour-hmac added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd2.ktab.
|
|
kadmin.local: ktadd -k /etc/gss_client_osd3.ktab ceph/ceph-osd3
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd3 with kvno 3, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd3.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd3 with kvno 3, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd3.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd3 with kvno 3, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd3.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd3 with kvno 3, encryption type arcfour-hmac added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd3.ktab.
|
|
kadmin.local: ktadd -k /etc/gss_client_osd4.ktab ceph/ceph-osd4
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd4 with kvno 4, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd4.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd4 with kvno 4, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd4.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd4 with kvno 4, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd4.ktab.
|
|
Entry for principal ceph/ceph-osd4 with kvno 4, encryption type arcfour-hmac added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/gss_client_osd4.ktab.
|
|
|
|
# ls -1 /etc/gss_client_*
|
|
/etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab
|
|
/etc/gss_client_osd1.ktab
|
|
/etc/gss_client_osd2.ktab
|
|
/etc/gss_client_osd3.ktab
|
|
/etc/gss_client_osd4.ktab
|
|
|
|
|
|
We can also check these newly created keytab client files by: ::
|
|
|
|
# klist -kte /etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab
|
|
Keytab name: FILE:/etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab
|
|
KVNO Timestamp Principal
|
|
---- ------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
2 10/8/2018 14:35:30 ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
|
|
2 10/8/2018 14:35:31 ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM (aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
|
|
2 10/8/2018 14:35:31 ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM (des3-cbc-sha1)
|
|
2 10/8/2018 14:35:31 ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM (arcfour-hmac)
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
6. A new *set parameter* was added in Ceph, ``gss ktab client file`` which
|
|
points to the keytab file related to the Ceph node *(or principal)* in
|
|
question.
|
|
|
|
By default it points to ``/var/lib/ceph/$name/gss_client_$name.ktab``. So,
|
|
in the case of a Ceph server ``osd1.mydomain.com``, the location and name
|
|
of the keytab file should be: ``/var/lib/ceph/osd1/gss_client_osd1.ktab``
|
|
|
|
Therefore, we need to ``scp`` each of these newly created keytab files from
|
|
the KDC to their respective Ceph cluster nodes (i.e):
|
|
``# for node in mon1 osd1 osd2 osd3 osd4; do scp /etc/gss_client_$node*.ktab root@ceph-$node:/var/lib/ceph/$node/; done``
|
|
|
|
Or whatever other way one feels comfortable with, as long as each keytab
|
|
client file gets copied over to the proper location.
|
|
|
|
At this point, even *without using any keytab client file* we should be
|
|
already able to authenticate a *user principal*: ::
|
|
|
|
# kdestroy -A && kinit -f johndoe && klist -f
|
|
Password for johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM:
|
|
Ticket cache: KEYRING:persistent:0:0
|
|
Default principal: johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
|
|
Valid starting Expires Service principal
|
|
10/10/2018 15:32:01 10/11/2018 07:32:01 krbtgt/MYDOMAIN.COM@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
renew until 10/11/2018 15:32:01, Flags: FRI
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
Given that the *keytab client file* is/should already be copied and available at the
|
|
Kerberos client (Ceph cluster node), we should be able to athenticate using it before
|
|
going forward: ::
|
|
|
|
# kdestroy -A && kinit -k -t /etc/gss_client_mon1.ktab -f 'ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM' && klist -f
|
|
Ticket cache: KEYRING:persistent:0:0
|
|
Default principal: ceph/ceph-mon1@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
|
|
Valid starting Expires Service principal
|
|
10/10/2018 15:54:25 10/11/2018 07:54:25 krbtgt/MYDOMAIN.COM@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
renew until 10/11/2018 15:54:25, Flags: FRI
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
7. The default client keytab is used, if it is present and readable, to
|
|
automatically obtain initial credentials for GSSAPI client applications. The
|
|
principal name of the first entry in the client keytab is used by default
|
|
when obtaining initial credentials:
|
|
|
|
a. The ``KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME environment`` variable.
|
|
b. The ``default_client_keytab_name`` profile variable in ``[libdefaults]``.
