## Run shells with substitute user and group template(`su_restricted_domain_template', ` gen_require(` type su_exec_t; ') type $1_su_t; domain_entry_file($1_su_t,su_exec_t) domain_type($1_su_t) domain_role_change_exempt($1_su_t) domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t) domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t) domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t) role $3 types $1_su_t; allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal; allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource }; dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit }; allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms }; allow $1_su_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; # Transition from the user domain to this domain. domain_auto_trans($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t) allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld; # By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed. corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2) allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld; kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_su_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand($1_su_t) selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t) selinux_validate_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t) selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_su_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t) auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t) domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t) files_read_etc_files($1_su_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_su_t) files_search_var_lib($1_su_t) init_dontaudit_use_fd($1_su_t) init_dontaudit_use_script_pty($1_su_t) # Write to utmp. init_rw_script_pid($1_su_t) libs_use_ld_so($1_su_t) libs_use_shared_libs($1_su_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t) seutil_read_config($1_su_t) seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t) # Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains. userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t) optional_policy(`cron',` cron_read_pipe($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(`kerberos',` kerberos_use($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(`nscd',` nscd_use_socket($1_su_t) ') ifdef(`TODO',` # Caused by su - init scripts dontaudit $1_su_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl }; ') dnl end TODO ') ####################################### ## ## The per user domain template for the su module. ## ## ##

## This template creates a derived domain which is allowed ## to change the linux user id, to run shells as a different ## user. ##

##

## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and ## generally does not need to be invoked directly ## by policy writers. ##

##
## ## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user ## is the prefix for user_t). ## ## ## The type of the user domain. ## ## ## The role associated with the user domain. ## # template(`su_per_userdomain_template',` gen_require(` type su_exec_t; bool secure_mode; ') type $1_su_t; domain_entry_file($1_su_t,su_exec_t) domain_type($1_su_t) domain_role_change_exempt($1_su_t) domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t) domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t) domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t) role $3 types $1_su_t; allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal; allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource }; dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit }; allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms }; # Transition from the user domain to this domain. domain_auto_trans($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t) allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld; # By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed. corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2) allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fd use; allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld; kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_su_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand($1_su_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_su_t) selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t) selinux_validate_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t) selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t) # Relabel ttys and ptys. term_relabel_all_user_ttys($1_su_t) term_relabel_all_user_ptys($1_su_t) # Close and re-open ttys and ptys to get the fd into the correct domain. term_use_all_user_ttys($1_su_t) term_use_all_user_ptys($1_su_t) auth_domtrans_user_chk_passwd($1,$1_su_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t) auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t) corecmd_search_bin($1_su_t) corecmd_search_sbin($1_su_t) domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t) files_read_etc_files($1_su_t) files_search_var_lib($1_su_t) init_dontaudit_use_fd($1_su_t) # Write to utmp. init_rw_script_pid($1_su_t) libs_use_ld_so($1_su_t) libs_use_shared_libs($1_su_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t) seutil_read_config($1_su_t) seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t) userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_su_t) userdom_search_user_home($1,$1_su_t) ifdef(`targeted_policy',` # allow user to suspend terminal. # does not work in strict since the # parent may not be able to use # the terminal if we newrole, # which relabels the terminal. allow $1_su_t self:process sigstop; corecmd_exec_bin($1_su_t) userdom_manage_all_user_files($1_su_t) userdom_manage_all_user_symlinks($1_su_t) # newrole does not make any sense in # the targeted policy. This is to # make sediff easier. if(!secure_mode) { unconfined_domtrans($1_su_t) unconfined_signal($1_su_t) } ',` if(secure_mode) { # Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains. userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t) } else { # Allow transitions to all user domains userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users($1_su_t) } ') tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` fs_search_nfs($1_su_t) ') tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_search_cifs($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(`cron',` cron_read_pipe($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(`kerberos',` kerberos_use($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(`nscd',` nscd_use_socket($1_su_t) ') ifdef(`TODO',` ifdef(`support_polyinstantiation', ` mls_file_read_up($1_su_t) mls_file_write_down($1_su_t) mls_file_upgrade($1_su_t) mls_file_downgrade($1_su_t) mls_process_set_level($1_su_t) # Su can polyinstantiate polyinstantiater($1_su_t) # Su has to unmount polyinstantiated directories (like home) # that should not be polyinstantiated under the new user allow $1_su_t fs_t:filesystem unmount; # Su needs additional permission to mount over a previous mount allow $1_su_t polymember:dir mounton; ') # Caused by su - init scripts dontaudit $1_su_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl }; # Inherit and use descriptors from gnome-pty-helper. ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_su_t $1_gph_t:fd use;') allow $1_su_t $1_home_t:file create_file_perms; ifdef(`user_canbe_sysadm', ` allow $1_su_t home_dir_type:dir { search write }; ', ` dontaudit $1_su_t home_dir_type:dir { search write }; ') # Modify .Xauthority file (via xauth program). ifdef(`xauth.te', ` file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, staff_home_dir_t, staff_xauth_home_t, file) file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, user_home_dir_t, user_xauth_home_t, file) file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_xauth_home_t, file) domain_auto_trans($1_su_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t) ') ifdef(`cyrus.te', ` allow $1_su_t cyrus_var_lib_t:dir search; ') ifdef(`ssh.te', ` # Access sshd cookie files. allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms; file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sshd_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) ') ') dnl end TODO ') ####################################### ## ## Execute su in the caller domain. ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## # interface(`su_exec',` gen_require(` type su_exec_t; ') can_exec($1,su_exec_t) ')