#
# This is the guide for converting old macros to local policy
# and new interfaces.
#
# $1, $2, etc. are replaced with and the first and second, etc.
# parameters to the old macro.
#

########################################
#
# Attributes
#
# $1 is the type this attribute is on

#
# admin_tty_type: complete
#
{ sysadm_tty_device_t sysadm_devpts_t }

#
# auth: complete
#
auth_read_shadow($1)

#
# auth_chkpwd: complete
#
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1)

#
# file_type: complete
#
files_file_type($1)

#
# fs_domain: complete
#
# one or both of these:
storage_raw_read_fixed_disk($1)
storage_raw_write_fixed_disk($1)

#
# nscd_client_domain: complete
#
nscd_use_socket($1)

#
# privfd: complete
#
domain_wide_inherit_fd($1)

#
# privlog: complete
#
logging_send_syslog_msg($1)

#
# privmail: 
#
mta_send_mail($1)
# this needs more work:
allow mta_user_agent $1:fd use;
allow mta_user_agent $1:process sigchld;
allow mta_user_agent $1:fifo_file { read write };

#
# privmodule: complete
#
modutils_domtrans_insmod($1)

#
# privowner: complete
#
domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1)

#
# privrole: complete
#
domain_role_change_exempt($1)

#
# privuser: complete
#
domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1)

#
# userspace_objmgr: complete
#
allow $1 self:process getattr;
# Receive notifications of policy reloads and enforcing status changes.
allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { create bind read };
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_validate_context($1)
selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
selinux_compute_create_context($1)
selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)
seutil_read_config($1)
seutil_read_default_contexts($1)

########################################
#
# Access macros
#

#
# access_terminal():
#
allow $1 $2_tty_device_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow $1 devtty_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow $1 devpts_t:dir { read search getattr };
allow $1 $2_devpts_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };

#
# append_log_domain():
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file  { create ra_file_perms };
type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t;

#
# append_logdir_domain():
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir { setattr ra_dir_perms };
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file  { create ra_file_perms };
type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t;

#
# application_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
domain_type($1_t)
domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t)
role sysadm_r types $1_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, $1_exec_t, $1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)

#
# base_can_network($1,$2):
#
allow $1 self:$2_socket connected_socket_perms;
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
corenet_$2_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)

#
# base_can_network($1,$2,$3):
#
allow $1 self:$2_socket connected_socket_perms;
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_$2_bind_all_nodes($1)
corenet_$2_sendrecv_$3_port($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)

#
# base_file_read_access():
#
files_list_home($1)
files_read_usr_files($1)
allow $1 bin_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 bin_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
allow $1 sbin_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 sbin_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)
seutil_read_config($1)
tunable_policy(`read_default_t',`
	files_list_default($1)
	files_read_default_files($1)
	files_read_default_symlinks($1)
	files_read_default_sockets($1)
	files_read_default_pipes($1)
')

#
# base_pty_perms():
#
allow $1_t ptmx_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t devpts_t:filesystem getattr;
allow $1_t devpts_t:dir { getattr read search };
dontaudit $1_t bsdpty_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write };

#
# can_create():
#
# for each i in $3
can_create_internal($1,$2,$i)

#
# can_create_internal($1,$2,dir):
#
allow $1 $2:$3 { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };

#
# can_create_internal($1,$2,lnk_file):
#
allow $1 $2:$3 { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };

#
# can_create_internal($1,$2,[file,chr_file,blk_file,sock_file,fifo_file]):
#
allow $1 $2:$3 { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };

#
# can_create_other_pty(): complete
#
term_create_pty($1_t,$2_devpts_t)
allow $1_t $2_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append };

#
# can_create_pty(): complete
#
# $2 may require more conversion
type $1_devpts_t $2;
term_pty($1_devpts_t)
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append };
term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)

#
# can_exec_any(): complete
#
domain_exec_all_entry_files($1)
files_exec_generic_etc_files($1)
corecmd_exec_bin($1)
corecmd_exec_sbin($1)
libs_use_ld_so($1)
libs_use_shared_libs($1)
libs_exec_ld_so($1)
libs_exec_lib_files($1)

#
# can_getcon(): complete
#
allow $1 self:process getattr;
kernel_read_system_state($1)

#
# can_getsecurity(): complete
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_validate_context($1)
selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
selinux_compute_create_context($1)
selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)

#
# can_kerberos(): complete
#
optional_policy(`kerberos.te',`
	kerberos_use($1)
')

#
# can_ldap(): complete
#
optional_policy(`ldap.te',`
	allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1)
	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
	sysnet_read_config($1)
')