|
|
c. The hardcoded default, ``DEFCKTNAME``.
|
|
|
|
So, what we do is to internally, set the environment variable
|
|
``KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME`` to the same location as ``gss_ktab_client_file``,
|
|
so ``/var/lib/ceph/osd1/gss_client_osd1.ktab``, and change the ``ceph.conf``
|
|
file to add the new authentication method. ::
|
|
|
|
/etc/ceph/ceph.conf
|
|
[global]
|
|
...
|
|
auth cluster required = gss
|
|
auth service required = gss
|
|
auth client required = gss
|
|
gss ktab client file = /{$my_new_location}/{$my_new_ktab_client_file.keytab}
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
8. With that the GSSAPIs will then be able to read the keytab file and using
|
|
the process of name and service resolution *(provided by the DNS)*, able to
|
|
request a *TGT* as follows:
|
|
|
|
a. User/Client sends principal identity and credentials to the KDC Server
|
|
(TGT request).
|
|
b. KDC checks its internal database for the principal in question.
|
|
c. a TGT is created and wrapped by the KDC, using the principal's key
|
|
(TGT + Key).
|
|
d. The newly created TGT, is decrypted and stored in the credentials
|
|
cache.
|
|
e. At this point, Kerberos/GSSAPI aware applications (and/or services) are
|
|
able to check the list of active TGT in the keytab file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** *For Ceph Developers Only* **
|
|
=================================
|
|
|
|
We certainly could have used straight native ``KRB5 APIs`` (instead of
|
|
``GSSAPIs``), but we wanted a more portable option as regards network security,
|
|
which is the hallmark of the ``GSS`` *(Generic Security Standard)* ``-API``.
|
|
It does not actually provide security services itself.
|
|
|
|
Rather, it is a framework that provides security services to callers in a
|
|
generic way. ::
|
|
|
|
+---------------------------------+
|
|
| Application |
|
|
+---------------------------------+
|
|
| Protocol (RPC, Etc. [Optional]) |
|
|
+---------------------------------+
|
|
| GSS-API |
|
|
+---------------------------------+
|
|
| Security Mechs (Krb v5, Etc) |
|
|
+---------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
|
|
The GSS-API does two main things:
|
|
|
|
1. It creates a security context in which data can be passed between
|
|
applications. A context can be thought of as a sort of *"state of trust"*
|
|
between two applications.
|
|
|
|
Applications that share a context know who each other are and thus can
|
|
permit data transfers between them as long as the context lasts.
|
|
|
|
2. It applies one or more types of protection, known as *"security services"*,
|
|
to the data to be transmitted.
|
|
|
|
|
|
GSS-API provides several types of portability for applications:
|
|
|
|
a. **Mechanism independence.** GSS-API provides a generic interface to the
|
|
mechanisms for which it has been implemented. By specifying a default
|
|
security mechanism, an application does not need to know which mechanism
|
|
it is using (for example, Kerberos v5), or even what type of mechanism
|
|
it uses. As an example, when an application forwards a user's credential
|
|
to a server, it does not need to know if that credential has a Kerberos
|
|
format or the format used by some other mechanism, nor how the
|
|
credentials are stored by the mechanism and accessed by the application.
|
|
(If necessary, an application can specify a particular mechanism to use)
|
|
|
|
b. **Protocol independence.** The GSS-API is independent of any
|
|
communications protocol or protocol suite. It can be used with
|
|
applications that use, for example, sockets, RCP, or TCP/IP.
|
|
RPCSEC_GSS "RPCSEC_GSS Layer" is an additional layer that smoothly
|
|
integrates GSS-API with RPC.
|
|
|
|
c. **Platform independence.** The GSS-API is completely oblivious to the
|
|
type of operating system on which an application is running.
|
|
|
|
d. **Quality of Protection independence.** Quality of Protection (QOP) is
|
|
the name given to the type of algorithm used in encrypting data or
|
|
generating cryptographic tags; the GSS-API allows a programmer to ignore
|
|
QOP, using a default provided by the GSS-API.
