Introduce the substitutions for the /usr/local/lib* locations (towards /usr/lib)
and /etc/init.d (towards /etc/rc.d/init.d).
Update the file contexts of the translated locations.
Rebased (collided with Guido's patch for commenting within the
file_contexts.subs_dist file) since v3.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Since most distributions now support /run (which, thanks the the
file context substitutions, is marked as var_run_t), we need to update the
SELinux policies to support "dynamically" building up /run. Unlike /var/run,
which is most likely statically defined during distribution installation, /run
is a tmpfs which is built up from scratch on each and every boot.
But not only that, many services also use this location for other purposes than
just PID files (which is to be expected as these "other reasons" is why /run
came to be in the first place), so we need to support other types within this
location easily.
For this reason, we introduce support to
- creating the /run/lock location
- supporting named file transitions when init scripts create stuff in /run
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Allow mount to write not only to /etc/mtab but also to the /etc/mtab~[0-9]\{0,20\}
lock files (the number corresponds to the PID). Such files are still mistakenly
being labelled as etc_t instead of etc_runtime_t (thus preventing the successful
completion of the write operation and the accumulation of unremovable stale lock
files over several operation attempts as in normal system reboots, for example).
Do the same with the standard mount temporary file /etc/mtab.tmp.
The above refers to mount from util-linux-2.21.2 from kernel.org. See mount -vvv
for the location of such files.
Now that we have file_contexts.subs_dist, translations that were put in the file context definition files can now be
cleaned up.
Differences from v1:
- removes a few duplicate entries in the libraries.fc file, and
- removes the contrib references
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Replaced calls to interfaces allowing access to all files except
auth_file_type files with calls to interfaces allowing access to
non_auth_file_type files.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reduce the binary policy size by eliminating some set expressions
related to file accesses and make Repolicy easier to convert into CIL.
- Moved the auth_file_type attribute.
- Created a new type attribute called non_auth_file_type.
- Created new interfaces to allow file accesses on non_auth_file_type
files.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
The locations for debugfs_t (/sys/kernel/debug) and security_t
(/selinux or /sys/fs/selinux) should be marked as mountpoints as well.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
When udev creates the temporary block devices (such as /dev/.tmp-block-8:1) they
get by default marked as device_t. However, in case of software raid devices,
the mdadm application (running in mdadm_t) does not hold the proper privileges
to access this for its auto-assembly of the raids.
Other block device applications, like blkid (running in fsadm_t) use these
temporary block devices as well, but already hold the necessary privileges on
device_t to continue their work.
By marking the temporary block device as a fixed_disk_device_t, all these block
device handling applications (such as blkid, but also mdadm) now hold the proper
privileges. Since udev is selinux-aware, the created files are immediately
restorecon'ed before the rules are applied.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
This changes the port declarations for cases where a type is used for
ports above and below 1024. The old code would give both the reserved
and unreserved port attribute. This new code only gives the reserved
port attribute.
Add a milter_port_t for use with inet sockets for communication
between milters and MTAs.
There are no defined ports with this type: admins are expected
to use semanage to specify the ports being used for milters.
Many XFCE4 helper applications are located in /usr/lib locations. This patch
marks those helpers as bin_t.
Recursively marking the directories bin_t does not work properly as these
locations also contain actual libraries.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Add read_lnk_file_perms to all interfaces giving access to var_run_t and
var_lock_t.
This is needed as on Debian /var/run and /var/lock are now symlinks to
/run and /run/lock.
The zabbix agent has its own dedicated port (10050) on which it needs to
bind/listen.
Also, the agent connects to the server so we add the zabbix_tcp_connect
interface (shamelessly copied from mysql_tcp_connect) and use it for the
zabbix_agent_t domain.
Update: structure interface calls more closely to styleguide
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
The zabbix server uses a dedicated port (10051). We define it and allow the
zabbix server to bind/listen on it.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Various changes to the Xen userspace policy, including:
- Add gntdev and gntalloc device node labeling.
- Create separate domains for blktap and qemu-dm rather than leaving them in xend_t.
- No need to allow xen userspace to create its own device nodes anymore;
this is handled automatically by the kernel/udev.
- No need to allow xen userspace access to generic raw storage; even if
using dedicated partitions/LVs for disk images, you can just label them
with xen_image_t.
The blktap and qemu-dm domains are stubs and will likely need to be
further expanded, but they should definitely not be left in xend_t. Not
sure if I should try to use qemu_domain_template() instead for qemu-dm,
but I don't see any current users of that template (qemu_t uses
virt_domain_template instead), and qemu-dm has specific interactions
with Xen.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add the support to login and use the system from /dev/console.
1. Make gettty_t able to use the /dev/console;
2. Make local_login_t able to relabel /dev/console to user tty types;
3. Provide the type_change rule for relabeling /dev/console.
All above supports are controlled by the allow_console tunable.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
The attached patch adds a few database object classes, as follows:
* db_schema
------------
A schema object performs as a namespace in database; similar to
directories in filesystem.
It seems some of (but not all) database objects are stored within
a certain schema logically. We can qualify these objects using
schema name. For example, a table: "my_tbl" within a schema: "my_scm"
is identified by "my_scm.my_tbl". This table is completely different
from "your_scm.my_tbl" that it a table within a schema: "your_scm".
