The kernel_delete_unlabeled_chr_files interface is called by the
(deprecated) files_delete_isid_type_chr_files interface in
kernel/files.if.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
The kernel_delete_unlabeled_blk_files interface is called by the
(deprecated) files_delete_isid_type_blk_files in kernel/files.if.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
The kernel_delete_unlabeled_sockets interface is called by the
(deprecated) files_delete_isid_type_sock_files interface in
kernel/files.if.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
The kernel_delete_unlabeled_pipes interface is called by the
(deprecated) files_delete_isid_type_fifo_files interface in
kernel/files.if.
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
The kernel_delete_unlabeled_symlinks interface is called by the
files_delete_isid_type_symlinks interface (in kernel/files.if). This
interface is deprecated (and calls kernel_delete_unlabeled_symlinks).
Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Back when the SECMARK implementation was new, the packet class was always
checked. Because of that, unlabeled_t packet rules proliferated refpolicy
since the common case was to have no SECMARK rules. Since then, the kernel
has been modified to only enforce the packet class if there are SECMARK
rules. Remove the unlabeled_t packet rules, since users of SECMARK will
likely want no unlabeled_t packet rules, and the common case users will
have no impact since the packet class isn't enforced on their systems.
To have partial SECMARK confinement, the following rule applies:
allow { domain -type_i_want_to_constrain_t } unlabeled_t:packet { send recv };
It seems like over-allowing, but if you have no SECMARK rules, it's the equivalent of:
allow * unlabeled_t:packet { send recv };
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
The attached patch adds a few database object classes, as follows:
* db_schema
------------
A schema object performs as a namespace in database; similar to
directories in filesystem.
It seems some of (but not all) database objects are stored within
a certain schema logically. We can qualify these objects using
schema name. For example, a table: "my_tbl" within a schema: "my_scm"
is identified by "my_scm.my_tbl". This table is completely different
from "your_scm.my_tbl" that it a table within a schema: "your_scm".
Its characteristics is similar to a directory in filesystem, so
it has similar permissions.
The 'search' controls to resolve object name within a schema.
The 'add_name' and 'remove_name' controls to add/remove an object
to/from a schema.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createschema.html
In the past discussion, a rubix folks concerned about no object
class definition for schema and catalog which is an upper level
namespace. Since I'm not certain whether we have a disadvantage
when 'db_schema' class is applied on catalog class, I don't add
this definition yet.
Default security context of 'db_table' and 'db_procedure' classes
get being computed using type_transition with 'db_schema' class,
instead of 'db_database' class. It reflects logical hierarchy of
database object more correctly.
* db_view
----------
A view object performs as a virtual table. We can run SELECT
statement on views, although it has no physical entities.
The definition of views are expanded in run-time, so it allows
us to describe complex queries with keeping readability.
This object class uniquely provides 'expand' permission that
controls whether user can expand this view, or not.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a schema object that owning the view.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createview.html
* db_sequence
--------------
A sequence object is a sequential number generator.
This object class uniquely provides 'get_value', 'next_value' and
'set_value' permissions. The 'get_value' controls to reference the
sequence object. The 'next_value' controls to fetch and increment
the value of sequence object. The 'set_value' controls to set
an arbitrary value.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a schema object that owning the sequence.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createsequence.html
* db_language
--------------
A language object is an installed engine to execute procedures.
PostgreSQL supports to define SQL procedures using regular script
languages; such as Perl, Tcl, not only SQL or binary modules.
In addition, v9.0 or later supports DO statement. It allows us to
execute a script statement on server side without defining a SQL
procedure. It requires to control whether user can execute DO
statement on this language, or not.
This object class uniquely provides 'implement' and 'execute'
permissions. The 'implement' controls whether a procedure can
be implemented with this language, or not. So, it takes security
context of the procedure as subject. The 'execute' controls to
execute code block using DO statement.
The default security context shall be computed by type transition
rule with a database object, because it is not owned by a certain
schema.
In the default policy, we provide two types: 'sepgsql_lang_t' and
'sepgsql_safe_lang_t' that allows unpriv users to execute DO
statement. The default is 'sepgsql_leng_t'.
We assume newly installed language may be harm, so DBA has to relabel
it explicitly, if he want user defined procedures using the language.
See also,
http://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-createlanguage.htmlhttp://developer.postgresql.org/pgdocs/postgres/sql-do.html
P.S)
I found a bug in MCS. It didn't constraint 'relabelfrom' permission
of 'db_procedure' class. IIRC, I fixed it before, but it might be
only MLS side. Sorry.
Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
policy/flask/access_vectors | 29 ++++++++
policy/flask/security_classes | 6 ++
policy/mcs | 16 ++++-
policy/mls | 58 ++++++++++++++-
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 8 ++
policy/modules/services/postgresql.if | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
policy/modules/services/postgresql.te | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Add ability to dontaudit requiests to load kernel modules. If you
disable ipv6 every confined app that does ip, tries to get the kernel to
load the module.
Better handling of unlabeled files by the kernel interfaces
The latest revision of the labeled policy patches which enable both labeled
and unlabeled policy support for NetLabel. This revision takes into account
Chris' feedback from the first version and reduces the number of interface
calls in each domain down to two at present: one for unlabeled access, one for
NetLabel access. The older, transport layer specific interfaces, are still
present for use by third-party modules but are not used in the default policy
modules.
trunk: Use netmsg initial SID for MLS-only Netlabel packets, from Paul Moore.
This patch changes the policy to use the netmsg initial SID as the "base"
SID/context for NetLabel packets which only have MLS security attributes.
Currently we use the unlabeled initial SID which makes it very difficult to
distinquish between actual unlabeled packets and those packets which have MLS
security attributes.
Laurent Bigonville
Chris PeBenito
Sven Vermeulen
Dominick Grift
KaiGai Kohei
Chris Richards
Dominick Grift