|
|
(On the other hand, an application can specify the QOP if necessary.)
|
|
|
|
The basic security offered by the GSS-API is authentication. Authentication
|
|
is the verification of an identity: *if you are authenticated, it means
|
|
that you are recognized to be who you say you are.*
|
|
|
|
The GSS-API provides for two additional security services, if supported by the
|
|
underlying mechanisms:
|
|
|
|
1. **Integrity:** It's not always sufficient to know that an application
|
|
sending you data is who it claims to be. The data itself could have
|
|
become corrupted or compromised.
|
|
|
|
The GSS-API provides for data to be accompanied by a cryptographic tag,
|
|
known as an ``Message Integrity Code (MIC)``, to prove that the data
|
|
that arrives at your doorstep is the same as the data that the sender
|
|
transmitted. This verification of the data's validity is known as
|
|
*"integrity"*.
|
|
|
|
2. **Confidentiality:** Both authentication and integrity, however, leave
|
|
the data itself alone, so if it's somehow intercepted, others can read
|
|
it.
|
|
|
|
The GSS-API therefore allows data to be encrypted, if underlying
|
|
mechanisms support it. This encryption of data is known as *"confidentiality"*.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mechanisms Available With GSS-API:
|
|
|
|
The current implementation of the GSS-API works only with the Kerberos v5 security
|
|
mechanism. ::
|
|
|
|
Mechanism Name Object Identifier Shared Library Kernel Module
|
|
---------------------- ---------------------- -------------- --------------
|
|
diffie_hellman_640_0 1.3.6.4.1.42.2.26.2.4 dh640-0.so.1
|
|
diffie_hellman_1024_0 1.3.6.4.1.42.2.26.2.5 dh1024-0.so.1
|
|
SPNEGO 1.3.6.1.5.5.2
|
|
iakerb 1.3.6.1.5.2.5
|
|
SCRAM-SHA-1 1.3.6.1.5.5.14
|
|
SCRAM-SHA-256 1.3.6.1.5.5.18
|
|
GSS-EAP (arc) 1.3.6.1.5.5.15.1.1.*
|
|
kerberos_v5 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 gl/mech_krb5.so gl_kmech_krb5
|
|
|
|
Therefore:
|
|
Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism
|
|
OID {1.2.840.113554.1.2.2}
|
|
|
|
Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism
|
|
Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism
|
|
OID {1.3.6.1.5.5.2}
|
|
|
|
|
|
There are two different formats:
|
|
|
|
1. The first, ``{ 1 2 3 4 }``, is officially mandated by the GSS-API
|
|
specs. ``gss_str_to_oid()`` expects this first format.
|
|
|
|
2. The second, ``1.2.3.4``, is more widely used but is not an official
|
|
standard format.
|
|
|
|
Although the GSS-API makes protecting data simple, it does not do certain
|
|
things, in order to maximize its generic nature. These include:
|
|
|
|
a. Provide security credentials for a user or application. These must
|
|
be provided by the underlying security mechanism(s). The GSS-API
|
|
does allow applications to acquire credentials, either automatically
|
|
or explicitly.
|
|
|
|
b. Transfer data between applications. It is the application's
|
|
responsibility to handle the transfer of all data between peers,
|
|
whether it is security-related or "plain" data.
|
|
|
|
c. Distinguish between different types of transmitted data (for
|
|
example, to know or determine that a data packet is plain data and
|
|
not GSS-API related).
|
|
|
|
d. Indicate status due to remote (asynchronous) errors.
|
|
|
|
e. Automatically protect information sent between processes of a
|
|
multiprocess program.
|
|
|
|
f. Allocate string buffers ("Strings and Similar Data") to be passed to
|
|
GSS-API functions.
|
|
|
|
g. Deallocate GSS-API data spaces. These must be explicitly deallocated
|
|
with functions such as ``gss_release_buffer()`` and
|
|
``gss_delete_name()``.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
These are the basic steps in using the GSS-API:
|
|
|
|
1. Each application, sender and recipient, acquires credentials explicitly,
|
|
if credentials have not been acquired automatically.
