create_netlink_socket_perms is defined as:
{ create_socket_perms nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }
This means that it is redundant to allow create_socket_perms and
nlmsg_read/nlmsg_write.
Clean up things without allowing anything new.
Use nscd_use instead of nscd_socket_use. This conditionally allows
nscd_shm_use
Remove the nscd_socket_use from ssh_keygen since it was redundant
already allowed by auth_use_nsswitch
Had to make some ssh_keysign_t rules unconditional else
nscd_use(ssh_keysign_t) would not build (nested booleans) but that does
not matter, the only actual domain transition to ssh_keysign_t is
conditional so the other unconditional ssh_keygen_t rules are
conditional in practice
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
On 01/05/2011 08:48 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 12/16/10 12:32, Paul Nuzzi wrote:
>> On 12/15/2010 03:54 PM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>> On 12/10/10 18:22, Paul Nuzzi wrote:
>>>> Added labeled IPSec support to hadoop. SELinux will be able to enforce what services are allowed to
>>>> connect to. Labeled IPSec can enforce the range of services they can receive from. This enforces
>>>> the architecture of Hadoop without having to modify any of the code. This adds a level of
>>>> confidentiality, integrity, and authentication provided outside the software stack.
>>>
>>> A few things.
>>>
>>> The verb used in Reference Policy interfaces for peer recv is recvfrom
>>> (a holdover from previous labeled networking implementations). So the
>>> interfaces are like hadoop_recvfrom_datanode().
>>
>> Easy change.
>>
>>> It seems like setkey should be able to setcontext any type used on ipsec
>>> associations. I think the best thing would be to add additional support
>>> to either the ipsec or corenetwork modules (I haven't decided which one
>>> yet) for associations. So, say we have an interface called
>>> ipsec_spd_type() which adds the parameter type to the attribute
>>> ipsec_spd_types. Then we can have an allow setkey_t
>>> ipsec_spd_types:association setkey; rule and we don't have to update it
>>> every time more labeled network is added.
>>
>> That seems a lot less clunky than updating setkey every time we add a new association.
>>
>>> This is definitely wrong since its not a file:
>>> +files_type(hadoop_lan_t)
>>
>> Let me know how you would like to handle associations and I could update the
>> patch.
>
> Lets go with putting the associations in corenetwork.
>
>> Will the files_type error be cleared up when we re-engineer this?
>
> I'm not sure what you mean. The incorrect rule was added in your patch.
>
Adds labeled IPSec policy to hadoop to control the remote processes that are allowed to connect to the cloud's services.
Signed-off-by: Paul Nuzzi <pjnuzzi@tycho.ncsc.mil>
The latest revision of the labeled policy patches which enable both labeled
and unlabeled policy support for NetLabel. This revision takes into account
Chris' feedback from the first version and reduces the number of interface
calls in each domain down to two at present: one for unlabeled access, one for
NetLabel access. The older, transport layer specific interfaces, are still
present for use by third-party modules but are not used in the default policy
modules.
trunk: Use netmsg initial SID for MLS-only Netlabel packets, from Paul Moore.
This patch changes the policy to use the netmsg initial SID as the "base"
SID/context for NetLabel packets which only have MLS security attributes.
Currently we use the unlabeled initial SID which makes it very difficult to
distinquish between actual unlabeled packets and those packets which have MLS
security attributes.
Chris PeBenito
Nicolas Iooss
Dominick Grift
Miroslav Grepl
Chris PeBenito
Paul Nuzzi