#
# can_loadpol(): complete
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_load_policy($1)

#
# can_network():
#
can_network_tcp($1, `$2')
can_network_udp($1, `$2')
ifdef(`mount.te', `
allow $1 mount_t:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
')

#
# can_network_client():
#
can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2')
can_network_udp($1, `$2')

#
# can_network_client_tcp($1): complete
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)

#
# can_network_client_tcp($1,$2):
#
# remove _port_t from $2
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_$2_port($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)

#
# can_network_server():
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2')

#
# can_network_server_tcp():
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2')

#
# can_network_tcp(): complete
#
can_network_server_tcp($1, `$2')
can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2')

#
# can_network_udp(): complete
#
base_can_network($1, udp, `$2')
allow $1 self:udp_socket { connect };

#
# can_ps():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { search getattr read };
allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
allow $1 $2:process getattr;
# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
# running in a privileged domain.
dontaudit $1 $2:process ptrace;

#
# can_ptrace():
#
allow $1 $2:process ptrace;
allow $2 $1:process sigchld;

#
# can_resolve(): complete
#
tunable_policy(`use_dns',`
	allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_dns_port($1)
	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1)
	sysnet_read_config($1)
')

#
# can_setbool(): complete
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_set_boolean($1)

#
# can_setcon(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
allow $1 self:process setcurrent;
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)

#
# can_setenforce(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_set_enforce_mode($1)

#
# can_setexec(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
allow $1 self:process setexec;
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)

#
# can_setfscreate(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
allow $1 self:process setfscreate;
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)

#
# can_setsecparam(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
kernel_setsecparam($1)

#
# can_sysctl(): complete
#
kernel_rw_all_sysctl($1)

#
# can_tcp_connect
#
allow $1 $2:tcp_socket { connectto recvfrom };
allow $2 $1:tcp_socket { acceptfrom recvfrom };
allow $2 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;
allow $1 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;

#
# can_udp_send():
#
allow $1 $2:udp_socket sendto;
allow $2 $1:udp_socket recvfrom;

#
# can_unix_connect():
#
allow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;

#
# can_unix_send():
#
allow $1 $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

#
# can_ypbind(): complete
#
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind($1)
')

#
# create_append_log_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr search add_name write };
allow $1 $2:file { create ioctl getattr setattr append link };

#
# create_dir_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };
allow $1 $2:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };

#
# create_dir_notdevfile():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };
allow $1 $2:{ file sock_file fifo_file } { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };

#
# daemon_base_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
role system_r types $1_t;
dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow $1_t self:process { sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal };
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
init_use_fd($1_t)
init_use_script_pty($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`rhgb.te',`
	rhgb_domain($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`selinux.te',`
	seutil_newrole_sigchld($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`udev.te', `
	udev_read_db($1_t)
')
allow $1_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t proc_t:lnk_file read;


#
# daemon_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file { getattr create read write append setattr unlink };
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_list_proc($1_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlink($1_t)
dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
init_use_fd($1_t)
init_use_script_pty($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_sysadm_home_dir($1_t)
ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`rhgb.te',`
	rhgb_domain($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`selinuxutils.te',`
	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`udev.te', `
	udev_read_db($1_t)
')

#
# daemon_sub_domain():
#
# $1 is the parent domain (or domains), $2_t is the child domain,
# and $3 is any attributes to apply to the child
type $2_t, domain, privlog, daemon $3;
type $2_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
role system_r types $2_t;
domain_auto_trans($1, $2_exec_t, $2_t)
allow $2_t $1:fd use;
allow $2_t $1:process sigchld;
allow $2_t self:process signal_perms;
libs_use_ld_so($2_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($2_t)
allow $2_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
allow $2_t device_t:dir getattr;

#
# etc_domain():
#
type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread;
files_file_type($1_etc_t)
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file { getattr read };

#
# etcdir_domain():
#
type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread;
files_file_type($1_etc_t)
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file r_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3):
#
allow $1 $3:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow $1 $3:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1 $3:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
allow $1 $3:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1 $3:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
type_transition $1 $2:{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } $3;

#
# file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3,$4):
#
allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
# for each i in $4:
can_create_internal($1,$3,$i)
type_transition $1 $2:$i $3;

#
# general_domain_access(): complete
#
allow $1 self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow $1 self:fd use;
allow $1 self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $1 self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow $1 self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow $1 self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow $1 self:msg { send receive };
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1)
userdom_use_unpriv_user_fd($1)
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind($1)
')

#
# general_proc_read_access(): complete
#
kernel_read_system_state($1)
kernel_read_sendrecv_state($1)
kernel_read_software_raid_state($1)
kernel_getattr_core($1)
kernel_getattr_message_if($1)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)