|
|
|
|
2. The sender initiates a security context and the recipient accepts it.
|
|
|
|
3. The sender applies security protection to the message (data) it wants to
|
|
transmit. This means that it either encrypts the message or stamps it
|
|
with an identification tag. The sender transmits the protected message.
|
|
(The sender can choose not to apply either security protection, in which
|
|
case the message has only the default GSS-API security service
|
|
associated with it. That is authentication, in which the recipient knows
|
|
that the sender is who it claims to be.)
|
|
|
|
4. The recipient decrypts the message (if needed) and verifies it
|
|
(if appropriate).
|
|
|
|
5. (Optional) The recipient returns an identification tag to the sender for
|
|
confirmation.
|
|
|
|
6. Both applications destroy the shared security context. If necessary,
|
|
they can also deallocate any *"leftover"* GSS-API data.
|
|
|
|
Applications that use the GSS-API should include the file ``gssapi.h``.
|
|
|
|
Good References:
|
|
- `rfc1964 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1964>`_.
|
|
- `rfc2743 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2743>`_.
|
|
- `rfc2744 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744>`_.
|
|
- `rfc4178 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4178>`_.
|
|
- `rfc6649 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6649>`_.
|
|
- `MIT Kerberos Documentation <https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-latest/doc/appdev/gssapi.html>`_.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** *Kerberos Server Setup* **
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
First and foremost, ``this is not a recommendation for a production
|
|
environment``. We are not covering ``Master/Slave replication cluster`` or
|
|
anything production environment related (*ntp/chrony, dns, pam/nss, sssd, etc*).
|
|
|
|
Also, on the server side there might be different dependencies and/or
|
|
configuration steps needed, depending on which backend database will be used.
|
|
``LDAP as a backend database`` is a good example of that.
|
|
|
|
On the client side there are different steps depending on which client backend
|
|
configuration will be used. For example ``PAM/NSS`` or ``SSSD`` (along with
|
|
LDAP for identity service, [and Kerberos for authentication service]) which is
|
|
the best suited option for joining ``MS Active Directory domains``, and doing
|
|
``User Logon Management``.
|
|
|
|
By no means we intend to cover every possible scenario/combination here. These
|
|
steps are for a simple *get a (MIT) Kerberos Server up and running*.
|
|
|
|
Please, note that *rpm packages might have slightly different names*, as well
|
|
as the locations for the binaries and/or configuration files, depending on
|
|
which Linux distro we are referring to.
|
|
|
|
Finally, keep in mind that some Linux distros will have their own ``wizards``,
|
|
which can perform the basic needed configuration: ::
|
|
|
|
SUSE:
|
|
Kerberos server:
|
|
yast2 auth-server
|
|
|
|
Kerberos client:
|
|
pam/nss: yast2 ldapkrb
|
|
sssd: yast2 auth-client
|
|
|
|
|
|
However, we are going through the ``manual configuration``.
|
|
|
|
|
|
In order to get a new MIT KDC Server running:
|
|
|
|
1. Install the KDC server by:
|
|
|
|
a. Install the needed packages: ::
|
|
|
|
SUSE: zypper install krb5 krb5-server krb5-client
|
|
Additionally:
|
|
for development: krb5-devel
|
|
if using 'sssd': sssd-krb5 sssd-krb5-common
|
|
|
|
REDHAT: yum install krb5-server krb5-libs krb5-workstation
|
|
Additionally: 'Needs to be checked'
|
|
|
|
|
|
b. Edit the KDC Server configuration file: ::
|
|
|
|
/var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf
|
|
[kdcdefaults]
|
|
kdc_ports = 750,88
|
|
[realms]
|
|
MYDOMAIN.COM = {
|
|
acl_file = /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
|
|
admin_keytab = FILE:/var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
|
|
default_principal_flags = +postdateable +forwardable +renewable +proxiable
|
|
+dup-skey -preauth -hwauth +service
|
|
+tgt-based +allow-tickets -pwchange
|
|
-pwservice
|
|
dict_file = /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.dict
|
|
key_stash_file = /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/.k5.MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
kdc_ports = 750,88
|
|
max_life = 0d 10h 0m 0s
|
|
max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s
|
|
}
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
c. Edit the Kerberos Client configuration file: ::
|
|
|
|
/etc/krb5.conf
|
|
[libdefaults]
|
|
dns_canonicalize_hostname = false
|
|
rdns = false
|
|
forwardable = true
|
|
dns_lookup_realm = true //--> if using DNS/DNSMasq
|
|
dns_lookup_kdc = true //--> if using DNS/DNSMasq
|
|
allow_weak_crypto = false
|
|
default_realm = MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
default_ccache_name = KEYRING:persistent:%{uid}
|
|
|
|
[realms]
|
|
MYDOMAIN.COM = {
|
|
kdc = kerberos.mydomain.com
|
|
admin_server = kerberos.mydomain.com
|
|
...
