mirror of
https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs
synced 2024-12-30 18:22:14 +00:00
4f7bf100a9
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
306 lines
14 KiB
ReStructuredText
306 lines
14 KiB
ReStructuredText
Storage model
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
*A storage model is a model that captures key physical aspects of data
|
|
structure in a data store. A filesystem is the logical structure organizing
|
|
data on top of the storage device.*
|
|
|
|
The filesystem assumes several features or limitations of the storage device
|
|
and utilizes them or applies measures to guarantee reliability. BTRFS in
|
|
particular is based on a COW (copy on write) mode of writing, i.e. not updating
|
|
data in place but rather writing a new copy to a different location and then
|
|
atomically switching the pointers.
|
|
|
|
In an ideal world, the device does what it promises. The filesystem assumes
|
|
that this may not be true so additional mechanisms are applied to either detect
|
|
misbehaving hardware or get valid data by other means. The devices may (and do)
|
|
apply their own detection and repair mechanisms but we won't assume any.
|
|
|
|
The following assumptions about storage devices are considered (sorted by
|
|
importance, numbers are for further reference):
|
|
|
|
1. atomicity of reads and writes of blocks/sectors (the smallest unit of data
|
|
the device presents to the upper layers)
|
|
2. there's a flush command that instructs the device to forcibly order writes
|
|
before and after the command; alternatively there's a barrier command that
|
|
facilitates the ordering but may not flush the data
|
|
3. data sent to write to a given device offset will be written without further
|
|
changes to the data and to the offset
|
|
4. writes can be reordered by the device, unless explicitly serialized by the
|
|
flush command
|
|
5. reads and writes can be freely reordered and interleaved
|
|
|
|
The consistency model of BTRFS builds on these assumptions. The logical data
|
|
updates are grouped, into a generation, written on the device, serialized by
|
|
the flush command and then the super block is written ending the generation.
|
|
All logical links among metadata comprising a consistent view of the data may
|
|
not cross the generation boundary.
|
|
|
|
When things go wrong
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
**No or partial atomicity of block reads/writes (1)**
|
|
|
|
- *Problem*: a partial block contents is written (*torn write*), e.g. due to a
|
|
power glitch or other electronics failure during the read/write
|
|
- *Detection*: checksum mismatch on read
|
|
- *Repair*: use another copy or rebuild from multiple blocks using some encoding
|
|
scheme
|
|
|
|
**The flush command does not flush (2)**
|
|
|
|
This is perhaps the most serious problem and impossible to mitigate by
|
|
filesystem without limitations and design restrictions. What could happen in
|
|
the worst case is that writes from one generation bleed to another one, while
|
|
still letting the filesystem consider the generations isolated. Crash at any
|
|
point would leave data on the device in an inconsistent state without any hint
|
|
what exactly got written, what is missing and leading to stale metadata link
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
Devices usually honor the flush command, but for performance reasons may do
|
|
internal caching, where the flushed data are not yet persistently stored. A
|
|
power failure could lead to a similar scenario as above, although it's less
|
|
likely that later writes would be written before the cached ones. This is
|
|
beyond what a filesystem can take into account. Devices or controllers are
|
|
usually equipped with batteries or capacitors to write the cache contents even
|
|
after power is cut. (*Battery backed write cache*)
|
|
|
|
**Data get silently changed on write (3)**
|
|
|
|
Such thing should not happen frequently, but still can happen spuriously due
|
|
the complex internal workings of devices or physical effects of the storage
|
|
media itself.
|
|
|
|
* *Problem*: while the data are written atomically, the contents get changed
|
|
* *Detection*: checksum mismatch on read
|
|
* *Repair*: use another copy or rebuild from multiple blocks using some
|
|
encoding scheme
|
|
|
|
**Data get silently written to another offset (3)**
|
|
|
|
This would be another serious problem as the filesystem has no information
|
|
when it happens. For that reason the measures have to be done ahead of time.
|
|
This problem is also commonly called *ghost write*.
|
|
|
|
The metadata blocks have the checksum embedded in the blocks, so a correct
|
|
atomic write would not corrupt the checksum. It's likely that after reading
|
|
such block the data inside would not be consistent with the rest. To rule that
|
|
out there's embedded block number in the metadata block. It's the logical
|
|
block number because this is what the logical structure expects and verifies.
|
|
|
|
The following is based on information publicly available, user feedback,
|
|
community discussions or bug report analyses. It's not complete and further
|
|
research is encouraged when in doubt.
|
|
|
|
Main memory
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
The data structures and raw data blocks are temporarily stored in computer
|
|
memory before they get written to the device. It is critical that memory is
|
|
reliable because even simple bit flips can have vast consequences and lead to
|
|
damaged structures, not only in the filesystem but in the whole operating
|
|
system.