#
# home_domain():
#

#
# home_domain_access():
#

#
# home_domain_ro():
#

#
# home_domain_ro_access():
#

#
# in_user_role():
#
role user_r types $1;
role staff_r types $1;

#
# init_service_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
init_use_fd($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
tunable_policy(`targeted_policy', `
term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
')dnl end targeted_policy tunable
allow $1_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
optional_policy(`udev.te', `
udev_read_db($1_t)
')
allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
dontaudit $1_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;

#
# inetd_child_domain():
#
type $1_t; #, nscd_client_domain;
type $1_exec_t;
inetd_(udp_|tcp_)?service_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
role system_r types $1_t;
type $1_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
allow $1_t self:process signal_perms;
allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t self:tcp_socket { listen accept connected_socket_perms }
# for identd
# cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules?
allow $1_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
allow $1_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
allow $1_t self:dir search;
allow $1_t self:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };
#allow $1_t home_root_t:dir search;
#can_kerberos($1_t)
#end for identd
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
corenet_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_interfaces($1_t)
corenet_sendrecv_raw_on_all_interfaces($1_t)
corenet_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_sendrecv_raw_on_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_bind_tcp_on_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_ports($1_t)
dev_read_urand($1_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t)
files_read_generic_etc_files($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
sysnet_read_config($1_t)
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind($1_t)
')

#
# legacy_domain(): complete
#
allow $1_t self:process execmem;
libs_legacy_use_shared_libs($1_t)
libs_legacy_use_ld_so($1_t)

#
# lock_domain(): complete
#
type $1_lock_t;
files_lock_file($1_lock_t)
allow $1_t $1_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_lock_file($1_t,$1_lock_t)

#
# log_domain(): complete
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t)

#
# logdir_domain(): complete
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
logging_search_logs($1_t,$1_log_t,{ file dir })

#
# mini_user_domain():
#

#
# network_home_dir():
#
create_dir_file($1, $2)
can_exec($1, $2)
allow $1 $2:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };

#
# pty_slave_label():
#
type $1_devpts_t, file_type, sysadmfile, ptyfile $2;
allow $1_devpts_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
type_transition $1_t devpts_t:chr_file $1_devpts_t;
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };

#
# r_dir_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { getattr read search };
allow $1 $2:file { read getattr };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# ra_dir_create_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file { create ra_file_perms };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr };

#
# ra_dir_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file ra_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# read_locale(): complete
#
miscfiles_read_localization($1)

#
# read_sysctl($1): complete
#
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)

#
# read_sysctl($1,full): complete
#
kernel_read_all_sysctl($1)

#
# rhgb_domain():
#
ifdef(`rhgb.te', `
allow $1 rhgb_t:process sigchld;
allow $1 rhgb_t:fd use;
allow $1 rhgb_t:fifo_file { read write };
')

#
# rw_dir_create_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow $1 $2:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };

#
# rw_dir_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow $1 $2:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# system_domain():
#
type $1_t;
domain_type($1_t)
role system_r types $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
allow $1_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;

#
# tmp_domain(): complete
#
# $2 may need more handling
#
type $1_tmp_t $2;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
# no class specified:
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })
# class specified:
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $3)
# $3 manage object perms here

#
# tmp_domain($1,$2,$3): complete
#
# $2 may need more handling
#
type $1_tmp_t $2;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $3)
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:$3 manage_obj_perms;

#
# tmpfs_domain(): complete
#
type $1_tmpfs_t;
files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t)
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
filesystem_create_private_tmpfs_data($1_t,$1_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

#
# unconfined_domain():
#

#
# user_application_domain():
#
type $1_t, domain, privlog $2;
type $1_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
role sysadm_r types $1_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, $1_exec_t, $1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
in_user_role($1_t)
domain_auto_trans(userdomain, $1_exec_t, $1_t)

#
# uses_authbind():
#
domain_auto_trans($1, authbind_exec_t, authbind_t)
allow authbind_t $1:process sigchld;
allow authbind_t $1:fd use;
allow authbind_t $1:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } rw_socket_perms;

#
# var_lib_domain():
#
type $1_var_lib_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
typealias $1_var_lib_t alias var_lib_$1_t;
file_type_auto_trans($1_t, var_lib_t, $1_var_lib_t, file)
allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

#
# var_run_domain($1):
#
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)

#
# var_run_domain($1,$2):
#
type $1_var_run_t, file_type, sysadmfile, pidfile;
file_type_auto_trans($1_t, var_run_t, $1_var_run_t, $2)
allow $1_t var_t:dir search;
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };