selinux-refpolicy/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/uml.if

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## <summary>Policy for UML</summary>
#######################################
## <summary>
## The per user domain template for the uml module.
## </summary>
## <desc>
## <p>
## This template creates a derived domains which are used
## for uml program.
## </p>
## <p>
## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and
## generally does not need to be invoked directly
## by policy writers.
## </p>
## </desc>
## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
## <summary>
## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
## is the prefix for user_t).
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_domain">
## <summary>
## The type of the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_role">
## <summary>
## The role associated with the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
template(`uml_per_userdomain_template',`
########################################
#
# Declarations
#
type $1_uml_t;
domain_type($1_uml_t)
role $3 types $1_uml_t;
type $1_uml_exec_t;
domain_entry_file($1_uml_t,$1_uml_exec_t)
type $1_uml_ro_t;
files_type($1_uml_ro_t)
type $1_uml_rw_t;
files_type($1_uml_rw_t)
type $1_uml_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_uml_tmp_t)
type $1_uml_tmpfs_t;
files_tmpfs_file($1_uml_tmpfs_t)
type $1_uml_devpts_t;
term_pty($1_uml_devpts_t)
########################################
#
# Local policy
#
allow $1_uml_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_uml_t self:process { fork signal_perms ptrace };
allow $1_uml_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
# Use the network.
allow $1_uml_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_uml_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1_uml_t $2:process sigchld;
allow $1_uml_t $2:fifo_file { ioctl read write getattr lock append };
# allow the UML thing to happen
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };
term_create_pty($1_uml_t,$1_uml_devpts_t)
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
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files_tmp_filetrans($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t, { file dir })
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can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t)
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_uml_t,$1_uml_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
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can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmpfs_t)
# access config files
allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:lnk_file { getattr read };
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
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userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1,$1_uml_t,$1_uml_rw_t,{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
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allow $2 uml_ro_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2 uml_ro_t:file r_file_perms;
allow $2 uml_ro_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:{ file sock_file fifo_file } { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };
allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:lnk_file { relabelfrom relabelto create_lnk_perms };
allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t $1_uml_exec_t }:dir { relabelfrom relabelto create_dir_perms };
allow $2 $1_uml_exec_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };
allow $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace;
allow $2 $1_uml_t:process signal_perms;
# allow ps, ptrace, signal
allow $2 $1_uml_t:dir { search getattr read };
allow $2 $1_uml_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
allow $2 $1_uml_t:process getattr;
# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
# (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
# running in a privileged domain.
dontaudit $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace;
allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
domain_auto_trans($2, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t }, $1_uml_t)
can_exec($1_uml_t, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t })
# for mconsole
allow { $2 $1_uml_t } $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow $1_uml_t $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
kernel_read_system_state($1_uml_t)
# for SKAS - need something better
kernel_write_proc_files($1_uml_t)
# for xterm
corecmd_exec_bin($1_uml_t)
corecmd_exec_sbin($1_uml_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t)
corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_uml_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_uml_t)
corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev($1_uml_t)
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domain_use_interactive_fds($1_uml_t)
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# for xterm
files_read_etc_files($1_uml_t)
files_dontaudit_read_etc_runtime_files($1_uml_t)
# putting uml data under /var is usual...
files_search_var($1_uml_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_uml_t)
init_read_utmp($1_uml_t)
init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_uml_t)
# for xterm
libs_use_ld_so($1_uml_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_uml_t)
libs_exec_lib_files($1_uml_t)
# Inherit and use descriptors from newrole.
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seutil_use_newrole_fds($1_uml_t)
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# Use the network.
sysnet_read_config($1_uml_t)
userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_uml_t)
optional_policy(`mount',`
mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_uml_t)
')
optional_policy(`nis',`
nis_use_ypbind($1_uml_t)
')
optional_policy(`ssh',`
ssh_tcp_connect($1_uml_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
# for X
optional_policy(`startx',`
ifelse($1, sysadm,`
',`
optional_policy(`xdm',`
allow $1_uml_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
')
allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file write;
allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
')
')
optional_policy(`uml_net.te',`
# for uml_net
domain_auto_trans($1_uml_t, uml_net_exec_t, uml_net_t)
allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
dontaudit uml_net_t privfd:fd use;
can_access_pty(uml_net_t, $1_uml)
dontaudit uml_net_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir { getattr search };
')
#TODO
optional_policy(`xauth',`
allow $1_uml_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };
')
')
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Set attributes on uml utility socket files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`uml_setattr_util_sockets',`
gen_require(`
type uml_switch_var_run_t;
')
allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:sock_file setattr;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Manage uml utility files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`uml_manage_util_files',`
gen_require(`
type uml_switch_var_run_t;
')
allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
')