|
|
|
|
Based on experience in the community, memory bit flips are more common than one
|
|
would think. When it happens, it's reported by the tree-checker or by a checksum
|
|
mismatch after reading blocks. There are some very obvious instances of bit
|
|
flips that happen, e.g. in an ordered sequence of keys in metadata blocks. We can
|
|
easily infer from the other data what values get damaged and how. However, fixing
|
|
that is not straightforward and would require cross-referencing data from the
|
|
entire filesystem to see the scope.
|
|
|
|
If available, ECC memory should lower the chances of bit flips, but this
|
|
type of memory is not available in all cases. A memory test should be performed
|
|
in case there's a visible bit flip pattern, though this may not detect a faulty
|
|
memory module because the actual load of the system could be the factor making
|
|
the problems appear. In recent years attacks on how the memory modules operate
|
|
have been demonstrated (*rowhammer*) achieving specific bits to be flipped.
|
|
While these were targeted, this shows that a series of reads or writes can
|
|
affect unrelated parts of memory.
|
|
|
|
Further reading:
|
|
|
|
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer
|
|
|
|
What to do:
|
|
|
|
* run *memtest*, note that sometimes memory errors happen only when the system
|
|
is under heavy load that the default memtest cannot trigger
|
|
* memory errors may appear as filesystem going read-only due to "pre write"
|
|
check, that verify meta data before they get written but fail some basic
|
|
consistency checks
|
|
|
|
Direct memory access (DMA)
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
Another class of errors is related to DMA (direct memory access) performed
|
|
by device drivers. While this could be considered a software error, the
|
|
data transfers that happen without CPU assistance may accidentally corrupt
|
|
other pages. Storage devices utilize DMA for performance reasons, the
|
|
filesystem structures and data pages are passed back and forth, making
|
|
errors possible in case page life time is not properly tracked.
|
|
|
|
There are lots of quirks (device-specific workarounds) in Linux kernel
|
|
drivers (regarding not only DMA) that are added when found. The quirks
|
|
may avoid specific errors or disable some features to avoid worse problems.
|
|
|
|
What to do:
|
|
|
|
* use up-to-date kernel (recent releases or maintained long term support versions)
|
|
* as this may be caused by faulty drivers, keep the systems up-to-date
|
|
|
|
Rotational disks (HDD)
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
Rotational HDDs typically fail at the level of individual sectors or small clusters.
|
|
Read failures are caught on the levels below the filesystem and are returned to
|
|
the user as *EIO - Input/output error*. Reading the blocks repeatedly may
|
|
return the data eventually, but this is better done by specialized tools and
|
|
filesystem takes the result of the lower layers. Rewriting the sectors may
|
|
trigger internal remapping but this inevitably leads to data loss.
|
|
|
|
Disk firmware is technically software but from the filesystem perspective is
|
|
part of the hardware. IO requests are processed, and caching or various
|
|
other optimizations are performed, which may lead to bugs under high load or
|
|
unexpected physical conditions or unsupported use cases.
|
|
|
|
Disks are connected by cables with two ends, both of which can cause problems
|
|
when not attached properly. Data transfers are protected by checksums and the
|
|
lower layers try hard to transfer the data correctly or not at all. The errors
|
|
from badly-connecting cables may manifest as large amount of failed read or
|
|
write requests, or as short error bursts depending on physical conditions.
|
|
|
|
What to do:
|
|
|
|
* check **smartctl** for potential issues
|
|
|
|
Solid state drives (SSD)
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
The mechanism of information storage is different from HDDs and this affects
|
|
the failure mode as well. The data are stored in cells grouped in large blocks
|
|
with limited number of resets and other write constraints. The firmware tries
|
|
to avoid unnecessary resets and performs optimizations to maximize the storage
|
|
media lifetime. The known techniques are deduplication (blocks with same
|
|
fingerprint/hash are mapped to same physical block), compression or internal
|
|
remapping and garbage collection of used memory cells. Due to the additional
|
|
processing there are measures to verity the data e.g. by ECC codes.
|
|
|
|
The observations of failing SSDs show that the whole electronic fails at once
|
|
or affects a lot of data (e.g. stored on one chip). Recovering such data
|
|
may need specialized equipment and reading data repeatedly does not help as
|
|
it's possible with HDDs.
|
|
|
|
There are several technologies of the memory cells with different
|
|
characteristics and price. The lifetime is directly affected by the type and
|
|
frequency of data written. Writing "too much" distinct data (e.g. encrypted)
|
|
may render the internal deduplication ineffective and lead to a lot of rewrites
|
|
and increased wear of the memory cells.