|
|
}
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
2. Create the Kerberos database: ::
|
|
|
|
SUSE: kdb5_util create -s
|
|
|
|
REDHAT: kdb5_util create -s
|
|
|
|
|
|
3. Enable and Start both 'KDC and KDC admin' servers: ::
|
|
|
|
SUSE: systemctl enable/start krb5kdc
|
|
systemctl enable/start kadmind
|
|
|
|
REDHAT: systemctl enable/start krb5kdc
|
|
systemctl enable/start kadmin
|
|
|
|
|
|
4. Create a Kerberos Administrator
|
|
Kerberos principals can be created either locally on the KDC server itself
|
|
or through the network, using an 'admin principal'. On the KDC server,
|
|
using ``kadmin.local``:
|
|
|
|
a. List the existing principals: ::
|
|
|
|
kadmin.local: listprincs
|
|
K/M@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
krbtgt/MYDOMAIN.COM@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
kadmin/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
kadmin/changepw@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
kadmin/history@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
kadmin/kerberos.mydomain.com@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
root/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
b. In case we don't have a built-in 'admin principal', we then create one
|
|
(whatever ``principal name``, we are using ``root``, once by default
|
|
``kinit`` tries to authenticate using the same system login user name,
|
|
unless a ``principal`` is passed as an argument ``kinit principal``): ::
|
|
|
|
# kadmin.local -q "addprinc root/admin"
|
|
Authenticating as principal root/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM with password.
|
|
WARNING: no policy specified for root/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM; defaulting to no policy
|
|
Enter password for principal "root/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM":
|
|
|
|
|
|
c. Confirm the newly created 'admin principal' has the needed permissions
|
|
in the KDC ACL (if ACLs are changed, ``kadmind`` needs to be restarted): ::
|
|
|
|
SUSE: /var/lib/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
|
|
REDHAT: /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
|
|
|
|
###############################################################################
|
|
#Kerberos_principal permissions [target_principal] [restrictions]
|
|
###############################################################################
|
|
#
|
|
*/admin@MYDOMAIN.COM *
|
|
|
|
|
|
d. Create a simple 'user principal' (same steps as by *The 'Ceph side' of
|
|
the things*; 4a): ::
|
|
|
|
kadmin.local: addprinc johndoe
|
|
WARNING: no policy specified for johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM; defaulting to no policy
|
|
Enter password for principal "johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM":
|
|
Re-enter password for principal "johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM":
|
|
Principal "johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM" created.
|
|
|
|
|
|
e. Confirm the newly created 'user principal' is able to authenticate (same
|
|
steps as by *The 'Ceph side' of the things*; 6): ::
|
|
|
|
# kdestroy -A && kinit -f johndoe && klist -f
|
|
Password for johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM:
|
|
Ticket cache: KEYRING:persistent:0:0
|
|
Default principal: johndoe@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
|
|
Valid starting Expires Service principal
|
|
11/16/2018 13:11:16 11/16/2018 23:11:16 krbtgt/MYDOMAIN.COM@MYDOMAIN.COM
|
|
renew until 11/17/2018 13:11:16, Flags: FRI
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
5. At this point, we should have a *simple (MIT) Kerberos Server up and running*:
|
|
|
|
a. Considering we will want to work with keytab files, for both 'user and
|
|
service' principals, refer to The *'Ceph side' of the things* starting
|
|
at step 4.
