btrfs-progs: docs: separate chapter for hardware considerations
Make it more visible than just in section 5. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
f1b4ef2f35
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Hardware considerations
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=======================
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.. include:: ch-hardware-considerations.rst
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@ -491,222 +491,7 @@ block number because this is what the logical structure expects and verifies.
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HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS
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-----------------------
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The following is based on information publicly available, user feedback,
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community discussions or bug report analyses. It's not complete and further
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research is encouraged when in doubt.
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MAIN MEMORY
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^^^^^^^^^^^
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The data structures and raw data blocks are temporarily stored in computer
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memory before they get written to the device. It is critical that memory is
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reliable because even simple bit flips can have vast consequences and lead to
|
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damaged structures, not only in the filesystem but in the whole operating
|
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system.
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|
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Based on experience in the community, memory bit flips are more common than one
|
||||
would think. When it happens, it's reported by the tree-checker or by a checksum
|
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mismatch after reading blocks. There are some very obvious instances of bit
|
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flips that happen, e.g. in an ordered sequence of keys in metadata blocks. We can
|
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easily infer from the other data what values get damaged and how. However, fixing
|
||||
that is not straightforward and would require cross-referencing data from the
|
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entire filesystem to see the scope.
|
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|
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If available, ECC memory should lower the chances of bit flips, but this
|
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type of memory is not available in all cases. A memory test should be performed
|
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in case there's a visible bit flip pattern, though this may not detect a faulty
|
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memory module because the actual load of the system could be the factor making
|
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the problems appear. In recent years attacks on how the memory modules operate
|
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have been demonstrated ('rowhammer') achieving specific bits to be flipped.
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While these were targeted, this shows that a series of reads or writes can
|
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affect unrelated parts of memory.
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|
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Further reading:
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* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer
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What to do:
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* run *memtest*, note that sometimes memory errors happen only when the system
|
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is under heavy load that the default memtest cannot trigger
|
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* memory errors may appear as filesystem going read-only due to "pre write"
|
||||
check, that verify meta data before they get written but fail some basic
|
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consistency checks
|
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|
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DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS (DMA)
|
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
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Another class of errors is related to DMA (direct memory access) performed
|
||||
by device drivers. While this could be considered a software error, the
|
||||
data transfers that happen without CPU assistance may accidentally corrupt
|
||||
other pages. Storage devices utilize DMA for performance reasons, the
|
||||
filesystem structures and data pages are passed back and forth, making
|
||||
errors possible in case page life time is not properly tracked.
|
||||
|
||||
There are lots of quirks (device-specific workarounds) in Linux kernel
|
||||
drivers (regarding not only DMA) that are added when found. The quirks
|
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may avoid specific errors or disable some features to avoid worse problems.
|
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|
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What to do:
|
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* use up-to-date kernel (recent releases or maintained long term support versions)
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* as this may be caused by faulty drivers, keep the systems up-to-date
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|
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ROTATIONAL DISKS (HDD)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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|
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Rotational HDDs typically fail at the level of individual sectors or small clusters.
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Read failures are caught on the levels below the filesystem and are returned to
|
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the user as *EIO - Input/output error*. Reading the blocks repeatedly may
|
||||
return the data eventually, but this is better done by specialized tools and
|
||||
filesystem takes the result of the lower layers. Rewriting the sectors may
|
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trigger internal remapping but this inevitably leads to data loss.
|
||||
|
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Disk firmware is technically software but from the filesystem perspective is
|
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part of the hardware. IO requests are processed, and caching or various
|
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other optimizations are performed, which may lead to bugs under high load or
|
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unexpected physical conditions or unsupported use cases.
|
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|
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Disks are connected by cables with two ends, both of which can cause problems
|
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when not attached properly. Data transfers are protected by checksums and the
|
||||
lower layers try hard to transfer the data correctly or not at all. The errors
|
||||
from badly-connecting cables may manifest as large amount of failed read or
|
||||
write requests, or as short error bursts depending on physical conditions.
