The script basically does what the name suggests, and additionally it
need to be able to stop and start avahi-daemon via its init script
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
Generic interface to platform dependent persistent storage
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/pstore
This basically works pretty much the same as cgroup file systems from a
SELinux perspective
Make sure that the installed /sys/fs/pstore directory is labeled
properly so that the pstore file system can be mounted on that
I also removed the files_type() calls as they are duplicate (it is
already called in files_mountpoint)
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
This keytab functionality should be re-evaluated because it does not
make sense in its current implementation
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@gmail.com>
The grub2-install application runs a few grub2-* commands. Two of those,
grub2-bios-setup and grub2-probe, need read/write access to the (fixed) disks.
Mark those two applications as bootloader_exec_t (as is the case with the "grub"
legacy command in the past) allows the commands to continue.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Back when the SECMARK implementation was new, the packet class was always
checked. Because of that, unlabeled_t packet rules proliferated refpolicy
since the common case was to have no SECMARK rules. Since then, the kernel
has been modified to only enforce the packet class if there are SECMARK
rules. Remove the unlabeled_t packet rules, since users of SECMARK will
likely want no unlabeled_t packet rules, and the common case users will
have no impact since the packet class isn't enforced on their systems.
To have partial SECMARK confinement, the following rule applies:
allow { domain -type_i_want_to_constrain_t } unlabeled_t:packet { send recv };
It seems like over-allowing, but if you have no SECMARK rules, it's the equivalent of:
allow * unlabeled_t:packet { send recv };
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
The chsh application (which runs in the chfn_t domain) requires read access on
the file context definitions. If not, the following error occurs:
Changing the login shell for root
Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default
Login Shell [/bin/zsh]: /bin/bash
chsh: failure while writing changes to /etc/passwd
The following AVC denials are shown:
Jan 23 20:23:43 lain kernel: [20378.806719] type=1400 audit(1358969023.507:585):
avc: denied { search } for pid=18281 comm="chsh" name="selinux" dev="dm-0"
ino=23724520 scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:chfn_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t tclass=dir
In permissive mode, this goes up to:
Jan 23 20:22:15 lain kernel: [20290.691128] type=1400 audit(1358968935.217:566):
avc: denied { open } for pid=18195 comm="chsh"
path="/etc/selinux/strict/contexts/files/file_contexts" dev="dm-0" ino=23726403
scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:chfn_t tcontext=staff_u:object_r:file_context_t
tclass=file
Hence, adding in seutil_read_file_contexts().
A second error is that chsh, if available, wants to execute nscd:
Changing the login shell for root
Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default
Login Shell [/bin/sh]: /bin/bash
chsh: cannot execute /usr/sbin/nscd: Permission denied
chsh: nscd exited with status 126
chsh: Failed to flush the nscd cache.
chsh: cannot execute /usr/sbin/nscd: Permission denied
chsh: nscd exited with status 126
chsh: Failed to flush the nscd cache.
chsh: cannot execute /usr/sbin/nscd: Permission denied
chsh: nscd exited with status 126
chsh: Failed to flush the nscd cache.
Similar to most other user admin utilities, we grant it the rights to run nscd.
Changes since v1
- Removed seutil_dontaudit_search_config() call
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Dominick Grift
Chris PeBenito
Sven Vermeulen