Its characteristics is similar to a directory in filesystem, so
it has similar permissions.
The 'search' controls to resolve object name within a schema.
The 'add_name' and 'remove_name' controls to add/remove an object
to/from a schema.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createschema.html
In the past discussion, a rubix folks concerned about no object
class definition for schema and catalog which is an upper level
namespace. Since I'm not certain whether we have a disadvantage
when 'db_schema' class is applied on catalog class, I don't add
this definition yet.
Default security context of 'db_table' and 'db_procedure' classes
get being computed using type_transition with 'db_schema' class,
instead of 'db_database' class. It reflects logical hierarchy of
database object more correctly.
* db_view
----------
A view object performs as a virtual table. We can run SELECT
statement on views, although it has no physical entities.
The definition of views are expanded in run-time, so it allows
us to describe complex queries with keeping readability.
This object class uniquely provides 'expand' permission that
controls whether user can expand this view, or not.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a schema object that owning the view.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createview.html
* db_sequence
--------------
A sequence object is a sequential number generator.
This object class uniquely provides 'get_value', 'next_value' and
'set_value' permissions. The 'get_value' controls to reference the
sequence object. The 'next_value' controls to fetch and increment
the value of sequence object. The 'set_value' controls to set
an arbitrary value.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a schema object that owning the sequence.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createsequence.html
* db_language
--------------
A language object is an installed engine to execute procedures.
PostgreSQL supports to define SQL procedures using regular script
languages; such as Perl, Tcl, not only SQL or binary modules.
In addition, v9.0 or later supports DO statement. It allows us to
execute a script statement on server side without defining a SQL
procedure. It requires to control whether user can execute DO
statement on this language, or not.
This object class uniquely provides 'implement' and 'execute'
permissions. The 'implement' controls whether a procedure can
be implemented with this language, or not. So, it takes security
context of the procedure as subject. The 'execute' controls to
execute code block using DO statement.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a database object, because it is not owned by a certain
schema.
In the default policy, we provide two types: 'sepgsql_lang_t' and
'sepgsql_safe_lang_t' that allows unpriv users to execute DO
statement. The default is 'sepgsql_leng_t'.
We assume newly installed language may be harm, so DBA has to relabel
it explicitly, if he want user defined procedures using the language.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createlanguage.htmlhttp://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-do.html
P.S)
I found a bug in MCS. It didn't constraint 'relabelfrom' permission
of 'db_procedure' class. IIRC, I fixed it before, but it might be
only MLS side. Sorry.
Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
policy/flask/access_vectors | 29 ++++++++
policy/flask/security_classes | 6 ++
policy/mcs | 16 ++++-
policy/mls | 58 ++++++++++++++-
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 8 ++
policy/modules/services/postgresql.if | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
policy/modules/services/postgresql.te | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
On 01/05/2011 08:48 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 12/16/10 12:32, Paul Nuzzi wrote:
>> On 12/15/2010 03:54 PM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>> On 12/10/10 18:22, Paul Nuzzi wrote:
>>>> Added labeled IPSec support to hadoop. SELinux will be able to enforce what services are allowed to
>>>> connect to. Labeled IPSec can enforce the range of services they can receive from. This enforces
>>>> the architecture of Hadoop without having to modify any of the code. This adds a level of
>>>> confidentiality, integrity, and authentication provided outside the software stack.
>>>
>>> A few things.
>>>
>>> The verb used in Reference Policy interfaces for peer recv is recvfrom
>>> (a holdover from previous labeled networking implementations). So the
>>> interfaces are like hadoop_recvfrom_datanode().
>>
>> Easy change.
>>
>>> It seems like setkey should be able to setcontext any type used on ipsec
>>> associations. I think the best thing would be to add additional support
>>> to either the ipsec or corenetwork modules (I haven't decided which one
>>> yet) for associations. So, say we have an interface called
>>> ipsec_spd_type() which adds the parameter type to the attribute
>>> ipsec_spd_types. Then we can have an allow setkey_t
>>> ipsec_spd_types:association setkey; rule and we don't have to update it
>>> every time more labeled network is added.
>>
>> That seems a lot less clunky than updating setkey every time we add a new association.
>>
>>> This is definitely wrong since its not a file:
>>> +files_type(hadoop_lan_t)
>>
>> Let me know how you would like to handle associations and I could update the
>> patch.
>
> Lets go with putting the associations in corenetwork.
>
>> Will the files_type error be cleared up when we re-engineer this?
>
> I'm not sure what you mean. The incorrect rule was added in your patch.
>
Adds labeled IPSec policy to hadoop to control the remote processes that are allowed to connect to the cloud's services.
Signed-off-by: Paul Nuzzi <pjnuzzi@tycho.ncsc.mil>
As of util-linux-n 2.18, the mount utility now attempts to write to the root
of newly mounted filesystems. It does this in an attempt to ensure that the
r/w status of a filesystem as shown in mtab is correct. To detect whether
a filesystem is r/w, mount calls access() with the W_OK argument. This
results in an AVC denial with current policy. As a fallback, mount also
attempts to modify the access time of the directory being mounted on if
the call to access() fails. As mount already possesses the necessary
privileges, the modification of the access time succeeds (at least on systems
with the futimens() function, which has existed in linux since kernel 2.6.22
and glibc since version 2.6, or about July 2007).
Signed-off-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com>
