Yes mmap is the standard way of accessing the mail spool.
Removed spamd_gpg_t because there's no point to it, the separation doesn't
provide an actual benefit.
Made the other requested changes.
Signed-off-by: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
D-Bus services wanting to pass file descriptors for
tun/tap devices need to read/write privileges to /dev/tun.
Without this privilege the following denial will happen:
type=AVC msg=audit(1582227542.557:3045): avc: denied { read write } for pid=1741 comm="dbus-daemon" path="/dev/net/tun" dev="devtmpfs" ino=486 scontext=system_u:system_r:system_dbusd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
This is needed by OpenVPN 3 Linux, where an unprivileged
process (openvpn3-service-client) requests a tun device
from a privileged service (openvpn3-service-netcfg) over
the D-Bus system bus.
GitHub-Issue: #190
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
I'm seeing problems on RHEL7 with lvm2-activation-generator that are
coming from recent changes to put systemd-fstab-generator into it's
own domain. I resolved the issues by creaing this generator attribute
to grant common generator permissions and move all generators into
a single systemd_generator_t domain.
Then setup specific types for the following generators:
lvm2-activation-generator - needs to read lvm2 config
systemd-sysv-generator - needs to read stuff in init_t that other generators don't.
systemd-efi-boot-generator - needs to read stuff on the EFI boot partition labeled boot_t
For fstab generator allow it to write /sys
[ 19.482951] type=1400 audit(1584548691.268:7): avc: denied { write } for pid=1638 comm="systemd-fstab-g" name="/" dev="sysfs" ino=1 Allow scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_fstab_generator_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysfs_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
audit(1585500099.139:6): avc: denied { read } for pid=1635 comm="systemd-cryptse" path="/run/systemd/generator/dev-mapper-luks\x2d6a613af0\x2d0a61\x2d462f\x2d8679\x2d1b0d964fbc88.device.d/.#90-device-timeout.confsOskdU" dev="tmpfs" ino=12243 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_generator_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
audit(1585500099.139:7): avc: denied { setattr } for pid=1635 comm="systemd-cryptse" name=".#90-device-timeout.confsOskdU" dev="tmpfs" ino=12243 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_generator_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
audit(1585500099.139:8): avc: denied { rename } for pid=1635 comm="systemd-cryptse" name=".#90-device-timeout.confsOskdU" dev="tmpfs" ino=12243 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_generator_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Signed-off-by: Dave Sugar <dsugar@tresys.com>
When getting dumps from a crash in a mount namespace, systemd wants to run stat on the root in that namespace
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <Daniel.Burgener@microsoft.com>
According to IANA, winshadow is port 3261 for both TCP and UDP.
3161 for TCP looks like a typo that slipped through.
Signed-off-by: Florian Schmidt <flosch@nutanix.com>
There is a STIG requirement (CCE-27326-8) that all files in /dev be labeled (something other than 'device_t'). On the systems I am working on there are a few files labeled device_t.
Signed-off-by: Dave Sugar <dsugar100@gmail.com>
Usbguard enforces the USB device authorization policy for all USB
devices. Users can be authorized to manage rules and make device
authorization decisions using a command line tool.
Add rules for usbguard. Optionally, allow authorized users to control
the daemon, which requires usbguard-daemon to be able modify its rules
in /etc/usbguard.
Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Modern systems shouldn't need direct access to raw memory
devices (/dev/mem, /dev/kmem, /dev/mergemem, dev/oldmem, /dev/port)
anymore, so let's remove the access in most cases and make it tunable
in the rest.
Add dev_read_raw_memory_cond(), dev_write_raw_memory_cond() and
dev_wx_raw_memory_cond(), which are conditional to new boolean
allow_raw_memory_access.
Remove raw memory access for a few domains that should never have
needed it (colord_t, iscsid_t, mdamd_t, txtstat_t), should not need it
anymore (dmidecode_t, Debian devicekit_diskt_t, hald_t, hald_mac_t,
xserver_t) or the domains that should transition to different domain
for this (rpm_t, kudzu_t, dpkg_t).
Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
/dev/ipmi is labeled, but no interfaces exist to grant access to the device.
Adding interface for read/write access, I'm not sure of read-only access is usefull. ipmitool seems to only read and write
type=AVC msg=audit(1581618155.319:786): avc: denied { read write } for pid=4498 comm="ipmitool" name="ipmi0" dev="devtmpfs" ino=10460 scontext=system_u:system_r:ipmi_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:ipmi_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1581618155.319:786): avc: denied { open } for pid=4498 comm="ipmitool" path="/dev/ipmi0" dev="devtmpfs" ino=10460 scontext=system_u:system_r:ipmi_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:ipmi_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1581618155.320:787): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=4498 comm="ipmitool" path="/dev/ipmi0" dev="devtmpfs" ino=10460 ioctlcmd=6910 scontext=system_u:system_r:ipmi_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:ipmi_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
Chris PeBenito
Russell Coker
bauen1
David Sommerseth
Dave Sugar
Christian Göttsche
Daniel Burgener
Florian Schmidt
Laurent Bigonville
Guido Trentalancia
Topi Miettinen