These interfaces are not being called in the policy.
corenetwork.if.in:corenet_sctp_bind_generic_port(),
corenet_dontaudit_sctp_bind_generic_port(), and
corenet_sctp_connect_generic_port()
Removed references to undeclared type ephemeral_port_t.
corenetwork.if.in:corenet_sctp_recvfrom_unlabeled()
Removed references to undeclared type attribute corenet_unlabled_type.
devices.if:dev_read_printk()
Removed references to undeclared type printk_device_t and marked
interface as deprecated because it is now empty.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
type=AVC msg=audit(1504637347.487:280): avc: denied { map } for pid=857 comm="xenconsoled" path="/dev/xen/privcmd" dev="devtmpfs" ino=16289 scontext=system_u:system_r:xenconsoled_t:s0
Without this we can't use xenconsole (client) to
talk to xenconsoled (server).
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org>
Kernel commit 6941857e82ae ("selinux: add a map permission check
for mmap") added a map permission check on mmap so that we can
distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications
for revocation). The purpose of a separate map permission check on
mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files
for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly
useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime
in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured
pipeline without data copying). The kernel commit is anticipated to
be included in Linux 4.13.
This refpolicy change defines map permission for refpolicy. It mirrors
the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common
definitions for files and sockets. This will break compatibility for
kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33,
< RHEL 6); on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission
to the end of each file and socket access vector.
This change only allows map permission as needed, e.g. only in the
mmap_file_perms and exec_file_perms object permission sets
(since map is always required there) and only in specific interfaces
or modules where denials were observed in limited testing.
It is important to note that effective use of this permission requires
complete removal of unconfined, as otherwise unconfined domains will be
able to map all file types and therefore bypass the intended protection.
If we wanted to exclude map permission to all file types by default from
unconfined, we would need to add it to the list of permissions excluded from
files_unconfined_type in kernel/files.te.
Policies that depend on this permission not being allowed to specific file
types should also make use of neverallow rules to ensure that this is not
undermined by any allow rule, and ensure that they are performing neverallow
checking at policy build time (e.g. make validate) or runtime (e.g.
semanage.conf expand-check=1).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This patch is slightly more involved than just running sed. It also adds
typealias rules and doesn't change the FC entries.
The /dev/apm_bios device doesn't exist on modern systems. I have left that
policy in for the moment on the principle of making one change per patch. But
I might send another patch to remove that as it won't exist with modern
kernels.
Patches for modutils, at least one of which is needed to generate an initramfs
on Debian.
Patch to allow lvm to talk to fifos from dpkg_script_t for postinst scripts
etc.
Patch for brctl to allow it to create sysfs files.
This patch doesn't do everything that is needed to have systemd-nspawn work.
But it does everything that is needed and which I have written in a clear and
uncontroversial way. I think it's best to get this upstream now and then
either have a separate discussion about the more difficult issues, or wait
until I devise a way of solving those problems that's not too hacky.
Who knows, maybe someone else will devise a brilliant solution to the remaining
issues after this is accepted upstream.
Also there's a tiny patch for systemd_machined_t that is required by
systemd_nspawn_t.
Description: systemd-nspawn
Author: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
Last-Update: 2017-03-29
This patch adds missing permissions in the kernel module that prevent
to run it without the unconfined module.
This second version improves the comment section of new interfaces:
"Domain" is replaced by "Domain allowed access".
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
audit.log shows that journald needs to read the kernel read buffer:
avc: denied { syslog_read } for pid=147 comm="systemd-journal" scontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t tclass=system permissive=1
Moreover journald uses RW access to /dev/kmsg, according to its code:
http://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/tree/src/journal/journald-kmsg.c?id=v215#n394
Second part of the support of security_t under /sys/fs/selinux - when
asked not to audit getting attributes on the selinux file system, have
this propagate to the sysfs parts as well.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Because it is no longer a top-level file system, we need to enhance some
of the interfaces with the appropriate rights towards sysfs_t.
First set to allow getattr rights on the file system, which now also
means getattr on the sysfs_t file system as well as search privileges in
sysfs_t.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
In glibc, the get_nprocs method reads /sys/devices/system/cpu/online, so
we need to grant most domains read access to this file. As we don't want
them to have read access on sysfs_t by default, create a new type
(cpu_online_t) and assign it to the file, and grant domains read access
to the file.
This does require systems to relabel the file upon every boot, something
distributions do in their bootup scripts, as /sys devices don't keep
their context.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Used by kernel to communicate with user space (cachefilesd)
Label the character file accordingly
Create a dev_rw_cachefiles_dev() for cachefilesd
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
As of util-linux-n 2.18, the mount utility now attempts to write to the root
of newly mounted filesystems. It does this in an attempt to ensure that the
r/w status of a filesystem as shown in mtab is correct. To detect whether
a filesystem is r/w, mount calls access() with the W_OK argument. This
results in an AVC denial with current policy. As a fallback, mount also
attempts to modify the access time of the directory being mounted on if
the call to access() fails. As mount already possesses the necessary
privileges, the modification of the access time succeeds (at least on systems
with the futimens() function, which has existed in linux since kernel 2.6.22
and glibc since version 2.6, or about July 2007).
Signed-off-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com>
dontaudit attempts to read/write device_t chr files occurring before udev relabel
allow init_t and initrc_t read/write on device_t chr files (necessary to boot without unconfined)
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Solt <jsolt@tresys.com>
Move devtmpfs to devices module (remove from filesystem module)
Make device_t a filesystem
Add interface for associating types with device_t filesystem (dev_associate)
Call dev_associate from dev_filetrans
Allow all device nodes associate with device_t filesystem
Remove dev_tmpfs_filetrans_dev from kernel_t
Remove fs_associate_tmpfs(initctl_t) - redundant, it was in dev_filetrans, now in dev_associate
Mounton interface, to allow the kernel to mounton device_t
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Solt <jsolt@tresys.com>
Jagannathan Raman
Jason Zaman
James Carter
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Luis Ressel
Chris PeBenito
Stephen Smalley
Guido Trentalancia
Nicolas Iooss
Chris PeBenito
Alexander Wetzel
Sven Vermeulen
Chris PeBenito
Dominick Grift
Chris Richards
Dominick Grift
Jeremy Solt