|
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|
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What to do:
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* check **smartctl** for potential issues
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SOLID STATE DRIVES (SSD)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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|
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The mechanism of information storage is different from HDDs and this affects
|
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the failure mode as well. The data are stored in cells grouped in large blocks
|
||||
with limited number of resets and other write constraints. The firmware tries
|
||||
to avoid unnecessary resets and performs optimizations to maximize the storage
|
||||
media lifetime. The known techniques are deduplication (blocks with same
|
||||
fingerprint/hash are mapped to same physical block), compression or internal
|
||||
remapping and garbage collection of used memory cells. Due to the additional
|
||||
processing there are measures to verity the data e.g. by ECC codes.
|
||||
|
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The observations of failing SSDs show that the whole electronic fails at once
|
||||
or affects a lot of data (eg. stored on one chip). Recovering such data
|
||||
may need specialized equipment and reading data repeatedly does not help as
|
||||
it's possible with HDDs.
|
||||
|
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There are several technologies of the memory cells with different
|
||||
characteristics and price. The lifetime is directly affected by the type and
|
||||
frequency of data written. Writing "too much" distinct data (e.g. encrypted)
|
||||
may render the internal deduplication ineffective and lead to a lot of rewrites
|
||||
and increased wear of the memory cells.
|
||||
|
||||
There are several technologies and manufacturers so it's hard to describe them
|
||||
but there are some that exhibit similar behaviour:
|
||||
|
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* expensive SSD will use more durable memory cells and is optimized for
|
||||
reliability and high load
|
||||
* cheap SSD is projected for a lower load ("desktop user") and is optimized for
|
||||
cost, it may employ the optimizations and/or extended error reporting
|
||||
partially or not at all
|
||||
|
||||
It's not possible to reliably determine the expected lifetime of an SSD due to
|
||||
lack of information about how it works or due to lack of reliable stats provided
|
||||
by the device.
|
||||
|
||||
Metadata writes tend to be the biggest component of lifetime writes to a SSD,
|
||||
so there is some value in reducing them. Depending on the device class (high
|
||||
end/low end) the features like DUP block group profiles may affect the
|
||||
reliability in both ways:
|
||||
|
||||
* *high end* are typically more reliable and using 'single' for data and
|
||||
metadata could be suitable to reduce device wear
|
||||
* *low end* could lack ability to identify errors so an additional redundancy
|
||||
at the filesystem level (checksums, *DUP*) could help
|
||||
|
||||
Only users who consume 50 to 100% of the SSD's actual lifetime writes need to be
|
||||
concerned by the write amplification of btrfs DUP metadata. Most users will be
|
||||
far below 50% of the actual lifetime, or will write the drive to death and
|
||||
discover how many writes 100% of the actual lifetime was. SSD firmware often
|
||||
adds its own write multipliers that can be arbitrary and unpredictable and
|
||||
dependent on application behavior, and these will typically have far greater
|
||||
effect on SSD lifespan than DUP metadata. It's more or less impossible to
|
||||
predict when a SSD will run out of lifetime writes to within a factor of two, so
|
||||
it's hard to justify wear reduction as a benefit.
|
||||
|
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Further reading:
|
||||
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/ssd-and-deduplication-end-spinning-disk-2012
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/realities-solid-state-storage-2013-2013
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/ssd-performance-primer-2013
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/how-controllers-maximize-ssd-life-2013
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* run **smartctl** or self-tests to look for potential issues
|
||||
* keep the firmware up-to-date
|
||||
|
||||
NVM EXPRESS, NON-VOLATILE MEMORY (NVMe)
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
NVMe is a type of persistent memory usually connected over a system bus (PCIe)
|
||||
or similar interface and the speeds are an order of magnitude faster than SSD.
|
||||
It is also a non-rotating type of storage, and is not typically connected by a
|
||||
cable. It's not a SCSI type device either but rather a complete specification
|
||||
for logical device interface.
