selinux-refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te

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policy_module(domain,1.3.0)
########################################
#
# Declarations
#
# Mark process types as domains
attribute domain;
# Transitions only allowed from domains to other domains
neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
# Domains that are unconfined
attribute unconfined_domain_type;
# Domains that can set their current context
# (perform dynamic transitions)
attribute set_curr_context;
# enabling setcurrent breaks process tranquility. If you do not
# know what this means or do not understand the implications of a
# dynamic transition, you should not be using it!!!
neverallow { domain -set_curr_context } self:process setcurrent;
# entrypoint executables
attribute entry_type;
# widely-inheritable file descriptors
attribute privfd;
#
# constraint related attributes
#
# [1] types that can change SELinux identity on transition
attribute can_change_process_identity;
# [2] types that can change SELinux role on transition
attribute can_change_process_role;
# [3] types that can change the SELinux identity on a filesystem
# object or a socket object on a create or relabel
attribute can_change_object_identity;
# [3] types that can change to system_u:system_r
attribute can_system_change;
# [4] types that have attribute 1 can change the SELinux
# identity only if the target domain has this attribute.
# Types that have attribute 2 can change the SELinux role
# only if the target domain has this attribute.
attribute process_user_target;
# For cron jobs
# [5] types used for cron daemons
attribute cron_source_domain;
# [6] types used for cron jobs
attribute cron_job_domain;
# [7] types that are unconditionally exempt from
# SELinux identity and role change constraints
attribute process_uncond_exempt; # add userhelperdomain to this one
neverallow { domain unlabeled_t } ~{ domain unlabeled_t }:process *;
neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *;
########################################
#
# Rules applied to all domains
#
# read /proc/(pid|self) entries
allow domain self:dir r_dir_perms;
allow domain self:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow domain self:file rw_file_perms;
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(domain)
# create child processes in the domain
allow domain self:process { fork sigchld };
# Use trusted objects in /dev
dev_rw_null(domain)
dev_rw_zero(domain)
term_use_controlling_term(domain)
# list the root directory
files_list_root(domain)
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
# RBAC is disabled in the targeted policy,
# as only one role is used, system_r.
role system_r types domain;
# FIXME:
# workaround until role dominance is fixed in
# the module compiler
role secadm_r types domain;
role sysadm_r types domain;
role user_r types domain;
role staff_r types domain;
')
tunable_policy(`global_ssp',`
# enable reading of urandom for all domains:
# this should be enabled when all programs
# are compiled with ProPolice/SSP
# stack smashing protection.
dev_read_urand(domain)
')
optional_policy(`
setrans_translate_context(domain)
')
########################################
#
# Unconfined access to this module
#
# unconfined access also allows constraints, but this
# is handled in the interface as typeattribute cannot
# be used on an attribute.
# Use/sendto/connectto sockets created by any domain.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;
# Use descriptors and pipes created by any domain.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fd use;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
# Act upon any other process.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap };
# Create/access any System V IPC objects.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ sem msgq shm } *;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:msg { send receive };
# For /proc/pid
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:dir r_dir_perms;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:file r_file_perms;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# act on all domains keys
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:key *;