|
|
|
|
There are several technologies and manufacturers so it's hard to describe them
|
|
but there are some that exhibit similar behaviour:
|
|
|
|
* expensive SSD will use more durable memory cells and is optimized for
|
|
reliability and high load
|
|
* cheap SSD is projected for a lower load ("desktop user") and is optimized for
|
|
cost, it may employ the optimizations and/or extended error reporting
|
|
partially or not at all
|
|
|
|
It's not possible to reliably determine the expected lifetime of an SSD due to
|
|
lack of information about how it works or due to lack of reliable stats provided
|
|
by the device.
|
|
|
|
Metadata writes tend to be the biggest component of lifetime writes to a SSD,
|
|
so there is some value in reducing them. Depending on the device class (high
|
|
end/low end) the features like DUP block group profiles may affect the
|
|
reliability in both ways:
|
|
|
|
* *high end* are typically more reliable and using *single* for data and
|
|
metadata could be suitable to reduce device wear
|
|
* *low end* could lack ability to identify errors so an additional redundancy
|
|
at the filesystem level (checksums, *DUP*) could help
|
|
|
|
Only users who consume 50 to 100% of the SSD's actual lifetime writes need to be
|
|
concerned by the write amplification of btrfs DUP metadata. Most users will be
|
|
far below 50% of the actual lifetime, or will write the drive to death and
|
|
discover how many writes 100% of the actual lifetime was. SSD firmware often
|
|
adds its own write multipliers that can be arbitrary and unpredictable and
|
|
dependent on application behavior, and these will typically have far greater
|
|
effect on SSD lifespan than DUP metadata. It's more or less impossible to
|
|
predict when a SSD will run out of lifetime writes to within a factor of two, so
|
|
it's hard to justify wear reduction as a benefit.
|
|
|
|
Further reading:
|
|
|
|
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/ssd-and-deduplication-end-spinning-disk-2012
|
|
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/realities-solid-state-storage-2013-2013
|
|
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/ssd-performance-primer-2013
|
|
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/how-controllers-maximize-ssd-life-2013
|
|
|
|
What to do:
|
|
|
|
* run **smartctl** or self-tests to look for potential issues
|
|
* keep the firmware up-to-date
|
|
|
|
NVM express, non-volatile memory (NVMe)
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
NVMe is a type of persistent memory usually connected over a system bus (PCIe)
|
|
or similar interface and the speeds are an order of magnitude faster than SSD.
|
|
It is also a non-rotating type of storage, and is not typically connected by a
|
|
cable. It's not a SCSI type device either but rather a complete specification
|
|
for logical device interface.
|
|
|
|
In a way the errors could be compared to a combination of SSD class and regular
|
|
memory. Errors may exhibit as random bit flips or IO failures. There are tools
|
|
to access the internal log (**nvme log** and **nvme-cli**) for a more detailed
|
|
analysis.
|
|
|
|
There are separate error detection and correction steps performed e.g. on the
|
|
bus level and in most cases never making in to the filesystem level. Once this
|
|
happens it could mean there's some systematic error like overheating or bad
|
|
physical connection of the device. You may want to run self-tests (using
|
|
**smartctl**).
|
|
|
|
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NVM_Express
|
|
* https://www.smartmontools.org/wiki/NVMe_Support
|
|
|
|
Drive firmware
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
Firmware is technically still software but embedded into the hardware. As all
|
|
software has bugs, so does firmware. Storage devices can update the firmware
|
|
and fix known bugs. In some cases the it's possible to avoid certain bugs by
|
|
quirks (device-specific workarounds) in Linux kernel.
|
|
|
|
A faulty firmware can cause wide range of corruptions from small and localized
|
|
to large affecting lots of data. Self-repair capabilities may not be sufficient.
|
|
|
|
What to do:
|
|
|
|
* check for firmware updates in case there are known problems, note that
|
|
updating firmware can be risky on itself
|
|
* use up-to-date kernel (recent releases or maintained long term support versions)
|
|
|
|
SD flash cards
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
There are a lot of devices with low power consumption and thus using storage
|
|
media based on low power consumption too, typically flash memory stored on
|
|
a chip enclosed in a detachable card package. An improperly inserted card may be
|
|
damaged by electrical spikes when the device is turned on or off. The chips
|
|
storing data in turn may be damaged permanently. All types of flash memory
|
|
have a limited number of rewrites, so the data are internally translated by FTL
|
|
(flash translation layer). This is implemented in firmware (technically a
|
|
software) and prone to bugs that manifest as hardware errors.
|
|
|
|
Adding redundancy like using DUP profiles for both data and metadata can help
|
|
in some cases but a full backup might be the best option once problems appear
|
|
and replacing the card could be required as well.
|
|
|
|
Hardware as the main source of filesystem corruptions
|
|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
|
|
**If you use unreliable hardware and don't know about that, don't blame the
|
|
filesystem when it tells you.**
|