This permission is currently granted in an ifdef(systemd) block, but
it's also required on non-systemd systems if signed kernel modules are
being used.
Remove unneeded permissions to read user content from the
xserver module (xserver and xdm domains).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
- add systemd service macro sets
- add some documentation
- add some recursion to some macro sets (ipv perm, object class sets)
- deprecate domain_trans and domain_auto_trans
- remove unpriv_socket_class_set
When reading or managing noxattr fs files or symbolic links, also
let the user list noxattr fs directories.
This patch should be applied after the following one:
http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2016-October/008539.html
"Let users read/manage symlinks on fs that do not support xattr"
posted on Sat, 29 Oct 2016 15:39:46 UTC.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
Let unprivileged users list filesystems mounted on mount points such
as /mnt (cdrom, FAT, NTFS and so on).
This makes a great difference to the usability and effectiveness of
graphical filesystem browsers such as Gnome Nautilus and currently
comes at no security penalty because mounted filesystems can be
listed with programs such as the "df" program from GNU coreutils or
by simply reading /proc/mounts.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
Let unprivileged and administrative users read symbolic links on
filesystems that do not support extended attributes (xattr) such
as cdroms, FAT, NTFS and so on.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
On Tuesday, 2 August 2016 7:59:28 PM AEDT Chris PeBenito wrote:
> On 07/31/16 08:34, Russell Coker wrote:
> > The following patch deals with a single binary for modutils, so depmod_t,
> > and insmod_t are merged.
>
> Since the main SELinux distros (including RHEL/CentOS 7) all have merged
> modutils these days, I'm open to taking a patch that fully merges these
> domains (in which case renaming to kmod_t, with proper aliasing seems
> the best idea).
>
> However, it's been some time since I used a busybox-based system; does
> busybox still have separated tools? Yes, this is a bit of an obvious
> question since busybox is also single-binary, but IIRC, the embedded
> guys made some tiny helper scripts or executables so proper
> transitioning could occur. Separate domains may still make sense.
As we have had no response from Busybox users in the last 3 months and also no
response to the thread Luis started in 2013 I think it's safe to assume that
they don't need this.
I've attached a new patch which renames to kmod_t as you suggested. Please
consider it for inclusion.
--
My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/
My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
Description: Change modutils policy to match the use of a single binary
Author: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
Last-Update: 2014-06-25
commit a7334eb0de98af11ec38b6263536fa01bc2a606c
libsemanage: validate and compile file contexts before installing
validates the fcontexts when they are still in /var/lib/selinux. Without
setfiles_t having access to read the files, validation fails and the
policy cannot be updated.
Introduce a new file context for user certificates (user_cert_t)
located in home directories.
Introduce new auxiliary interfaces to read and manage such files
files and directories.
Thanks to Christopher PeBenito for the useful suggestions that
led to this improved version of the patch.
Compared to the previous version, this patch adds the ability to
search the user home directories in the new interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
Improve the existing user domain template policy:
- better support for the "user_rw_noexattrfile" boolean (enable
write operations on filesystems that do not support extended
attributes, such as FAT or cdrom filesystem);
- add support for a new "user_exec_noexattrfile" boolean to
control the execution of files from filesystems that do not
support extended attributes (potentially dangerous);
- add support for a new "user_write_removable" boolean which
enables write operations on removable devices (such as
external removable USB memory, USB mobile phones, etc).
Note that devices might be removable but support extended
attributes (Linux xattr filesystems on external USB mass storage
devices), so two separate booleans are needed for optimal
configuration flexibility.
Writing to removable mass storage devices is a major cause of
leakage of confidential information, so the new boolean defaults
to false.
Disable raw access for MLS policies (thanks to Christoper
PeBenito for suggesting this).
This new version of the patch correctly includes the definitions
of the new booleans (by including the .te file differences).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
Update the lvm module to add a permission needed by cryptsetup.
At the moment the SELinux kernel code is not able yet to distinguish
the sockets in the AF_ALG namespace that are used for interfacing to
the kernel Crypto API.
In the future the SELinux kernel code will be updated to distinguish
the new socket class and so this permission will change its class
from the generic "socket" to the new socket (e.g. "alg_socket").
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
The "module_load" permission has been recently added to the "system"
class (kernel 4.7).
The following patch updates the Reference Policy so that the new
permission is allowed when a kernel module should be loaded.
To preserve the module encapsulation, a new interface is defined
in the kernel files module and that interface is then used in the
kernel module.
A short note is added about unneeded permissions that set the
kernel scheduling parameters (might lead to service disruption).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
- updated the file contexts for the Xsession script;
- created an interface for chatting over dbus with
xdm (currently used by the userdomain module in
the common user template);
- added permission to chat over dbus with colord.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>