Also known as 'vmchannel', a transport mechanism is needed for
communication between the host userspace and guest userspace for
achieving things like making clipboard copy/paste work seamlessly across
the host and guest, locking the guest screen in case the vnc session to
the guest is closed and so on. This can be used in offline cases as
well, for example with libguestfs to probe which file systems the guest
uses, the apps installed, etc.
Virtio-serial is just the transport protocol that will enable such
applications to be written. It has two parts: (a) device emulation in
qemu that presents a virtio-pci device to the guest and (b) a guest
driver that presents a char device interface to userspace applications.
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
The script basically does what the name suggests, and additionally it
need to be able to stop and start avahi-daemon via its init script
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
Generic interface to platform dependent persistent storage
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/pstore
This basically works pretty much the same as cgroup file systems from a
SELinux perspective
Make sure that the installed /sys/fs/pstore directory is labeled
properly so that the pstore file system can be mounted on that
I also removed the files_type() calls as they are duplicate (it is
already called in files_mountpoint)
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
This keytab functionality should be re-evaluated because it does not
make sense in its current implementation
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
The grub2-install application runs a few grub2-* commands. Two of those,
grub2-bios-setup and grub2-probe, need read/write access to the (fixed) disks.
Mark those two applications as bootloader_exec_t (as is the case with the "grub"
legacy command in the past) allows the commands to continue.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Back when the SECMARK implementation was new, the packet class was always
checked. Because of that, unlabeled_t packet rules proliferated refpolicy
since the common case was to have no SECMARK rules. Since then, the kernel
has been modified to only enforce the packet class if there are SECMARK
rules. Remove the unlabeled_t packet rules, since users of SECMARK will
likely want no unlabeled_t packet rules, and the common case users will
have no impact since the packet class isn't enforced on their systems.
To have partial SECMARK confinement, the following rule applies:
allow { domain -type_i_want_to_constrain_t } unlabeled_t:packet { send recv };
It seems like over-allowing, but if you have no SECMARK rules, it's the equivalent of:
allow * unlabeled_t:packet { send recv };
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Dominick Grift
Chris PeBenito
Sven Vermeulen