|
||||
|
||||
In a way the errors could be compared to a combination of SSD class and regular
|
||||
memory. Errors may exhibit as random bit flips or IO failures. There are tools
|
||||
to access the internal log (**nvme log** and **nvme-cli**) for a more detailed
|
||||
analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
There are separate error detection and correction steps performed e.g. on the
|
||||
bus level and in most cases never making in to the filesystem level. Once this
|
||||
happens it could mean there's some systematic error like overheating or bad
|
||||
physical connection of the device. You may want to run self-tests (using
|
||||
**smartctl**).
|
||||
|
||||
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NVM_Express
|
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* https://www.smartmontools.org/wiki/NVMe_Support
|
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|
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DRIVE FIRMWARE
|
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
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|
||||
Firmware is technically still software but embedded into the hardware. As all
|
||||
software has bugs, so does firmware. Storage devices can update the firmware
|
||||
and fix known bugs. In some cases the it's possible to avoid certain bugs by
|
||||
quirks (device-specific workarounds) in Linux kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
A faulty firmware can cause wide range of corruptions from small and localized
|
||||
to large affecting lots of data. Self-repair capabilities may not be sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* check for firmware updates in case there are known problems, note that
|
||||
updating firmware can be risky on itself
|
||||
* use up-to-date kernel (recent releases or maintained long term support versions)
|
||||
|
||||
SD FLASH CARDS
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
There are a lot of devices with low power consumption and thus using storage
|
||||
media based on low power consumption too, typically flash memory stored on
|
||||
a chip enclosed in a detachable card package. An improperly inserted card may be
|
||||
damaged by electrical spikes when the device is turned on or off. The chips
|
||||
storing data in turn may be damaged permanently. All types of flash memory
|
||||
have a limited number of rewrites, so the data are internally translated by FTL
|
||||
(flash translation layer). This is implemented in firmware (technically a
|
||||
software) and prone to bugs that manifest as hardware errors.
|
||||
|
||||
Adding redundancy like using DUP profiles for both data and metadata can help
|
||||
in some cases but a full backup might be the best option once problems appear
|
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and replacing the card could be required as well.
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HARDWARE AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF FILESYSTEM CORRUPTIONS
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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**If you use unreliable hardware and don't know about that, don't blame the
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filesystem when it tells you.**
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.. include:: ch-hardware-considerations.rst
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SEE ALSO
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--------
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|
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
|
|||
The following is based on information publicly available, user feedback,
|
||||
community discussions or bug report analyses. It's not complete and further
|
||||
research is encouraged when in doubt.
|
||||
|
||||
MAIN MEMORY
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
The data structures and raw data blocks are temporarily stored in computer
|
||||
memory before they get written to the device. It is critical that memory is
|
||||
reliable because even simple bit flips can have vast consequences and lead to
|
||||
damaged structures, not only in the filesystem but in the whole operating
|
||||
system.
|
||||
|
||||
Based on experience in the community, memory bit flips are more common than one
|
||||
would think. When it happens, it's reported by the tree-checker or by a checksum
|
||||
mismatch after reading blocks. There are some very obvious instances of bit
|
||||
flips that happen, e.g. in an ordered sequence of keys in metadata blocks. We can
|
||||
easily infer from the other data what values get damaged and how. However, fixing
|
||||
that is not straightforward and would require cross-referencing data from the
|
||||
entire filesystem to see the scope.
|
||||
|
||||
If available, ECC memory should lower the chances of bit flips, but this
|
||||
type of memory is not available in all cases. A memory test should be performed
|
||||
in case there's a visible bit flip pattern, though this may not detect a faulty
|
||||
memory module because the actual load of the system could be the factor making
|
||||
the problems appear. In recent years attacks on how the memory modules operate
|
||||
have been demonstrated ('rowhammer') achieving specific bits to be flipped.
|
||||
While these were targeted, this shows that a series of reads or writes can
|
||||
affect unrelated parts of memory.
|
||||
|
||||
Further reading:
|
||||
|
||||
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* run *memtest*, note that sometimes memory errors happen only when the system
|
||||
is under heavy load that the default memtest cannot trigger
|
||||
* memory errors may appear as filesystem going read-only due to "pre write"
|
||||
check, that verify meta data before they get written but fail some basic
|
||||
consistency checks
|
||||
|
||||
DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS (DMA)
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Another class of errors is related to DMA (direct memory access) performed
|
||||
by device drivers. While this could be considered a software error, the
|
||||
data transfers that happen without CPU assistance may accidentally corrupt
|
||||
other pages. Storage devices utilize DMA for performance reasons, the
|
||||
filesystem structures and data pages are passed back and forth, making
|
||||
errors possible in case page life time is not properly tracked.
|
||||
|
||||
There are lots of quirks (device-specific workarounds) in Linux kernel
|
||||
drivers (regarding not only DMA) that are added when found. The quirks
|
||||
may avoid specific errors or disable some features to avoid worse problems.
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* use up-to-date kernel (recent releases or maintained long term support versions)
|
||||
* as this may be caused by faulty drivers, keep the systems up-to-date
|
||||
|
||||
ROTATIONAL DISKS (HDD)
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Rotational HDDs typically fail at the level of individual sectors or small clusters.
|
||||
Read failures are caught on the levels below the filesystem and are returned to
|
||||
the user as *EIO - Input/output error*. Reading the blocks repeatedly may
|
||||
return the data eventually, but this is better done by specialized tools and
|
||||
filesystem takes the result of the lower layers. Rewriting the sectors may
|
||||
trigger internal remapping but this inevitably leads to data loss.
|
||||
|
||||
Disk firmware is technically software but from the filesystem perspective is
|
||||
part of the hardware. IO requests are processed, and caching or various
|
||||
other optimizations are performed, which may lead to bugs under high load or
|
||||
unexpected physical conditions or unsupported use cases.
|
||||
|
||||
Disks are connected by cables with two ends, both of which can cause problems
|
||||
when not attached properly. Data transfers are protected by checksums and the
|
||||
lower layers try hard to transfer the data correctly or not at all. The errors
|
||||
from badly-connecting cables may manifest as large amount of failed read or
|
||||
write requests, or as short error bursts depending on physical conditions.
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* check **smartctl** for potential issues
|
||||
|
||||
SOLID STATE DRIVES (SSD)
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
The mechanism of information storage is different from HDDs and this affects
|
||||
the failure mode as well. The data are stored in cells grouped in large blocks
|
||||
with limited number of resets and other write constraints. The firmware tries
|
||||
to avoid unnecessary resets and performs optimizations to maximize the storage
|
||||
media lifetime. The known techniques are deduplication (blocks with same
|
||||
fingerprint/hash are mapped to same physical block), compression or internal
|
||||
remapping and garbage collection of used memory cells. Due to the additional
|
||||
processing there are measures to verity the data e.g. by ECC codes.
|
||||
|
||||
The observations of failing SSDs show that the whole electronic fails at once
|
||||
or affects a lot of data (eg. stored on one chip). Recovering such data
|
||||
may need specialized equipment and reading data repeatedly does not help as
|
||||
it's possible with HDDs.
|
||||
|
||||
There are several technologies of the memory cells with different
|
||||
characteristics and price. The lifetime is directly affected by the type and
|
||||
frequency of data written. Writing "too much" distinct data (e.g. encrypted)
|
||||
may render the internal deduplication ineffective and lead to a lot of rewrites
|
||||
and increased wear of the memory cells.
|
||||
|
||||
There are several technologies and manufacturers so it's hard to describe them
|
||||
but there are some that exhibit similar behaviour:
|
||||
|
||||
* expensive SSD will use more durable memory cells and is optimized for
|
||||
reliability and high load
|
||||
* cheap SSD is projected for a lower load ("desktop user") and is optimized for
|
||||
cost, it may employ the optimizations and/or extended error reporting
|
||||
partially or not at all
|
||||
|
||||
It's not possible to reliably determine the expected lifetime of an SSD due to
|
||||
lack of information about how it works or due to lack of reliable stats provided
|
||||
by the device.
