fifo_files inherited from domains allowed to change role to sysadm_r.
This enables to do e.g. 'echo "..." | sudo -r sysadm_r command' from a
staff_u:staff_r:staff_t context
CryFS (https://www.cryfs.org/) is a software that can be run by non-root
users that have access to /dev/fuse. Its command is directly used to
mount a directory ("/usr/bin/cryfs basedir mountpoint"), like command
"mount". Unmounting a mountpoint is done with "fusermount -u
mountpoint", /usr/bin/fusermount being a setuid-root program labeled
mount_exec_t.
EncFS (https://www.arg0.net/encfs) is a similar software that has been
considered insecure since a security audit in 2014 found vulnerabilities
that are not yet fixed (like https://github.com/vgough/encfs/issues/9).
gocryptfs (https://nuetzlich.net/gocryptfs/) is a similar software that
has been inspired by EncFS.
Allow users with role sysadm to use all these projects.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
WireGuard is a fast, modern, secure VPN tunnel, according to
https://www.wireguard.com/. In order to install it, the mostly
documented way consists in building and installing an out-of-tree kernel
module and using userland tools to configure this module (wg and
wg-quick).
* WireGuard is like "ip": the userland tool communicates with the kernel
module through a netlink socket.
* WireGuard is like "iptables": there is no daemon, but some
distributions ship systemd units that restores a WireGuard
configuration when started.
* WireGuard is like other services: its configuration files are in /etc,
and it can use /run and /tmp.
Create a new policy module which handles all of this.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
This is the update I have made based on suggestions for the previous
patches to add a udev_run interface. This adds the new domain udevadm_t
which is entered from /usr/bin/udevadm.
It seems to meet the needs that I have, but there are some things to
note that are probably important.
1) There are a few systemd services that use udevadm during startup.
I have granted the permisssions that I need based on denials I was
seeing during startup (the machine would fail to start without the
permisions).
2) In the udev.fc file there are other binaries that I don't have on a
RHEL7 box that maybe should also be labeled udevadm_exec_t.
e.g. /usr/bin/udevinfo and /usr/bin/udevsend
But as I don't have those binaries to test, I have not updated the
type of that binary.
3) There are some places that call udev_domtrans that maybe should now
be using udevadm_domtrans - rpm.te, hal.te, hotplug.te. Again,
these are not things that I am using in my current situation and am
unable to test the interactions to know if the change is correct.
Other than that, I think this was a good suggestion to split udevadm
into a different domain.
Only change for v4 is to use stream_connect_pattern as suggested.
Signed-off-by: Dave Sugar <dsugar@tresys.com>
There are several nacl binaries that need labels.
Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.
Git policy misses chromium_role() lines, were they in another patch that was
submitted at the same time?
I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir
Allow domain_use_interactive_fds() for running via ssh -X.
Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.
Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from lsb_release or some
other shell script.
How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process
share access involving chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?
Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.
Every Infiniband network will have a default pkey, so that is labeled.
The rest of the pkey configuration is network specific. The policy allows
access to the default and unlabeled pkeys for sysadm and staff users.
kernel_t is allowed access to all pkeys, which it needs to process and
route management datagrams.
Endports are all unlabeled by default, sysadm users are allowed to
manage the subnet on unlabeled endports. kernel_t is allowed to manage
the subnet on all ibendports, which is required for configuring the HCA.
This patch requires selinux series: "SELinux user space support for
Infiniband RDMA", due to the new ipkeycon labeling mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
This is the base part of the policy needed to support libmtp (an
Initiator implementation of the Media Transfer Protocol).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido at trentalancia.net>
This patch is slightly more involved than just running sed. It also adds
typealias rules and doesn't change the FC entries.
The /dev/apm_bios device doesn't exist on modern systems. I have left that
policy in for the moment on the principle of making one change per patch. But
I might send another patch to remove that as it won't exist with modern
kernels.
Chris PeBenito
bauen1
Laurent Bigonville
Nicolas Iooss
Alexander Miroshnichenko
Sugar, David
Russell Coker
Alexander Miroshnichenko
Jason Zaman
Christian Göttsche
Daniel Jurgens
Guido Trentalancia