|
|
|
|
b. Make sure you are comfortable with following and their ``manpages``: ::
|
|
|
|
krb5.conf -> Krb client config file
|
|
kdc.conf -> KDC server config file
|
|
|
|
krb5kdc -> KDC server daemon
|
|
kadmind -> KDC administration daemon
|
|
|
|
kadmin -> Krb administration tool
|
|
kdb5_util -> Krb low-level database administration tool
|
|
|
|
kinit -> Obtain and cache Kerberos ticket-granting ticket tool
|
|
klist -> List cached Kerberos tickets tool
|
|
kdestroy -> Destroy Kerberos tickets tool
|
|
|
|
|
|
6. Name Resolution
|
|
As mentioned earlier, Kerberos *relies heavly on name resolution*. Most of
|
|
the Kerberos issues are usually related to name resolution, since Kerberos
|
|
is *very picky* on both *systems names* and *host lookups*.
|
|
|
|
a. As described in *The 'Ceph side' of the things*; step 2a, DNS RRs
|
|
greatly improves service location and host/domain resolution, by using
|
|
``(srv resources)`` and ``(txt record)`` respectively (as per
|
|
*Before We Start*; *DNS resolution*). ::
|
|
|
|
/var/lib/named/master/mydomain.com
|
|
kerberos IN A 192.168.10.21
|
|
kerberos-slave IN A 192.168.10.22
|
|
_kerberos IN TXT "MYDOMAIN.COM"
|
|
_kerberos._udp IN SRV 1 0 88 kerberos
|
|
_kerberos._tcp IN SRV 1 0 88 kerberos
|
|
_kerberos._udp IN SRV 20 0 88 kerberos-slave
|
|
_kerberos-master._udp IN SRV 0 0 88 kerberos
|
|
_kerberos-adm._tcp IN SRV 0 0 749 kerberos
|
|
_kpasswd._udp IN SRV 0 0 464 kerberos
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
b. For a small network or development environment, where a *DNS server is
|
|
not available*, we have the option to use ``DNSMasq``, an
|
|
ease-to-configure lightweight DNS server (along with some other
|
|
capabilities).
|
|
|
|
These records can be added to ``/etc/dnsmasq.conf`` (in addition to the
|
|
needed 'host records'): ::
|
|
|
|
/etc/dnsmasq.conf
|
|
...
|
|
txt-record=_kerberos.mydomain.com,"MYDOMAIN.COM"
|
|
srv-host=_kerberos._udp.mydomain.com,kerberos.mydomain.com,88,1
|
|
srv-host=_kerberos._udp.mydomain.com,kerberos-2.mydomain.com,88,20
|
|
srv-host=_kerberos-master._udp.mydomain.com,kerberos.mydomain.com,88,0
|
|
srv-host=_kerberos-adm._tcp.mydomain.com,kerberos.mydomain.com,749,0
|
|
srv-host=_kpasswd._udp.mydomain.com,kerberos.mydomain.com,464,0
|
|
srv-host=_kerberos._tcp.mydomain.com,kerberos.mydomain.com,88,1
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
c. After 'b)' is all set, and ``dnsmasq`` service up and running, we can
|
|
test it using: ::
|
|
|
|
# nslookup kerberos
|
|
Server: 192.168.10.1
|
|
Address: 192.168.10.1#53
|
|
|
|
Name: kerberos.mydomain.com
|
|
Address: 192.168.10.21
|
|
|
|
# host -t SRV _kerberos._tcp.mydomain.com
|
|
_kerberos._tcp.mydomain.com has SRV record 1 0 88 kerberos.mydomain.com.
|
|
|
|
# host -t SRV {each srv-host record}
|
|
# host -t TXT _kerberos.mydomain.com
|
|
_kerberos.mydomain.com descriptive text "MYDOMAIN.COM"
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
|
f. As long as ``name resolution`` is working properly, either ``dnsmasq``
|
|
or ``named``, Kerberos should be able to find the needed service
|
|
records.
|