|
||||
|
||||
Metadata writes tend to be the biggest component of lifetime writes to a SSD,
|
||||
so there is some value in reducing them. Depending on the device class (high
|
||||
end/low end) the features like DUP block group profiles may affect the
|
||||
reliability in both ways:
|
||||
|
||||
* *high end* are typically more reliable and using 'single' for data and
|
||||
metadata could be suitable to reduce device wear
|
||||
* *low end* could lack ability to identify errors so an additional redundancy
|
||||
at the filesystem level (checksums, *DUP*) could help
|
||||
|
||||
Only users who consume 50 to 100% of the SSD's actual lifetime writes need to be
|
||||
concerned by the write amplification of btrfs DUP metadata. Most users will be
|
||||
far below 50% of the actual lifetime, or will write the drive to death and
|
||||
discover how many writes 100% of the actual lifetime was. SSD firmware often
|
||||
adds its own write multipliers that can be arbitrary and unpredictable and
|
||||
dependent on application behavior, and these will typically have far greater
|
||||
effect on SSD lifespan than DUP metadata. It's more or less impossible to
|
||||
predict when a SSD will run out of lifetime writes to within a factor of two, so
|
||||
it's hard to justify wear reduction as a benefit.
|
||||
|
||||
Further reading:
|
||||
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/ssd-and-deduplication-end-spinning-disk-2012
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/realities-solid-state-storage-2013-2013
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/ssd-performance-primer-2013
|
||||
* https://www.snia.org/educational-library/how-controllers-maximize-ssd-life-2013
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* run **smartctl** or self-tests to look for potential issues
|
||||
* keep the firmware up-to-date
|
||||
|
||||
NVM EXPRESS, NON-VOLATILE MEMORY (NVMe)
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
NVMe is a type of persistent memory usually connected over a system bus (PCIe)
|
||||
or similar interface and the speeds are an order of magnitude faster than SSD.
|
||||
It is also a non-rotating type of storage, and is not typically connected by a
|
||||
cable. It's not a SCSI type device either but rather a complete specification
|
||||
for logical device interface.
|
||||
|
||||
In a way the errors could be compared to a combination of SSD class and regular
|
||||
memory. Errors may exhibit as random bit flips or IO failures. There are tools
|
||||
to access the internal log (**nvme log** and **nvme-cli**) for a more detailed
|
||||
analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
There are separate error detection and correction steps performed e.g. on the
|
||||
bus level and in most cases never making in to the filesystem level. Once this
|
||||
happens it could mean there's some systematic error like overheating or bad
|
||||
physical connection of the device. You may want to run self-tests (using
|
||||
**smartctl**).
|
||||
|
||||
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NVM_Express
|
||||
* https://www.smartmontools.org/wiki/NVMe_Support
|
||||
|
||||
DRIVE FIRMWARE
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware is technically still software but embedded into the hardware. As all
|
||||
software has bugs, so does firmware. Storage devices can update the firmware
|
||||
and fix known bugs. In some cases the it's possible to avoid certain bugs by
|
||||
quirks (device-specific workarounds) in Linux kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
A faulty firmware can cause wide range of corruptions from small and localized
|
||||
to large affecting lots of data. Self-repair capabilities may not be sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
What to do:
|
||||
|
||||
* check for firmware updates in case there are known problems, note that
|
||||
updating firmware can be risky on itself
|
||||
* use up-to-date kernel (recent releases or maintained long term support versions)
|
||||
|
||||
SD FLASH CARDS
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
There are a lot of devices with low power consumption and thus using storage
|
||||
media based on low power consumption too, typically flash memory stored on
|
||||
a chip enclosed in a detachable card package. An improperly inserted card may be
|
||||
damaged by electrical spikes when the device is turned on or off. The chips
|
||||
storing data in turn may be damaged permanently. All types of flash memory
|
||||
have a limited number of rewrites, so the data are internally translated by FTL
|
||||
(flash translation layer). This is implemented in firmware (technically a
|
||||
software) and prone to bugs that manifest as hardware errors.
|
||||
|
||||
Adding redundancy like using DUP profiles for both data and metadata can help
|
||||
in some cases but a full backup might be the best option once problems appear
|
||||
and replacing the card could be required as well.
|
||||
|
||||
HARDWARE AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF FILESYSTEM CORRUPTIONS
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
**If you use unreliable hardware and don't know about that, don't blame the
|
||||
filesystem when it tells you.**
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Welcome to BTRFS documentation!
|
|||
Introduction
|
||||
man-index
|
||||
Administration
|
||||
Hardware
|
||||
CHANGES
|
||||
Glossary
|
||||
INSTALL
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue